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This research scrutinises the moral and political crisis of the empire caused by the 
American Revolution and indicates its impact on Anglo-American evangelicals’ 
attitudes towards slavery. Anglo-American evangelicals made a new leap forwards in 
antislavery ideology or abolitionism during the revolutionary period. For this process, 
the Revolution was of importance in three respects: it offered a set of conditions in 
which antislavery became more useful for many political and religious purposes; an 
evangelical sense of crisis was intensified in the political crisis caused by the Revolution 
and American evangelicals in particular recognised the inconsistency between their 
revolutionary ideas and the nature of slavery. In contrast to some historians’ view, the 
critical moments caused by the American Revolution only intensified the existing 
religious motivation of evangelicals which had been evident between the 1730s and the 
1760s. In this sense, the Revolution did not cause, but stimulated, the rise of an 
antislavery ideology or abolitionism. 
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 This study stems from part of the author's PhD dissertation, “The Spread and 
Transformation of Antislavery Sentiment in the Transatlantic Evangelical Network, 
1730s-1790s” (University of Warwick, 2011). 
 Seoul National University 




This essay analyses the critical situation caused by the American Revolution and 
demonstrates how it affected Anglo-American evangelicals’ attitudes towards slavery. 
As demonstrated by a number of scholars since the early 1980s, the transatlantic 
network of evangelicals, stimulated by “the Great Awakening” or the religious revival in 
the 1730s-1740s, offered a communication channel for discussions about slavery on an 
Atlantic scale, and enhanced the propagation of antislavery views.1 However, these 
religious factors were not enough to explain the rise of the abolitionist movement in 
Britain and the new United States. Discomfort does not necessarily lead to activism; 
this required a conviction to act against the institution of slavery. The development of a 
coherent ideology, and a set of conditions in which antislavery became useful for 
political purposes, were both needed to transform the sentiment into purposeful action. 
Both contemporary and modern scholars have viewed the Revolution as a catalyst for 
this transformative process.2 This essay supports this assessment of the Revolution but 
focuses more narrowly on the changes in the evangelical mindset. Firstly, the 
interrelation between the American Revolution, evangelicalism and the development of 
the antislavery movement is examined. Secondly, there is a discussion of how and why 
the Revolution affected the rise of evangelical abolitionism. 
 
 
1. The Correlation between the Revolution and Evangelical 
Abolitionism 
 
Evangelical Protestantism, the antislavery movement and revolutionary 
republicanism are important themes in late eighteenth century Britain and America. 
For a more comprehensive interpretation of the period, we need to examine the 
interrelationships between these themes. As mentioned above, it is largely 
                                                   
1  For the transatlantic evangelical network, see. [Durden] O’Brien, “A Transatlantic 
Community of Saints: The Great Awakening and the First Evangelical Network, 
1735-1755,” American Historical Review 91 (1986): 811-832; Michael R. Watts, The 
Dissenters, from the Foundation to the French Revolution (Oxford, 1978), 394-406.; Frank 
Lambert, ““Pedlar in Divinity”: George Whitefield and the Great Awakening, 1737-1745,” 
The Journal of American History 77 (1990): 812-837. 
2 Thomas Clarkson, An Essay on the Impolicy of the African Slave Trade In Two Parts 
(London: J. Phillips, 1788), p. 30; Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of 
British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: The North Carolina University Press, 2006), passim.  
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demonstrated that a transatlantic communication channel for discussions about slavery 
issue was forming through the transatlantic evangelical network throughout the 
eighteenth century.3 Thus, this essay focuses on the correlation between the Revolution 
and the abolitionist movement, and the interplay between the Revolution and 
evangelicalism. 
 
1.1. The Relationship between the Revolution and the Antislavery Cause  
 
There has been virtual agreement among scholars that the Revolution influenced the 
rise of the antislavery movement. One of the strongest indications of a correlation 
between the American Revolution and the development of evangelical antislavery 
ideology may be found in the timing of antislavery publications. It is notable that 
expressions of antislavery sentiment in print culture by Anglo-American evangelicals 
increased sharply towards 1780s, when the tension caused by the American Revolution 
also reached its peak. The close relationship between these developments is indicated 
by evidence in Charles Evans’ American Bibliography, published in 1904, an important 
source which details the titles of most books, pamphlets and periodicals published in the 
United States of America from 1639 to 1820.4 This data may be used to analyse the 
proportion of material related to pro and antislavery literature, in order to ascertain the 
link between the Revolution and attitudes to slavery.  
During that time, American printers eagerly imported and reprinted British 
publications, and American publication markets were much dependent on British 
writers. Considering this trend, data compiled from Evans’ source reflects changes in 
publications not only in the American colonies, but also to some extent in Britain. 
Furthermore, this data also shows the contribution of evangelicals to the development 
of antislavery publications. Although the religious inclination of all writers is not 
precisely identified, at least 48 percent of antislavery publications (11 out of 23) in the 
1770s and 41 percent (15 out of 36) in the 1780s were written by those who clearly 
expressed their evangelical faith. If the petitions by antislavery societies, mainly 
                                                   
3  In addition to scholars mentioned in footnote no. 2, for the interrelation between 
evangelicalism and the antislavery movement, see Young Hwi Yoon, “The Spread of 
Antislavery Sentiment through Proslavery Tracts in the Transatlantic Evangelical 
Community, 1740s-1770s,” Church History: Studies in Christianity and Culture 81 (2012). 
4  Charles Evans, American Bibliography: A Chronological Dictionary of All Books, 
Pamphlets, and Periodicals in the United States of America from the Genesis in 1639 Down 
to and Including the Year 1820 (vols. 13, Chicago: Printed for the author by the Blakely 
Press, 1904). 
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initiated by evangelicals, were added on to this figure, the proportion of evangelical 
antislavery publications would be even higher. 
From the 1730s to the 1760s, the number of slavery-related publications in each 
decade was fewer than ten. However, this figure increased to 17 in the 1760s when 
conflicts between Britain and the American colonies intensified, and doubled to 33 in 
the 1770s when the War of American Independence broke out. In the 1780s, the 
proportion of slavery-related titles continued to rise. The number of antislavery 
publication also increased dramatically towards 1790: recording a twofold increase over 
the 1760s and continuing to grow in the 1780s. (See, Figure 1)  
 
<Figure 1>  American publications related to slavery, 1731-17905 
 
 
Comparison of the total number of titles published in the period indicates that the 
rate of increase of slavery-related publications exceeds that of the total publications, 
although the quantity of publication itself was relatively small.6 For the two decades 
after 1771, there were 11,145 items published in America, which represented a 130 
                                                   
5 Data compiled from Evans, American Bibliography, vols 2-8. 
6 Data compiled from Evans, American Bibliography, vols 2-8. The publications related to 
slavery were less than 1 percent of the total. Evans’ data did not reflect how many copies of 
the slavery publications were sold but only listed the individual titles published during a 
particular period. Thus, small number of titles does not necessarily mean small sales 
volume. 
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percent increase over the total number of titles (8,571) published in the four decades 
from 1731 to 1770. In the same period, the number of titles related to slavery increased 
by 260 percent, and those about antislavery by 370 percent. The ratio of antislavery 
literature to general slavery-related publications showed rapid growth: 53 percent 
between 1731 and 1770 increasing to 73.5 percent between 1771 and 1790. Although 
Figure 1 does not reflect the entire production of American publications, it still gives an 
idea of what writers and publishers believed would appeal to their readership. It 
certainly indicates that their interests in the antislavery cause rapidly increased during 
the two decades after 1771.  
A close examination of the themes of these titles supports a connection between the 
Revolution and antislavery publications. The antislavery publications in the years 
between 1731 and 1790 may be categorised into six basic types according to their 
themes: ‘Revolution’, ‘Religion’, ‘Law’, ‘Humanity’, ‘Quaker’ and ‘Narratives’. The 
category ‘Revolution’ includes titles which viewed slavery in the context of the 
Anglo-American relationship and reflected the revolutionary context of their titles. 
‘Religion’ includes religious tract, sermons and hymns. ‘Law’ includes petitions to the 
colonial assemblies, court cases for slaves and legislation in parliament. ‘Humanity’ 
titles are relevant to the humanitarian argument. The category ‘Quaker’ has Yearly and 
Monthly Meeting reports. ‘Narratives’ includes essays and poems relevant to the 
antislavery cause. The analysis of the antislavery titles provides some idea of the 
writers’ rationale. Table 1 shows that before 1770 there were only a small number of 
antislavery publications and few expressed revolutionary ideas. However, the number of 
titles in the category ‘Revolution’, increased rapidly after 1770. In the 1770s, 48 percent 
(11 out of 23) of antislavery publications dealt with the critical situation of the 
Revolution. However, the ratio of revolutionary antislavery titles declined to 14 percent 
(5 out of 36) in the 1780s when the critical issues of the Revolution were resolved. 
Another theme, ‘Law’ also showed rapid growth: 6 percent of antislavery publications (1 
out of 16) from 1731 to 1770 increasing to 17 percent (4 out of 23) in the 1770s, and to 17 
percent (6 out 36) in the 1780s. Some of the ‘Law’ publications were also relevant to 
revolutionary ideology as they dealt with the rights of slaves as well as those of colonials. 
The rapid growth of antislavery publications relevant to the revolutionary theme in the 
1770s and 1780s suggests that the social changes caused by the American Revolution 
may be one of the key factors affecting public views on slavery. The quantitative 
information offers a comprehensive explanation of the upward trend in antislavery 
publication and its correlation with the American Revolution.  
6 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 3 (2013) 
 
<Table 1>  Themes of Antislavery Publications7 
 









1731-1740 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
1741-1750 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1751-1760 0 1 0 1 2 0 4 
1761-1770 1 2 1 1 0 5 10 
1771-1780 11 4 4 0 0 4 23 
1781-1790 5 2 6 2 3 18 36 
Total 17 11 11 4 5 27 75 
 
 
1.2. The Relationship between the Revolution and Evangelical Protestantism  
 
There also existed interplay between the religious and political movements which led 
to the rise of abolitionism. While there was a demonstrable correlation between the 
revolutionary environment and antislavery expression, religious elements were a 
crucial factor in the development of the antislavery movement. Thus, the influence of 
the American Revolution on the rise of the antislavery movement needs to be 
investigated in the context of the evangelical network.  
Many historians acknowledge the evangelical contribution to the development of 
American revolutionary ideas. For example, Perry Miller showed that a synthesis 
existed between evangelical Protestantism and republicanism, and tried to find 
revolutionary potential in the transatlantic religious revivals of the mid-eighteenth 
century. 8  Alan Heimert divided American colonials into evangelicals and 
                                                   
7 Data compiled from Evans, American Bibliography, vols 2-8..  
8 See Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War 
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anti-evangelicals according to their religious tendencies. He connected the former with 
the Revolution and counted Jonathan Edwards as a pioneer who provided patriots with 
an intellectual context; whereas anti-evangelicals he described as being resistant to the 
Revolution.9 The main premise of this historiography was that religious factors caused 
political changes. More recently, James T. Kloppenberg presented evangelicalism as a 
source of liberal ideas; he argued that liberal ideology was connected with ideas from 
Protestant traditions as well as classical republicanism in the early history of the 
United States; 10 similarly, Jon Butler deemed the Great Awakening a significant cause 
of the change in the political sphere of the early republic.11 
The difference between Perry Miller and other researchers, like Morgan and Sidney E. 
Mead, William McLoughlin and John Murrin, who attempt to downplay evangelical 
influence in their historical interpretation of the revolutionary era, is not about whether 
evangelicals influenced the Revolution but by how much. Murrin cannot but 
acknowledge that “an extraordinarily high correlation exists between New Lights and 
patriots.”12 He emphasises that the Great Awakening did not create the Revolution 
itself but also recognises that the Awakening surely contributed to the success of the 
Revolution to some extent.13 If, as these researchers argue, evangelicalism had an effect 
on the development of republicanism, to what extent and in which ways were they 
connected to each other, and how did this connection affect the rise of the abolitionist 
movement?  
Most of all, the moral discourse of leading evangelicals enhanced a link between 
evangelicalism and republicanism in the eighteenth century. In the critical moment 
caused by the Revolution, the moral authority of the imperial system was undermined; 
British restrictions on the ‘God-given rights’ of property and liberty of the American 
colonials, and British authorisation of the slave trade led many people to doubt the 
justification of the imperial policy. In the tense atmosphere caused by the Revolution, 
Americans felt it necessary to assert their moral superiority while attacking the 
immorality of their counterparts. Evangelicals’ constant emphasis on “virtue, 
                                                                                                                                                     
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), 3-95. 
9  Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind from the Great Awakening to the 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 398-400. 
10 James T. Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and 
Ethics in Early American Discourse,” Journal of American History 74 (1987): 9-33 at 9-10.  
11 Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), 195. 
12  John Murrin, “No Awakening, No Revolution? More Counterfactual Speculations,” 
Reviews in American History 11 (1983): 161-171 at 161. 
13 Murrin, “No Awakening, No Revolution?”, 169. 
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responsibility, and, especially morality” helped make that immorality of the imperial 
system stand out, and made sense of revolutionary rhetoric about corruption and the 
evil behaviour among British politicians and society.14 Here, American evangelicals 
found a space to connect their religious values with the revolutionary cause. “Liberal 
ideas could be joined with ideas,” as Kloppenberg pointed out “from the different 
traditions of Protestant Christianity and classical republicanism,” at a decisive moment, 
when “Americans were launching the Revolution.”15 During the revolutionary period, 
“a Protestant tradition rooted in the Reformation and recently renewed by the New 
Light revivalism of John Wesley, George Whitefield, and [Jonathan] Edwards who 
stressed human disability… [and] noetic deficiency” became intertwined with “the 
language of commonsense moralism.” 16  This “coming together” of religio-political 
ideologies has appeared in many studies, although some researchers considered it “an 
oddity in the eighteenth century”.17 
More importantly, in this context, the evangelical revival enhanced the compatibility 
of religious discourse with political language. The Awakening stimulated public 
religious sensitivity and also offered prominence to evangelical moral perception. In the 
words of Mark Noll, this brought “the Puritan heritage closer to the moral reasoning of 
the developing republican tradition.” 18  In the revolutionary era, evangelicals and 
patriots came to speak alike on social issues as both religious and political discourses 
became useful to each other. The patriots pamphlets spoke the language of 
republicanism “as clearly as they spoke the language of dissenting Protestantism,” and 
the evidence that “the two languages coexisted in revolutionary political discourse is 
incontrovertible.”19 Noll asserted that the exercise of evangelical virtue provided “the 
necessary foundation for a free and well-balanced society.”20 In the revolutionary years, 
“meanings from the religious sphere came to infuse the political project, or – from the 
                                                   
14 Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith, 201. 
15 Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” 9-10. 
16 New Light refers to those who supported the evangelical revival in diverse protestant 
denominations during the “Great Awakening”. Mark Noll, “The American Revolution and 
Protestant Evangelicalism,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23 (1993): 615-638 at 619. 
17 Ruth H. Bloch, Visionary Republic: Millennia1 Themes in American Thought, 1756-1800 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope of 
Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 187-222; Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith, 194-206; Kloppenberg, “The Virtues 
of Liberalism,” 9-10. Quotations are from Noll, “The American Revolution and Protestant 
Evangelicalism,” 617. 
18 Noll, “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism,” 627.  
19 Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” 20. 
20 Noll, “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism,” 631. 
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other direction – the valences of politics came to inform religious life.”21 Kloppenberg 
has argued that in the 1790s American Protestantism was able to accommodate “itself 
to a comfortable position” as guardian of new revolutionary virtues.22 As religious and 
political languages became interchangeable, the evangelical tradition was grafted into 
“a republican environment in which it continued to grow.”23  
The coming together of evangelicalism and republicanism in moral discourses was 
closely related to the development of the antislavery cause. First of all, this connection 
between religio-political ideologies was actively expressed in the form of the antislavery 
argument. As will be discussed further in a later part of this article, Anglo-American 
evangelicals took the antislavery cause as a means to strengthen their moral position in 
the revolutionary era as slavery and the slave trade were the most notable ‘evil’ in the 
Atlantic world. In this light, the conjuncture of religious and political discourses during 
this period played a significant role in making the antislavery argument more prevalent. 
Furthermore, this religio-political connection in moral discourses also opened the 
possibility of migration between evangelical abolitionism and moral discourse for 
national reformation; for leading evangelicals, the antislavery campaign, an attack on 
the most evident evil, played a substantial role in the greater project of the reformation 
of national morality. As the critical moments of the Revolution stimulated linguistic 
interchange between religious and political ideology, it also made religious language 
compatible with antislavery arguments.  
In this way, evangelicalism, the Revolution and the cause of antislavery are closely 
bound to each other. It is true that the Revolution offered a tumultuous atmosphere 
which stimulated antislavery expression. However, evangelicalism was also of 
importance; in the revolutionary era, particularly, evangelicalism extended its influence 
in the political movement for abolition, playing a significant role in the development of 
revolutionary ideology. Therefore, when the impact of the Revolution on the antislavery 
movement is analysed, the religious context should be considered together for a 





                                                   
21 Noll, “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism,” 624. 
22 Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” 25. 
23 Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism,” 12. 
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2. How and Why the Revolution Influenced the Rise of the 
Evangelical Antislavery Movement 
 
The demonstrable interplay between the American Revolution and the increased 
antislavery expression raises a further question about how the Revolution affected the 
developmental process of the abolitionist movement. For the rise of abolitionism, the 
Revolution was of importance in three respects: it offered a set of conditions in which 
antislavery became more useful for many political and religious purposes; an 
evangelical sense of crisis was intensified in the political crisis caused by the Revolution 
and American evangelicals in particular recognised the inconsistency between their 
revolutionary ideas and the nature of slavery.  
 
2.1. Antislavery Arguments and Political Expediency  
 
In the atmosphere of tension and conflict caused by the American Revolution, 
antislavery became a means to achieve multiple political ends. Here the Brown thesis is 
useful; Christopher Leslie Brown has claimed that the disruption and conflict caused by 
the Revolution undermined the moral authority of the British Empire and formed the 
atmosphere in which opponents of slavery, the most noticeable ‘vice’, could gain moral 
prestige; thus, the “antislavery argument became more useful during the era of the 
American Revolution and, thereafter.” 24  Here, Brown attempted to transcend the 
dichotomy between ideals and interests in the analysis of abolitionists’ motivation using 
the social science concept, “moral capital” or “moral prestige”.25 It means that a moral 
distinction can become a source of power in the world in the way that it facilitates and 
legitimises action; people who develop these forms of capital “possess investable 
resources capable of providing tangible returns.”26 Moral capital can serve a variety of 
purposes: cultural, intellectual, social, emotional or interpersonal. Contemporaneously, 
moral ideology and political interests are not inevitably opposed to each other. In this 
view, political cause can be a means to fulfil the moral cause and vice-versa. Brown 
presented the revolutionary environment as a crucial context which opened a door for 
abolitionists to gain this ‘moral capital’, campaigning with religious and moral purpose, 
                                                   
24 Brown, Moral Capital, 458. 
25 Brown, Moral Capital, 457-459. Political scientist John Kane defined, ‘moral capital’ as 
“moral prestige – whether of an individual, organisation or cause – in useful service.” John 
Kane, The Politics of Moral Capital (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7. 
26 Kane, The Politics of Moral Capita , 7. 
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as well as for political objectives. For example, Quakers were able to enhance their 
social prestige whilst expelling slaveholding members from their religious community. 
William Wilberforce also earned moral capital through his antislavery cause, and used 
it to promote Christianity. Following this, the defenders as well as critics of imperial 
policies were also able to use antislavery arguments as a means to an end during the 
years of political crisis caused by the Revolution. This section analyses this process 
focusing on the political rhetoric of specific evangelicals: John Wesley, James Ramsay 
and Granville Sharp.  
For evangelicals like John Wesley, who had negative views of the Revolution, 
antislavery provided a means to intensify his arguments. Wesley emphasised the 
seemingly revolutionary ideas of liberty and equality in his tracts, but grounded them in 
the English legal tradition. Central to his Some Observations on Liberty published in 
1776 was the condemnation of American Patriots. Wesley acknowledged that “to Liberty, 
[Americans] have an undoubted right” and to enjoy their liberty “in as full a manner as I 
do; or any reasonable man can desire.”27 However, Wesley thought that colonials 
already enjoyed that liberty, guaranteed by the English constitution.28 Moreover, he 
distinguished liberty from independence; independence was nothing more than an 
excuse “no longer to own the English Supremacy.”29 Wesley justified the power of 
Parliament “to make statues, to bind the Colonies in all cases whatever,” as it had 
power “to make statues, which bind Englishmen likewise.”30 For his political argument, 
Wesley actively used the antislavery cause to highlight Americans’ moral inferiority. 
While Americans claimed that “the Parliament has already deprived them of one great 
branch of liberty,” by taxing without their consent, Wesley pointed out that they did not 
realise their own abuse of liberty.31 He posited that slaveholding itself rebutted the 
revolutionaries’ arguments. While Americans complained that they are “bound by a law, 
to which [they] do not consent,” it was slaves who remained in such state. After defining 
slavery as a state, “wherein neither a man’s goods, nor liberty, nor life, are at his own 
disposal,” he refuted American slavery rhetoric for patriot cause. Wesley asked, “are 
their masters… in just the same slavery with the negroes… Does any one beat or 
imprison [these masters] at pleasure? Or take away their wives, or children, or lives? ... 
                                                   
27 John Wesley, Some Observations on Liberty: Occasioned by A Late Tract By John Wesley, 
M. A. (London: Printed by R. Hawes, 1776), 3-4. 
28 Wesley, Some Observations on Liberty, 4-5.  
29 Wesley, Some Observations on Liberty, 3, 5. 
30 Wesley, Some Observations on Liberty, 25. 
31 Wesley, Some Observations on Liberty, 5-6. 
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This is slavery: and will you face us down, that the Americans are in such slavery as 
this?”32 As long as Americans were closing their ears to men “chained to the oar”, 
portraying themselves as under the yoke of Parliament did not make sense.33 Wesley 
did not only oppose slavery in America in this tract but also criticise American 
Independence and for this end, he exemplified the exploitation of the antislavery cause 
as a rhetorical weapon against revolutionary ideology.  
The antislavery cause could also serve as an argument for a middle ground between 
the continuation of the imperial system and American Independence. The British 
evangelical writer, James Ramsay, like many other British evangelicals, was angered by 
the audacity of the North American rebels.34 However, unlike Wesley, he recognised the 
right of the American colonies to claim independence and declared, “North America is 
now separated for ever from the British state” and the British now “have no tie over 
them but conveniency.”35 Accepting American independence as fact, Ramsay would 
rather focus on how to strengthen an imperial policy relationship in the new 
circumstance after American Independence. For Ramsay, antislavery became an 
important means of establishing a new international relationship as well as promoting 
imperial commercial growth. He asserted that Britain would be “free to settle [its] trade, 
and accommodate [the British] in the manner that will best suit [their] purpose, 
without taking into account how it may probably affect them,” through the abolition of 
the slave trade.36 He claimed that the slave trade was harmful for the British imperial 
economy: British traders were still providing thousands of slaves to foreign merchants 
in the West African coast, contributing to their rivals continued naval importance.37 
Ramsay asserted that Britain should turn to Africa where it might enjoy extensive and 
free trade rather than attempting rapprochement with the North American colonies. “In 
the civilization of Africa,” he claimed, “we have a certain remedy” against the danger 
caused by the loss of North America.38 While criticising the slave trade, Ramsay was 
able to present an ideal commercial relationship for Britain, which would be, in the long 
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run, the best way of responding to American independence.39 
Antislavery arguments provided critics of the Empire, who were well disposed to 
American Independence, with a means to fortify their political stance. Granville Sharp 
was one who perceived the necessity of the reformation of the imperial system; he was 
also one of a few Britons who supported colonial autonomy and defended colonial rights. 
Unlike Wesley, Sharp believed that parliamentary supremacy over American affairs 
was against the spirit of English law. He thought that “British subjects, in general are 
commonly supposed to inherit” natural freedom and the “inestimable benefits of that 
happy legal Constitution,” by birthright. 40  Colonial resistance to the British 
government was justifiable, as their “most essential” rights of “the free Representation 
of the people in the legislature”, accorded by the English constitution, had been 
violated.41 Antislavery became an important means to maintain “excellent equilibrium 
of power, or mixt government, limited by law,” and to protect the “best Birthright and 
Inheritance” of people in the British Atlantic world.42 Sharp presented the British slave 
trade as an emblem of the “most abominable Tyranny,” and associated the fight against 
slavery with challenging the deterioration of the English constitution.43 He considered 
American slavery as a British institution because acts of the colonial assemblies to 
ameliorate slavery were “absolutely rejected,” by the British parliament and the King.44 
Highlighting “the African Slave Trade encouraged in GREAT BRITAIN,” and the 
“toleration of Slavery in THE BRITISH COLONIES,” he was able to undermine the 
moral authority of the imperial polity; the slave trade was “the HUMAN SACRIFICES 
offered up to MAMMON by the BRITISH NATION”.45 Sharp was able to strengthen his 
critical views of imperial policy with the antislavery cause and furthermore, also offer a 
strong argument which the American patriots could use for the justification of 
independence.  
Antislavery was further conducive to consolidating the revolutionary legacy in 
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post-revolutionary America. On the opposite side of the Atlantic, Morgan John Rhees, a 
Baptist minister in West Pennsylvania, lamented that Americans were distant from the 
revolutionary rationale after the political and military crisis caused by the Revolution 
was dissolved and he thought that in America, “gross darkness” was covering the land, 
and “strange infatuation possess the people.”46 Rhees thought that the revolutionary 
ideals were already threatened and to resist this trend he started attacking slavery. In 
his view, the institution deprived men of their natural rights and was contrary to what 
Americans pursued though the Revolution. That Americans should “with one hand sign 
a bill of rights declaring all men equally free, and yet with the other hand brandish a 
whip over their affrighted slaves” was a great contradiction.47 Thus, he presented 
slavery as the antithesis of liberty – one of the key revolutionary ideas – and attempted 
to raise moral capital for the revolutionary rationale through attacking the 
counter-revolutionary features of slavery. In his view, planters’ mistreatment of slaves 
meant the neglect of a “duty of citizenship” which did not comply with the revolutionary 
ideology in the new republic.48 In Letters on Liberty and Slavery, slaveholders’ rejection 
of Christian instruction to slaves was depicted as opposition to a “law of liberty.”49 
These ideas were widely shared by many other evangelicals such as Benjamin Rush and 
Samuel Davies. For many evangelical abolitionists in America, the condemnation of 
slavery was the best route to attack anti-revolutionary practice in the early United 
States.  
During the revolutionary era, antislavery came to serve a range of political purposes. 
As shown above, evangelical abolitionists were able to strengthen their views of what 
was politically right by asserting their moral superiority and blaming the immorality of 
their counterparts through attacks on the institution of slavery. This indicates that the 
American Revolution produced an environment in which “opposition to slavery could 
seem worthy of praise.”50 The political utility of attacks on slavery for critics of imperial 
policy as well as its defenders gave the antislavery cause a political importance which it 
had not had before, and was therefore conducive to forming an antislavery ideology that 
the institution should be abolished.  
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2.2. A Sense of Crisis  
 
The sense of crisis engendered by the Revolution also affected the rise of the 
evangelical abolitionist movement. National events in the 1770s and the 1780s, such as 
the American War of Independence and the dissolution of the British Empire in North 
America, caused this unease and intensified a fear of impending judgement in the 
evangelical network. This fear, compounded by the antislavery elements in 
evangelicalism, made people connect the ‘iniquity’ of slavery to wars, inflation and 
epidemics during the revolutionary years. Many British evangelicals thought national 
sin brought God’s judgement, and this had led to a crisis in the empire. Americans 
shared this apocalyptic sense of crisis as well, especially due to the potential threat from 
British invasion and economic and political instability in the newly-born nation. In this 
critical moment, many evangelicals on both sides of the Atlantic thought that their ‘sins’ 
contributed to the considerable social upheaval caused by the Revolution. 
During the revolutionary period, many evangelicals were aware of crisis on the level 
of personal faith as well as on a national scale. First, they articulated their personal 
crisis of faith that had been ignored for a long time. Many evangelicals perceived that 
the institution of slavery undermined the foundation of their religious faith. For 
example, Samuel Hopkins, a late eighteenth century theologian in New England, 
highlighted that slavery seemed to weaken an essential principle of evangelicalism, 
benevolence, and warned of the disastrous consequence which American ignorance of 
this sin would bring about. He followed Jonathan Edwards’ concept of ‘disinterested 
general benevolence’, positing this kind of love as the most cordial friendship applied to 
all fellow creatures. 51  Hopkins claimed that disinterested benevolence asked for 
unselfish goodness not just to “mankind in general” but to those who needed this love 
most and in his view, the most persecuted group was the enslaved Africans. 52 
Americans ignored that their practices effectually prevented “the introduction of the 
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gospel” to slaves and “directly” counteracted Christ’s command of benevolence.53 In his 
discourse, the personal crisis in faith was closely linked to the national crisis. Hopkins 
clearly outlined “a future judgement” to come, which the continued violation of key 
principles of their religion would bring to the nation.54   
In line with this, the revolutionary evangelicals also felt the sense of crisis on a 
national level. They found their ‘concept of covenant’ weakened whilst they permitted 
the slave trade. In the colonial era, for example, many Americans, like their Puritans 
ancestors who had emigrated to New England, believed that divine providence was 
peculiarly American and that they were “God’s professing people”.55 This ‘special’ 
relationship with God was not unconditional, only persisting as long as they followed 
teachings in the Scriptures. As Lovejoy pointed out, Americans believed that “owing to 
this privileged arrangement, more was expected of man in America than elsewhere.”56 
When Americans ignored scriptural teachings they would be punished “in order that the 
covenant be renewed.”57 American evangelicals became conscious that the continuation 
of slavery in post-revolutionary America undermined their evangelical identity as 
“God’s elect”. Slaveholding meant a rejection of “a particular Providence” upon 
Americans to “set [slaves] free,” when they obtained their own liberty.58 Referring to the 
turmoil witnessed in the early Republic such as insurrection, the destruction of cities 
and reduced commerce, Rhees, an American evangelical, an American evangelical, 
strongly asserted that the slave trade caused “the calamities that came on God’s 
professing people of old.”59  
This sense of crisis on a national and personal scale was connected to a fear of 
impending divine judgement. Terms like “retribution”, “judgment” and “punishment” 
were more intensely and repeatedly employed in evangelical antislavery tracts during 
this period than in the mid-eighteenth century. American evangelicals embraced this 
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opinion. Benjamin Rush urged the colonials to remember that “national crimes require 
national punishments” referring to God’s “Rod” as shown in the British repressive 
measures such as collecting tax through the Stamp and Revenue Acts.60 “Without 
declaring what punishment awaits this evil,” he warned his American contemporaries, 
“you may venture to assure them, that it cannot pass with impunity, unless God shall 
cease to be just or merciful.”61 Samuel Hopkins also insisted that “the hand of God very 
visibly stretched out against us” and “the calamities… introduced, as a judgment which 
God has brought upon us for enslaving the Africans.” 62  “Unless this practice be 
reformed,” he warned, “greater judgments” would be brought out.63  
The fear of the impending judgement also played a role as a constant motivation for 
British abolitionists. Granville Sharp thought that nations which deprived natural 
liberty from people in the slave trade, would likewise forfeit their own, and sit “under 
the IRON YOKES of unnatural, arbitrary Government”, such that the deplorable state 
of national misery would never diminish until “by… public Contempt of God’s eternal 
Laws, they had rendered a national RETRIBUTION.”64 Sharp informed his British 
audience that “we are absolutely in danger of THE LIKE JUDGEMENTS, if we do not 
immediately put a stop to all similar Oppression by National Authority.”65 “Therefore 
Now,” he urged the British, “amend your ways and your doings, and obey the Voice of 
the Lord your God.” The immediate abolition of the slave trade was the only way to 
avoid the impending vengeance and to expect “the Assurance of Peace.”66 This fear of 
national punishment was repeated in the late eighteenth century evangelical discourse.  
British evangelicals aggressively employed this rhetoric of crisis in their Parliamentary 
campaign in the late eighteenth century. For example, Wilberforce topped his speech in 
the parliamentary debate on abolition with an appeal to the fear of the divine 
judgement. He fully perceived the “present circumstances of his country,” which he 
argued “to be contrary to the rights of human nature, and the laws of God.” He invoked 
                                                   
60 Benjamin Rush, An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America, 
upon Slave-Keeping (Philadelphia: Printed by John Dunlap 1773), 30. 
61 Rush, An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America, 30. 
62 Samuel Hopkins, “Essay on the African Slave Trade,” The Providence Gazette and 
Country Journal, Oct. 6 and 13, 1787, reprinted as “The Slave Trade and Slavery” in 
Hopkins, Timely Articles on Slavery (Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 1854), 
619-20; Hopkins, A Dialogue Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, 51. 
63 Hopkins, A Dialogue Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, 51; Hopkins, A Discourse 
upon the Slave-Trade, 14. 
64 Sharp, The Law of Retribution, 67-68.  
65 Sharp, The Law of Retribution, 7. 
66 Sharp, The Law of Retribution, 76. 
18 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 3 (2013) 
 
the House, “in an exigency like the present, not to insult the forbearance of Heaven, and 
practically disclaim every hope of the divine favour,” by the support of the slavery 
system.67  He defined the slave trade as “a national crime” and asserted that “a 
continued course of wickedness, oppression, and cruelty… must infallibly bring down 
upon us the heaviest judgment of the Almighty.”68 In a crucial parliamentary debate in 
the post-revolutionary era, Charles Stanhope, Lord Mahon urged MPs to take 
immediate action to avoid the impending judgement; “if we continue in so flagrant a 
manner to violate [God’s] laws,” he asked, “what right we can venture to expect the 
protection and support of the Almighty”. Thus, he appealed; “Let us wash our hands 
clean of this foul pollution, let us act upon the principles of equal and impartial justice, 
and we may then, look… to the protection and support of that Supreme Disposer of 
events.”69 
The sense that the nation was facing God’s wrath, and thus had to repent, motivated 
evangelicals’ practical action to avoid this ‘judgement’. This marked a difference from 
the antislavery expression of the pre-revolutionary era. Two things need to be 
considered. Firstly, a number of Anglo-American evangelicals did believe that national 
crimes of the slave trade brought about national punishment and also were convinced 
that their religious appeal would stir public action. Otherwise, there was no particular 
reason for abolitionists to spend so much time and energy on ineffectual discourse.70 
Secondly, a crisis in the empire caused by the Revolution was of importance in this 
process. Although the Revolution itself did not cause the antislavery movement, this 
created the circumstances in which a sense of national crisis would be increased, and 
this contributed to the rise of the abolitionism on both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
2.3. Inconsistency between Slaveholding and the Revolutionary Rationale 
 
While the Revolution had an indirect influence upon the rise of the antislavery 
movement enhancing the sense of crisis, being intertwined with a fear of divine 
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judgement, the very nature of the revolutionary war meant that evangelicals who 
supported American independence perceived more vividly the contradiction between 
their rationale for war, and slaveholding practices. Although a large number of 
Americans gained economic benefits from the plantation system it was hard to ignore 
the fact that Africans in America had the same right as long as they considered the 
right to liberty as natural and inalienable. The fundamental inconsistency between 
Americans’ claim to rights and retaining the institution of slavery stimulated 
evangelical antislavery discourse. Central to Samuel Hopkins’ work, A Dialogue 
Concerning the Slavery of the Africans, was his elaboration of the inconsistency 
between slavery and the spirit of the Revolution. In his dedication in this publication to 
the Continental Congress, Hopkins argued that holding Africans who had “an equal 
right to freedom with ourselves” in slavery was untenable, “while we are maintaining 
this struggle for our own and our children’s liberty.”71 He considered that if they refused 
African slaves’ humanity, and right to liberty, while they pursued liberation from the 
tyranny of King and Parliament, it would be a denial of the revolutionary ideology.72 
Similar lamentations about the contradiction between American actions and words 
were found in other literature. The persistence of slavery discredited evangelical 
patriots’ claims to liberty. David Rice, a renowned American Presbyterian minister, 
deemed slavery “a standing monument of the tyranny” and “inconsistency of human 
governments,” which American patriots had pursued through the Revolution.73 In his 
view, Africans in America were declared “to be nature free,” and entitled “to the 
privilege of acquiring and enjoying property,” by “the united voice of America” through 
the Revolution.74 Rice criticised several states, which retained slavery on the grounds 
that they were defending principles, “which they are actually and avowedly destroying,” 
during the revolutionary war. Thus, he urged slaveholding Americans, to be consistent 
with their avowed revolutionary principles.75  
While American colonials kept holding Africans as their slaves, the revolutionary 
rhetoric only highlighted the colonials’ hypocrisy. During the 1760s and 1770s, one of 
the favoured rhetorical devices for the revolutionary cause was the allegory of slavery 
equating British imperialism with enslavement. For example, an address by an 
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anonymous person in New York contrasted, “union, activity and freedom” with “division, 
supineness and slavery.”76 Robert Bell entitled his address to citizens of Pennsylvania 
for American Independence, as Sentiments of What is Freedom, and What is Slavery.77 
Slavery was a presence in everyday life throughout the colonies, so it was natural for 
writers to use it as an example. However, antislavery evangelicals found contradiction 
within these words. Rice blamed Americans for “using one measure for themselves, and 
another for their [slave] neighbours.” 78  While the American patriot leaders had 
appointed “days for humiliation, and offering up of prayer” to ask God’s favour for their 
liberty, Cooper pointed out, “the poor Africans are continued in chains of slavery as 
creatures unworthy of notice in those high concerns, and left subject to laws disgraceful 
to humanity.”79 In this situation, an ‘allegory of slavery’ simply held Americans up to 
mockery. “In order to gain credit abroad, and confidence at home and to give proper 
energy to government,” Rice asserted, Americans should be “sensible of the evil of 
[their] conduct.”80 Many colonial evangelicals naturally came to think that they should 
take action to abolish slavery in the same way as they sought protection for their own 
liberty. This is one answer as to how national events during the revolutionary period 
contributed to the rise of political activism for abolition.  
In this way, the American Revolution evidently stimulated changes in evangelical 
attitudes towards slavery; antislavery became useful to achieve multiple political ends 
during this period; the sense of crisis caused by the Revolution played a role as a 
motivation for evangelical abolitionists; the nature of the revolution made evangelicals 
found the inconsistency between their rationale for war and slaveholding practices. 
Anglo-American evangelical attitudes were not unanimously antislavery in this period: 
a large number of proslavery tracts were still published and substantial numbers of 
evangelicals were holding slaves on their plantations. However, as for evangelicals who 
had antipathy towards slavery, views towards slavery during the revolutionary period 
changed through this process from unease with the institution to a firm conviction that 
it should be abolished.  
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As has been demonstrated, the American Revolution affected the development of 
antislavery ideology in the evangelical network, and acted as a stimulus that changed 
the nature of evangelical antislavery. Focusing on evangelical abolitionism is a useful 
way of understanding the impact of the Revolution on the transatlantic evangelical 
community. Much evidence supports a correlation between the intensity of the imperial 
crisis and the increase in antislavery publications. The question is why the Revolution 
changed evangelical attitudes towards slavery. Brown offers a persuasive argument 
that many Americans and Britons found a useful way to enhance their political and 
moral stance using antislavery during the years of crisis caused by the Revolution. In 
fact the situation in evangelical communities was more complex: through political 
events in the revolutionary era, evangelicals’ diverse views on slavery became more 
complicated, being intertwined with their opinions on the imperial system. In this sense, 
Brown’s views of Anglo-American attitudes towards slavery do not convey the whole 
story.  
In contrast to some historians’ view, what made religious people take action was the 
sense of crisis caused by the Revolution, rather than the critical situation of the 
Revolution itself. The sense that “the national sin brought the national punishment” led 
a greater number of evangelicals into political action targeting the abolition of slavery. 
The critical moments caused by the Revolution intensified the existing religious 
motivation of evangelicals which had been evident between the 1730s and the 1760s. 
When Anglo-American evangelicals reached the conclusion that they were facing 
impending divine judgement due to slavery, the natural choice was to take political 
action to remove that “national sin”. This reflects that evangelical antislavery 
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The period of 1972-74 saw a large-scale resettlement in Britain of the Asian 
population expelled from Uganda. Some literatures suggest that these people were 
accepted virtually as ‘refugees’, although their citizenship status was ‘British’ (Citizens 
of the United Kingdom and Colonies) and therefore technically they could not be 
regarded as refugees. Considering the facts that they were forcedly expelled from 
Uganda in a short period of three months and many of them arrived in Britain literally 
penniless as they were not allowed to take their properties out of Uganda, they were 
entitled to be assisted as ‘refugees’ once they were in Britain. However, while their 
admittance was justified as humanitarian acceptance of the unfortunate refugees when 
the British Government tried to persuade the indigenous population to tolerate another 
wave of immigrants, the public support afforded to the Asians after they were admitted 
was restricted by the governmental stance that preferential treatment for the Asians 
would allegedly perpetuate their presence in British society and ‘harm race relations’. 
Consequently, their resettlement had to be supported by generous help from voluntary 
organisations, and their own self-help. After all, these Asian expellees were welcomed 
reluctantly, and treated as “un-belongers” to post-imperial Britain. 
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This article will focus on the resettlement of the so-called ‘Uganda Asians’ in the early 
1970s. Through the two decades from the early 1950s, Britain had become a more 
‘multi-ethnic’ or ‘multi-racial’ state as a result of waves of immigration from the former 
colonial territories, mainly the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent1. Being visibly 
distinct–mainly because of the colour of their skin—the incoming of these so-called 
‘Commonwealth’ immigrants into the metropolis had underlined the unfamiliarity of 
these ‘fellow’ British subjects. Such unfamiliarity led to a widespread surge in 
anti-immigration feelings, which urged the Conservative Government to adopt 
restriction measures by 1962. Thus the abolishment of the ‘open door policy’ decreased 
the flow of the British subjects into their ‘mother country’, and the succeeding 
Governments, both Conservative and Labour, continued to adopt legal measures to shut 
the door more firmly against former colonial subjects. This, however, did little to resolve 
the complex situation surrounding immigration and citizenship in post-war Britain, and 
only highlighted inconsistencies present in the blurred, situational boundary making of 
the imperial British community had long involved2. 
Against the background of this racialization of British immigration policies, the 
admittance and resettlement of the Ugandan Asians shows how these complexities 
affect the experiences of a particular group of people uprooted from their ‘homeland’ and 
trying to find a new ‘home’ in a country whose citizenship status they retained for 
security in post-colonial Africa. It shows that the boundary between ‘belongers’ / 
‘non-belongers’—in other words, those who were thought to belong to the post-imperial 
British national community and those who were not—was constantly redrawn even 
through the sympathetic process of accepting unfortunate expellees. 
A number of literatures have dealt with this unprecedented influx of large number of 
‘refugees’ in such a short period of time. Many of them were written not so long after the 
incident, and well before the public documents concerning the relevant government 
                                                   
1 See, for example, Panikos Panayi, An Immigration History in Britain: Multicultural 
Racism since 1800 (Harlow 2010), for one of the most recent and most comprehensive 
overviews of this tremendous societal change. Recent historical research of immigration 
such as Panayi’s, however, often tries to emphasise the continuity beyond 1945, thus 
invalidating the influential view that Britain was suddenly ‘transformed’ into a 
multicultural society with the post war influx of ‘Black and Asian’ immigrants. 
2 There are a number of works on British immigration policies, two of the most recent and 
influential of which were Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War 
Britain, Oxford 2000 and Katherine Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in 
the Post-war Era, Ithaca 1997. 




policy were opened under the thirty years rule3. These articles and books include a lot of 
useful first- or second-hand information about how the Asians were treated at the time, 
although they were not always situated in a broader framework of immigrants / 
refugees integration in Britain. On the other hand, other literatures written in the 
proceeding decades4 have introduced intriguing perspectives on this peculiar ‘refugee 
resettlement’. However, these works have often focused on the resettlements in some 
particular local contexts5, therefore a close examination of the central government 
materials was not always well incorporated into their arguments. When extensively 
examined, these materials can provide a deeper understanding of the inherent 
complexity of the operation. 
In this article, the focus will be on how the British Government’s ‘reluctance’ affected 
this resettlement process: the Government, while persuading the indigenous population 
to tolerate another influx of ‘coloured’ immigrants based on their ‘unfortunate refugee’ 
rhetoric, had a strong commitment to the view that these Asians should not receive 
preferential treatment in Britain for the sake of ‘good race relations’. The governmental 
documents (mainly the Home Office papers concerning the resettlement managed by 
the Ugandan Resettlement Board) will be analysed, with the particular focus on how 






In the Uganda Asian Crisis, which was triggered by the expulsion order of the 
Ugandan dictator Idi Amin on 5 August 1972, British passport holders (United 
Kingdom Passport Holders, hereafter UKPH) of Asian origin living in Uganda were told 
to leave the country within 90 days. At that time it was estimated that there were 
                                                   
3 Derek Humphrey and Michael Ward, Passport and Politics, Harmondsworth 1974, and 
William G. Kuepper, et.al., Ugandan Asians in Great Britain, London 1975. 
4  Valerie Marett, Immigrants Settling is the City, Leicester 1989, Tony Kushner and 
Katherine Knox, Refugees in the Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives 
During the Twentieth Century, London 1999 and Emma Robertson, ‘Green for Come: 
Moving to York as a Ugandan Asian Refugee’ in Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdec, Refugee 
and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century, 
Basingstoke 2011. 
5 Marett focuses on the resettlement in Leicester, Kushner and Knox on the case in 
Hampshire, and Robertson on the case in York, although each has evaluated the central 
government’s and the URB’s operation to a certain extent. 
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50,000-60,000 residents of Asian origin living in the country, and about half of them 
were believed to hold British citizenship status. They were a linguistically and 
religiously heterogeneous group of people; most of them were offspring of those who 
migrated from the Indian subcontinent before and under British colonial rule, and 
substantial percentages of them had already lived in Uganda for more than a few 
decades. In the colonial society, they were granted ‘middle-person’ status between the 
small minority of the ruling Europeans and the majority of the indigenous Africans. As 
a result, a substantial part of the Asians were professional middle class, although still 
heterogeneous in social positions and education levels6. 
The origin of their British citizenship can be traced back to Uganda’s former British 
Protectorate status. In the 1960s when East African countries such as Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania became independent, the British Government offered these Asians the 
option of maintaining their status as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies 
(hereafter CUKC). Many of the Asians in Uganda retained this status as CUKC mainly 
because of concerns over their insecure position in a newly independent African 
majority-rule state. They were, rather accidentally, exempted from restriction posed by 
the 1962 Act, due to the facts that they were eligible for passports issued by the British 
High Commission in Kampala after independence and that the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act used the passport-issuing authority as a tool for restricting immigrants 
from former colonies,7. 
It was the influx of Kenyan Asians in the late 1960s that caused social and political 
hysteria in Britain, which led to the enactment of the new Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act in 1968 by the then Labour Government. The Kenyan Government’s ‘Africanisation 
policies’, that is, policies adopted to restrict Asian non-citizens’ social and political rights, 
urged the Asian CUKC to flee from East Africa, often exercising their rights to enter 
Britain. Under the 1968 Act, even British citizens (CUKC) holding passports issued by 
the British Government came under immigration control unless they had direct 
connection with Britain through immediate ancestry. It means that most of the UKPH 
in East Africa lost their unconditional legal rights of entry into Britain, even when their 
only passports were British. Their arrivals were ‘phased out’ by special entry vouchers, 
which were subject to an annual quota, thus rendering the Asian CUKC the 
                                                   
6 Douglas Tilbe, The Uganda Asian Crisis, London 1972.  
7  Randall Hansen, ‘The Kenyan Asians, British Politics and the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act, 1968’, The Historical Journal, 42, 3, 1999, 809-834.  




second-class citizens with ‘devalued’ passports8.  
In Uganda, like in Kenya, a similar kind of sparks were ready to burst into flame 
anytime: anti-Asian legislations started to restrict the Asian non-citizens’ rights to live 
and work in Ugandan society in the late 1960s, and after Amin seized power in a 
military coup in 1971, he often exploited persecution of minority population like the 
Jewish and the Asians to boost his popularity and accordingly the ethnic tensions were 
building up. The Asian queue for entry vouchers into Britain was getting longer and 
longer, and at the time of the expulsion order in August 1972, some 3000 heads of 
families were waiting in line. 
Therefore, although the Amin’s expulsion order was absolutely shocking to the world, 
and this was especially the case for the UK government which was named to assume the 
responsibility for the Asians with British passports, it was not a totally unimaginable 
situation; at least the Home Office officials were always mindful of this potential 
development, but had hoped that they would have been given a greater notice. They 
were also aware that when this situation did occur, Britain would have to be somehow 
responsible for those with British citizenship9. After a short attempt to alter Amin’s 
mind by posing economic sanctions, Britain made clear–or had to make clear—that it 
would accept the Asians holding British passports. Soon after this, the British 
Government set up the Uganda Resettlement Board (hereafter URB) as a body that 
would coordinate the resettlement process. At the same time, trying to disperse the 
Asian ‘burden’ internationally, the UK Government approached the governments of 
some 50 countries—including the Commonwealth countries they expected to be more 
amenable than others—to persuade them to accept some of the Asians. 
In the end, during the three months up to early November, Britain accepted more 
than 27,000 Asians from Uganda. The Heath Government’s determination to accept the 
responsibility was certainly praiseworthy, particularly considering the presence of 
political campaigning mounted by the anti-immigration political circle, and most 
notably by the anti-immigration hero, Enoch Powell10. Moreover, the public feeling was 
also apparently against another influx of ‘coloured’ immigrants; an opinion poll in 
August 1972 shows only six per cent of the respondents thought Britain should accept 
                                                   
8 Mariyam Harris, The ‘D’-valued Passport, London 1971.  
9 The acceptance of the Asian UKPH was guaranteed during the debate over the 1968 bill by 
the then Home Secretary James Callaghan. 
10 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, ‘Race’ and ‘Race’ Relations 
in Post-War Britain, Oxford 1992, 85-7. 
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all the UKPH from Uganda straight away11. 
Although their acceptance was laudable act of admitting responsibility for these 
unfortunate people, the airlift of the Asians was delayed (or more precisely, its swift 
execution was intentionally avoided)12. It was a politically expedient action, because the 
majority of the British nation was not happy to accept them immediately and the 
Government was most concerned with the domestic public opinion13 . Their acute 
concerns about a possible Asian ‘panic’ also led them to pursue the policy of the 
international dispersal of the Asians to lighten the burden. 
This ‘foot-dragging’ consequently placed the British Government in a better position 
to accept this unprecedented influx of people coming to Britain in such a short period. 
Britain succeeded in persuading other countries like Canada and India to ‘share the 
burden’, and consequently the British burden to bear was significantly lightened14. It 
also allowed enough time for the Government and the institutions involved in the 
resettlement (such as the URB) to prepare for the influx of Asians. Above all, this was 
also fortunate for the Government because the public opinion became increasingly 
sympathetic to the Asians, thus the resettlement of the Asians became less 
unacceptable, partly due to the media representation of the Asians as the ‘unfortunate 
refugees’. The media represented the Asians as pitiable victims of Amin’s violent 
racialist expulsion and also as a middle-class, well-educated professionals who could 
speak fluent English and therefore would be easy to absorb into British society. The 
opinion poll figures showed that the percentages of respondents who disapproved the 
government’s handling of the issue had steadily declined by mid-September 1972. 
It cannot be denied, however, that there were imminent dangers for the Asians: 
ill-disciplined Ugandan soldiers of the Amin regime would anytime threaten (and were 
actually threatening) their security and property15. Merely acknowledging the danger 
                                                   
11 David Kohler, ‘Public Opinion and the Ugandan Asians’, New Community, 2, 1973, 194-7. 
12 My preceding article closely examined the political and media discourse surrounding the 
acceptance of the Asians in the crucial three months from the Amin’s expulsion order to the 
November deadline. The following arguments in the background section are based on my 
arguments in ‘“Imperial Burden’ or “Jews of Africa?’: An Analysis of Political and Media 
Discourse in the Uganda Asian Crisis (1972)’, Twentieth Century British History, 22-3, 
2011, 415-436.  
13 The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter TNA), CAB 130/614, Cabinet 
Ministers’ Meeting, UKPHs in Uganda. 
14 Canada was quickest to respond to British call for help, and other countries such as the 
US, New Zealand, and Sweden started to follow suits in early September. It was most 
fortunate for Britain that by mid-September, India agreed to accept up to 15,000 on a 
temporary basis after long diplomatic negotiations. 
15 Bert N. Adams and Mike Bristow, ‘Ugandan Asian Expulsion Experiences: Rumour and 




did not, however, urge the British Government to accelerate the procedure of the Asian 
airlift. They finally decided to speed up their document issuing procedure at the British 
High Commission in Kampala, when they became acutely worried that their slow 
documentary clearance might give the impression to the international community that 
they were dragging their feet16.  
The Government was fully aware of the fact that these Asians were not technically 
‘refugees’ because according to the definition by the 1951 UN Convention, refugees are 
people who seek asylum outside of their country of nationality. The Government officials, 
however, approved this media labelling and the public perception of the Asians as 
‘refugees’ because they believed that it would be beneficial for them, putting the 
Government in a better position to persuade the public to accept the Asians17. At one 
cabinet meeting it was noted ‘the public now seemed disposed to accept the Asian 
UKPH as genuine refugees’18.  
This ‘refugee’ representation and humanitarian discourse obscured the British 
Government’s legal and political responsibility toward the Asian UKPH and could have 
potentially undermined the logical ground for the British Government’s rejecting 
non-UKPH such as stateless Asians who should have been accepted on a humanitarian 
basis. Most of them were former CUKC who were denied their Ugandan citizenship. 
The British Government insisted that their responsibility was exclusively for the 
British Citizens, and refused entry of so-called stateless Asians even when they knew 
this would result in family separation. This issue was to haunt the later resettlement 
and become known as the ‘headless family’ issue. 
In the official discourse, the term(s) ‘belongers’ (and ’non-belongers’ though less 
frequently) was used to differentiate between CUKC who have ancestral connections 
with Britain (the white British residents in Uganda), and those who do not (the Asian 
CUKC). These two groups were treated separately, and the ‘belongers’ were given more 
serious consideration concerning their security19. The ‘belongers’ were also invisible in 
their admittance and resettlement. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Reality’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 14, 1979, 191–203. 
16 TNA CAB 134/3523, The Minutes and Memoranda of Emergency Sub-committee. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum 72(9), 14 September. 
17 TNA FCO 31/1380, Expulsion of holders of British passports of Asian origin from Uganda. 
A Letter from T. Fitzgerald of the Home Office to C. P. Scott in the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office on 17 August 1972. 
18 The emphasis was added by the author. TNA CAB/128/50/43, The Cabinet Meeting 
Minutes, 21 September 1972. 
19 TNA, CAB 130/614, UKPHs in Uganda: Meeting Minutes, Contingency Planning for 
the Evacuation of UK ‘Belongers’. 
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This can be placed within a framework of belonging / un-belonging to an imagined 
national community20. In the acceptance of the Asians from Uganda, labelling them 
‘refugees’ certainly eased the opposition towards the Asian influx, but it also located 
them outside of the national community. In other words, it was labelling them as 
‘outsiders’ who were entitled to help due to their unfortunate predicament, but who 
should otherwise be excluded. Furthermore, as it has been pointed out, there is an 
inconsistency between their ‘humanitarian’ discourse and their position on the 
admittance of non-citizens, because the British Government still insisted on drawing a 
strict line between the CUKC and the non-CUKC. They rejected the stateless people, 
especially the stateless heads of families, although they knew it would cause tragic 
family separations. On 18 October 1972, in his oral answers to questions, Home 
Secretary Robert Carr repeatedly called the Asians ‘refugees’ and declared ‘the British 
people as a whole have shown themselves ready to respond with humanity and warmth 
to the plight of fellow human beings who are in need’. However, he at the same time 
made it clear that they would not accept any responsibility for the ‘stateless refugees’ 
and that their welfare was the responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). He stated that accepting these non-UKPH husbands ‘would be 
putting on this country a burden which is not ours to bear’ when they were ‘already 
bearing a pretty onerous one as it is.’21 
This image of Asians as helpless victims and a heavy burden to be shared was 
strengthened through the domestic resettlement process. This will be the focus on the 
analysis in the next section. 
 
 
3. Un-homely welcome 
 
The humanitarian discourse the Government employed could have helped persuade 
the national ‘public’ opinion to tolerate another wave of incoming Asians. This, however, 
betrayed inherent inconsistencies in their own reluctant attitude. The British 
                                                   
20 James Hampshire has argued that in the British immigration policies, belonging was 
defined in terms of descent, which had inevitable racial connotations. The enactment of the 
1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act had already suggested that the post-imperial 
imagined national community should be based on exclusive Britishness, rather than 
‘imperial’ and ‘inclusive’ British identity, thus making the citizenship status as CUKC ‘an 
empty promise’. James Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and Politics of 
Demographic Governance in Post-war Britain, Basingstoke 2005, 12. 
21 Hansard, 843, cc. 261-9, 18 October 1972. 




Government accepted their responsibility, but this sense of responsibility never 
extended beyond a ‘reluctant hospitality’ in which they tried to decrease their share of 
the cost. Now it will be argued that this reluctance had an undeniable impact on the 
subsequent resettlement process, making this ‘an un-homely welcome’. 
Here once again, their belongingness / un-belongingness was at stake. Once they 
placed their feet on British soil, these Asians started to be called ‘Ugandan Asians’ (not 
‘British Asians’ as they had sometimes been referred to while they were in Uganda). 
Their resettlement in a new ‘home’ was systematically supported by public and 
voluntary sectors, but the Government was always worried about the large cost of the 
resettlement, and particularly how these costs were presented to the British public. As 
they tried to refrain from making (or at least hide) their positive efforts to ensure the 
Asians’ early arrival in August and early September, so too did they try to cover up or 
inhibit preferential treatment for these virtual ‘refugees’, in the sense that they were 
people in need of special help. 
The resettlement operation of the Ugandan Asians has often been evaluated as one of 
the largest-scale ‘refugee resettlements’ in Britain by some researchers. For example, 
Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, in Refugees in an Age of Genocide evaluated the 
resettlement process as one of the notable cases of the refugee resettlement in the UK, 
while pointing out that the Asians from Uganda ‘were rarely considered as “refugees” in 
Britain but were termed “immigrants” for whom Britain had an obligation to provide’22. 
In the following section, it is possible to confirm the point they made, if it meant that 
the Ugandan Asians were (at least supposed to be treated as) ‘refugees’ but were not 
treated as such, and that the general perception was these Asians were adding to the 
burdens imposed on the ‘British’ national community by those ‘immigrants’ who had 
come before them. 
When we trace the Government’s change of discourse from presenting them as 
‘unfortunate refugees’ when they tried to persuade the public to accept them 
sympathetically, to treating them as ‘immigrants’ who should not enjoy any preferential 
treatments, their status as ‘refugees’ or ‘immigrants’ can be interpreted in terms of the 
framework of belongers / non-belongers in which the Ugandan Asians were eternal 
outsiders. At the same time, although they were regarded as ‘immigrants’ in the sense 
that they were denied any ‘preferential treatment’ especially once settled in a 
community and mainstreamed into the other ‘immigrant’ groups, there were genuine 
                                                   
22 Kushner and Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide, 287. 
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public sympathies for them as ‘refugees’ when it came to ‘help’ offered by voluntary 
organizations and individuals, which was ironically a consequence of the political (and 
the media’s) ‘refugee’ rhetoric. 
 
3-1. Were the Asians refugees? 
 
Some have argued that the Asians were fortunate to be regarded as ‘refugees’ because 
it allowed them to enjoy sympathetic help offered by the British public. A Race Today 
editorial in 1972 argued: ‘It is only right that the Asians should be regarded as 
refugees…it is likely, given the present British mood on race, that they would receive 
very much less than their deserts–or they needs–if they were regarded in any other 
way.’23 It can surely be said that where their resettlement was concerned, these Asians 
were virtually ‘refugees’, and they certainly needed special treatments considering their 
traumas and dire straits caused by their sudden expulsion. 
In the resettlement process, however, their status as ‘refugees’, as it meant that they 
should deserve special treatment, was not always guaranteed, even though they were 
often referred to as such. One of the politicians who were involved later recalled their 
policy: ‘[w]e were not to discriminate in favour of these people. Help was to be on the 
absolute minimum scale.’ 24  Thus contrary to their humanitarian discourse the 
Government employed to persuade the indigenous people to accept these Asians, the 
Government (and therefore, the URB) absolutely opposed to the idea of Asians receiving 
any preferential treatment, or anything that might give an impression that ‘the Asians 
were getting ahead at the expense of the native population’. They justified their position 
claiming that the special treatments would perpetuate the presence of the Ugandan 
Asians, and this would be harmful for race relations in British society. 
In a sense, the establishment of the URB itself needs to be understood as a strategy 
the Government employed to distance itself from the resettlement process, while 
placing it under absolute control. The URB was established in late August 1972, and 
appointed as its chairman was Sir Charles Cunningham, a former Permanent Secretary 
to the Home Office, an eminent bureaucrat25. Other members of the board were mainly 
                                                   
23 Quoted in Valerie Marett, ‘Resettlement of Ugandan Asians in Leicester ’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 6-3, 1993, 258. On the other hand, there were Asians who were unhappy 
to be called ‘refugees’ and to be regarded as someone who is dependent on other people (e.g. 
Mahmood Mamdani, From Citizen to Refugee, London 1973.). 
24 Humphrey and Ward, Passports and Politics, 47. 
25  The other initial Board members were Mark Bonham Carter, Chairman of the 




chosen from voluntary organizations, local authorities and immigrant communities, 
although it was not necessarily a ‘balanced’ representation26 of the actors involved. The 
URB’s task was to coordinate the resettlement process and act as a mediator among 
these different actors and the Government departments.  
The meeting minutes and other papers concerning the resettlement operation 
managed by the URB show how the coordination by the URB was frustrated by the fact 
that it was a Government-appointed body and therefore a Government-controlled 
organization. The Government’s overall reluctance to accept these Asians, and its desire 
to decrease the ‘cost’ of such an acceptance—or at least hide it from the public eye—had 
various (often negative) effects on the success of the initial resettlement. 
This first characterized the funding process for the Asian resettlement, which was 
pretty indirect; the Government aimed to camouflage the cost of resettlement by 
dividing it into a few channels, mainly support through increasing the amount of 
expenditure for the Rate Support Grants, and reimbursement of the costs which was 
spent at the discretion of the URB. The Government preferred the former channel, 
possibly because it is more indirect and ‘invisible’ from the eyes of the taxpayers. 
However, this led to diminishing the URB’s power as an agency of funding for the local 
authorities’ resettlement efforts27. 
Even when they had to acknowledge that the cost was substantial, the Government 
claimed that suspending the financial aid to Uganda would cancel out the current cost. 
Questioned about the cost of resettlement in the Parliament, Home Secretary Carr 
stated that he did not believe the cost of resettlement would not ‘add to that burden 
[namely, the original cost of international aids].’28 This statement implies that the 
development aid and the resettlement cost could be equated as post-Imperial ‘burdens’ 
to bear, and bearing a new burden would be financially justified by suspension of the 
old. 
                                                                                                                                                     
Community Relations Commission; Mrs Francis Clode, Chairman of the Women’s Royal 
Voluntary Service; Praful Patel, Secretary of the Committee of UK Citizenship; B. Wilson, 
Town Clerk of the London Borough of Camden; Douglas Tilbe, Director of the Community 
and Race Relations Unit of the British Council of Churches. Those who were later added 
were Sir Walter Coutts, an ex-Governor General of Uganda; Sir Ronald Ironmonger, Leader 
of the Sheffield City Council; Sir Frank Marshall, Leeds City Council; Lord Peter 
Thorneycroft, Conservative, House of Lords. 
26 Marett, Immigrants Settling in the City, 69. 
27 Marett, Immigrants Settling in the City, 71. According to the final report of the URB, out 
of the net expenditure up to December 1973, only one tenth of the URB’s total expenditure 
(about £610, 000) was spent as grants to the local authorities. Uganda Resettlement Board, 
The Final Report, London, 1974, 17. 
28 Hansard, 843, c. 268, 18 October 1972. 
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The policy that the Asians should not be treated preferentially had an undeniable 
influence on the process of Asian resettlement and integration into the wider 
community. Praful Patel was a Ugandan Asian already settled in the UK and a URB 
board member, who wanted to ensure effective resettlement by calling for the 
establishment of a loan scheme for business and house purchasing29. He repeatedly 
appealed to the Home Office and the URB to encourage the Government to make a 
positive commitment to this scheme and there were certainly much possibilities of 
large-scale funding scheme as some affluent Asians were interested in giving support. 
In the end, however, the Government refused to offer any funding or public guarantee to 
this scheme, claiming that it would undermine the principle that the Asians should not 
be treated preferentially30. What the Government preferred was a small charitable fund 
called the Uganda Asian Relief Trust, which could only offer minimal help (only five 
pounds per head) for the Asians such as purchasing basic furniture and goods for their 
new home31. 
The effort to minimise the cost led to another salient feature of the resettlement: its 
heavy, in a sense absolute, dependence on voluntary elements. Throughout the 
resettlement process, the support from the voluntary bodies was completely 
indispensable. As will be shown later, they played central roles in running the 
resettlement centres and helping the Asians adapt to their lives in Britain in almost 
every aspect. Even after the Asians left the centres and settled in communities, the 
voluntary bodies were expected to continue to offer support for the Asians. The 
Government also tried to count on the Asian community’s self-reliance, and expected the 
Asians, especially the rich quarters already settled in the UK, to offer financial help for 
their ‘fellow’ Asians. 
The Women’s Royal Voluntary Service, the British Red Cross, the St. John Ambulance 
Brigade were the three ‘traditional’ voluntary agencies the government tried to rely on 
for their expertise on contingency planning for emergencies, but helps from other less 
conventional voluntary bodies were also indispensable. Their contribution was 
coordinated by an umbrella body, the Co-ordinating Committee for the Welfare of 
                                                   
29 Patel also argued that this would help the Government to disperse the Asians as much as 
possible by giving the Asians incentives to settle in the ‘green’ areas. 
30 TNA, HO289/57, Approaches to Banks for Possible Financial Loans to UKPHs. See also 
TNA, HO289/5, Meeting of the Board; TNA, CAB134/3519, Home and Social Affairs 
Committee. 
31 TNA, CAB128/50/42, The Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 7 September 1972 and TNA, HO 
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Evacuees from Uganda (hereafter CCWEU), which was formed in August 197232. The 
operation coordinated by CCWEU involved about 70 voluntary groups. The CCWEU 
kept a cooperative but independent stance from the Government operation, and was an 
acute critic of the URB. 
The ‘voluntary’ element was also obvious in the coordination of housing for the Asians. 
As the housing shortage was one of the thorniest issues at that time, the URB called for 
offers of private unused accommodation from the public, and also approached local 
authorities to get them to offer available council housing.  
The offers of private housing came in considerable numbers; according to the URB 
interim report, 2,284 people offered private accommodation for the Asians. After the 
Women’s Royal Voluntary Service paid local visits and vetted these offers, the URB 
utilized 756 of them33, which housed 2,149 people. Though it is only a fraction of the 
total, it certainly shows British people’s sympathy for these unfortunate people 
uprooted from their ‘homes’. Intriguingly, at the same time, these private housing offers 
were represented by the media and were dismissed by the general public as a 
‘charitable’ act of the affluent middle class34. 
The Government had great difficulty in persuading the local councils to offer public 
housing for the Asians35. Sometimes through regional officers of the Department of 
Environment, the URB kept placing pressures on the local governments to accept their 
‘share’ of the Asians up to the later stages of the resettlement. In its Final Report, the 
URB gives the details of local authorities’ offers as follows: out of 2,292 dwellings offered 
by the time of the interim report, 1,680 had become available by the time of the final 
report and there were further 177 offers in the meantime. The URB appreciated this as 
                                                   
32  The organisations include the National Council of Social Service, the Community 
Relations Commission, Community Service Volunteers, the British Council of Churches’ 
Community and Race Relations Unit, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, the 
United Kingdom Immigrants Advisory Service, Oxfam, and Christian Action. The 
immigrant communities, Asian and non-Asian, were also included in member 
organizations, and played important roles. 
33 Many of the failed offers were either small accommodations for Asian families or not in 
good condition, or had only temporary terms of availability, so they were unavailable at the 
time of the actual resettlement or judged to be unsuitable for the purpose. TNA, HO289/3, 
Meeting of the Board. 
34 For example, a cynical Punch cartoon suggests that accommodating the Asians was some 
kind of new ‘social status’ symbol. It also underlined the stereotype of East African Asians 
as educated, professional, ‘posh’ middle-class. 
35 TNA, HO289/4, Meeting of the Board. The files of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government also show how long they struggled to attract housing offers from local 
authorities (TNA, HLG156/728 and HLG156/729, Policy on the Housing of Immigrants in 
East Midlands area).  
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‘invaluable help’36, but this is in a way a fruit of their incessant pressure on beleaguered 
local authorities, which were already suffering from housing problems before the 
incident. 
Against this background of a serious housing shortage, for some sections of the 
British public (obviously not those who would happily offer their unused housing to the 
‘refugees’) it would be disturbing to think that the Asians were being offered housing at 
the their expense—the ‘native’ British. Actually the Race Relations Board received a 
considerable number of complaints from the public that the resettlement of the Uganda 
Asians infringed the 1968 Race Relations Act which prohibited discrimination ‘on 
grounds of colour, race or ethnic or national origins’. These complaints were triggered by 
a reader’s letter published in Sunday Telegraph which took exception to an 
advertisement in the local press offering accommodation to a Ugandan Asian family. 
The Race Relations Board protested to the newspaper claiming that the offer was made 
because they were ‘a particular group who are in need because of their summary 
expulsion from Uganda’, in other words, they were ‘in effect refugees’.37 However, while 
the URB repeated the same stance38, it did not necessarily mean that for them, the 
Ugandan Asians should really be treated preferentially. 
 
3-2. Reception at the Airports  
 
While they were still in Uganda, the Asians learned of the news concerning the 
British public’s opposition to the Asian influx. The most apparent of this ‘unwelcome’ 
came from one English city in the East Midlands, Leicester: in early September, a 
newspaper advertisement in the Ugandan Argus posted by the Leicester City Council 
tried to dissuade the Asian from coming to the city. They had also seen news coverage of 
anti-immigration demonstrations in which angry British demonstrators were shouting 
‘Asians out’ and ‘Britain is for the British’.  
Therefore, by mid-September, when the special flight airlift of the Asians started, it is 
not difficult to imagine how apprehensive the arriving Asians were about coming to this 
new unwelcoming ‘home’. On the first day, the Asian arrivals were greeted by cold 
drizzle (the British newspapers unanimously pitied them who had to be transferred 
from temperate Kampala to the miserable weather of England). Contrary to their 
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possible expectation, they received a ‘warm’ reception by people from voluntary 
organizations helping the URB to welcome these Asians at the airports. They offered 
teas and snacks in what the media described as ‘a typical English welcome’39. The 
Ugandan Asians were also offered warm clothes contributed by mainly women and 
Christian organisations, in which they were wrapped up before they left for their next 
destination, while the Red Cross provided medical care and advice. The help offered by 
voluntary bodies at the time of the reception at the airport was literally for twenty-four 
hours and truly wide-ranging: interpretation, offers of short- and long-term 
accommodation, transport, finding jobs and places in schools and colleges, providing 
warm clothes and blankets, counselling and medical care40. 
The URB assumed that the arriving Asians might have already arranged their own 
destinations, and it was particularly worried that the Asians would instantly head for 
areas such as the London boroughs, and Leicester, Birmingham and other ‘immigrant’ 
areas outside London. The URB could not stop the Asians if they travelled at their own 
expense. 
Thus from the very beginning, the URB’s resettlement operation tried to disperse the 
Asians as much as possible, even though they knew that they could not enforce it. The 
news of the influx of the Asians had already caused panics in some localities, most 
notably in Leicester, where it was believed that most of the Asians were heading. The 
initial panic was eased by the financial package the Government promised, but still the 
concentration of the Asian ‘burden’ was regarded as undesirable, so every measure to 
dissuade the Asians to go to these areas was adopted by the URB. 
The famous ‘red’ and ‘green’ area designations were introduced here to achieve this 
aim: they tried to dissuade movement to the so-called ‘red’ areas41 and persuaded 
migration to the ‘green’ areas. A less well-known fact is that these areas were originally 
named as ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas respectively but the names were changed because 
                                                   
39 See, for example, ‘Tea in England for Asian Exile’, Daily Mail, 19 September 1972.  
40 London Metropolitan Archive (hereafter LMA), ACC/3121/E/04/0284, Ugandan Asians: 
Expulsion from Uganda. The Co-ordinating Committee for the Welfare of the Evacuees 
from Uganda ‘Twenty-Four-Hour Service for the Uganda Asians from the Voluntary 
Societies’, 25 September 1972.  
41 The so-called red areas included London Boroughs: Brent (Willesden and Kilburn),  
Camden, Ealing (Southall), Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, Hammersmith, Islington, 
Kensington, Lambeth (Brixton), Lewisham, Newham (East and West Ham), Southwark, 
Tower Hamlets (Stepney), Wandsworth (Clapham) and Westminster (Paddington); West 
Midlands: Birmingham, Leicester, Smethwick, Walsall, West Bromwich and  
Wolverhampton; West Riding: Bradford, Halifax, Huddersfield. 
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they were thought to be racially insensitive42. That tells volumes because it seems that 
in many cases the red / green areas were designated based on the mere concentration of 
the coloured immigrants in the areas, rather than the actual social difficulties people 
were experiencing there. It was also based on impressions and pressures rather than 
the exact statistics and numbers, and different Government departments had different 
criteria43. At first, the Government tried to keep the list of ‘red’ areas secret, until the 
newspapers revealed it as early as 18 September.44 
In the guideline written up by the URB for voluntary workers who interviewed the 
Asians at the airport, the URB expected these workers, on their behalf, to ‘guide the 
family to a suitable decision’. Admitting that the newcomers would need ‘more than 
ordinary tact and sympathy’ in their reception, the URB was asking the volunteers to 
persuade (because they knew that they ‘have no power of direction’) to settle in areas 
other than those listed. Without clarifying by whom, the guideline claims that these 
areas were already overcrowded, therefore those who had settled there were already 
suffering from severe housing shortage and difficulty in finding jobs, causing great 
strain on the social, medical, and educational services. Therefore, ‘in the interests of the 
newcomers, as well as those of existing Asian communities in this country’ the 
newcomers should be advised to settle elsewhere. It also made clear that if they head for 
the areas listed, they would not be given any financial help to travel from the airports.  
Reading this guideline, John Lyttle, the Chief Officer of the Race Relations Board, 
wrote to Mark Bonham-Carter, the Chairman of the Community Relations Commission 
and a URB board member, that it was ‘appalling’ that ‘the URB should follow the 
popular myth’ blaming immigrants for causing housing and job difficulties, and banning 
them from going to areas with an already substantial ‘immigrant’ population as they 
may cause more of the problems. He was ‘incredulous that [the URB] should think that 
they could send materials like this to bright young volunteers from [Community Service 
Volunteers] and get away with it.’ He even called the guideline ‘transparent hypocrisy’45. 
The CCWEU was also critical of the dispersal policy and the voluntary bodies gave 
support to the Asians who were not given travel warrants just because they were 
heading to the ‘red’ areas46.  
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3-3 Resettlement Centres  
 
After receiving the welcome at the airports, those who had no immediate destinations 
were accommodated at 16 resettlement centres or camps, which were prepared and 
opened in September and October 1972 by the URB. These camps or centres were 
mainly disused military installations, scattered across the country, and some were in 
very remote locations (one in a coastal area of Wales, another in Cornwall, two in rural 
Lincolnshire). According to the URB’s final report, out of 28,608 who passed through 
their ‘resettlement’ operation47, 21,987 went to and stayed at the 16 centres (regardless 
of length of their stay although the majority left the centres after short periods). The 
others (6,621) just received welcome at the airport by the URB and voluntary 
organizations, but did not stay at the resettlement centres or camps at all. They went to 
their own destinations—in most cases, where their families and friends had already 
settled—by their own arrangements. 
Each centre was administrated by mainly ex-military persons employed by the URB, 
and in appointment of these administrators, those with ‘colonial backgrounds’ were 
preferred. Humphry and Ward describe this as ‘unconscious reconstruction of colonial 
situations’. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the URB assumed the Asians would 
be better controlled by this particular type of people, which tells what these ‘centres’ 
were all about. When in need of an extra administrator, the URB instantly turned to the 
Ministry of Defense48. 
This ‘quasi-military’ control by some administrators led to some conflicts between 
them and the voluntary staff who were indispensable in running the centres49. The 
voluntary workers, especially the less conventional, young volunteers, were generally 
critical of these administrators because of their inflexible and high-handed manners. 
The voluntary workers thought that the administrators were only concerned with 
providing the Asians ‘food and bed’ and maintaining order at the camp at the lowest 
cost50, while the majority of voluntary workers believed that the centres should offer 
                                                   
47 These figures include those who arrived after the early November deadline. 
48 TNA, HO 289/2, Meeting of the Board. 
49 The Emergency Sub-Committee minutes and memoranda show how the running of the 
centres was dependent on the voluntary organizations’ help. TNA, CAB134/3523, The 
Emergency Sub-Committee Meeting Minutes of 10 October 1972. 
50 The officers tried to strictly control centres’ expenditures, and in the officers’ perception, 
the Asians were not cooperative enough in the daily management of the centres, such as 
cleaning. In one officer’s briefing memo for internal audit, it was claimed that it was 
because they did not want to do ‘degrading’ menial work as they were used to having 
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other functions such as entertainment and education to the Asian residents who stayed 
for longer periods51. 
The situations varied in different centres, of course. They were more complex when 
the volunteer staffs were not homogeneous: there seem to have been some minor 
conflicts between different organisations and different generations of workers52, while 
the older Asians expressed concerns that the young ‘hippie’ voluntary members might 
influence young Asians, especially the girls. The URB records show that there were a 
couple of troubles in the Greenham Common resettlement centre and it eventually led 
to evictions of three volunteers in a short period. This case clearly shows the complexity 
of multi-sided frictional situations among the administrator, volunteers and the 
Asians53. On the other hand, the progress report by the CCWEU tells that in some 
centres the administrators were less against, if not supportive of, the voluntary workers’ 
efforts to make the resettlement centres more comfortable and educationally oriented, 
and to integrate the Asians into the local indigenous populations54. 
The voluntary organisations also criticised the URB for their insensitivity in 
transferring the Asians from camp to camp many times. The URB aimed to reduce the 
cost of running the centres because as the Asians started to leave the centres to settle, 
maintaining as many as 16 centres was becoming financially unreasonable and actually 
some centres used facilities almost unfit for use. Yet the voluntary bodies were critical of 
the URB’s policy because many of such transfers were made at very short notice, 
without considering the situation of resettlement for the Asians55.  
Another URB record shows that there were certainly other considerations as well. 
When there was a request for transferring some Asians from one camp to another so 
that they can be reunited with their family members who were separately 
accommodated, the URB rejected these requests: they presumed that the transfer would 
make staying at the centre more comfortable and delay their departure. The URB was 
also worried that such reunion would make the family unit bigger, which would make 
                                                                                                                                                     
Africans do such jobs in Africa. The memo continues: ‘if they think the British taxpayer is 
going to willingly and meekly foot the bill for their little quirk, then they have to think 
again.’ TNA, HO289/60, Internal Audit, Points Stressed at Briefing at Staff Officers, 13 
November 1972. 
51 Kuepper et al., Uganda Asians in Great Britain, 66-68. 
52 Humphry and Ward, Passports and Politics, 54. 
53 TNA, HO289/36, Review of the Role of Volunteers at Greenham Common. 
54 LMA, ACC/1888/200, The Coordinating Committee for the Welfare of the Evacuees from 
Uganda, The Progress Report, No. 6, ‘Liaison Officers and Resettlement Centres’.  
55 TNA, HO289/3, Meeting of the Board. 




the resettlement even more difficult56. 
 
3-4 Clearing the burden 
 
The resettlement procedure—finding houses and jobs for the Asians—was 
coordinated by the resettlement teams of the URB, who were civil servants recruited 
from the Government departments. The resettlement teams at first tried to match job 
opportunities with housing offers, but later abandoned the policy for being unrealistic. 
This was because there were not enough housing available, and where this was 
available, there were not enough work places that could offer jobs for the Asians. 
Generally, finding a house was more difficult than finding a job. 
Resettling all the Asians in a short period of time was not at all an easy job. Since the 
Ugandan exodus was a forced migration and therefore it embraced the total population, 
it included a larger proportion of the elderly and the handicapped than is usual in 
ordinary immigrant communities, as well as children and women. There were big 
extended families, which the resettlement teams could not place in average-sized 
houses. Contrary to their ‘professional, highly educated, English-speaking’ image often 
promoted by the media, those who had sought employment for long often needed 
English-language training57. There seemed to be some, especially young single males, 
who were not satisfied with the type of jobs they were offered. In many cases, the jobs 
were menial, and below their qualifications and expectations. The URB complained that 
the Asians would not accept job offers because they were too ‘choosy’ and demanding. 
But in fact, most of the Asians were more than happy to accept the jobs that were much 
below their qualification and experience, and tried hard not to be a ‘burden’ on the 
public58. Here what was more problematic seemed to be the attitude of the resettlement 
officers who were eager to just ‘clear’ the Asians from the centres. 
From the Government’s perspective, the Asians were still ‘burdens’ to bear and if 
possible, to be shifted onto someone else. Even at the resettlement centres, the Asians 
were constantly encouraged to emigrate to the third countries. If they were emigrating 
overseas, the URB was expected to give financial assistance to the Asians by paying the 
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57  TNA, CAB134/3523, Minutes and Memoranda of Emergency Sub-committee. The 
Department of Employment Memorandum 72(22), 6 October 1972. 
58 Community Relations Commission, One Year On: A Report on the Resettlement of the 
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fares and ‘reasonable’ incidental costs of up to 750 pounds per family59.  
The issues of split families become rather relevant here. As pointed out earlier, the 
British Government refused the entry of Asians without British citizenship even when 
it would lead to family separations; therefore, when the head of a family was a 
non-citizen, only the family members with citizenship were accepted into Britain. These 
so-called ‘headless’ families could not be resettled easily because most of them hoped to 
be reunited first with the husbands and fathers, and the URB started to realize that 
most probably they would remain in the centres or depend on public support for a long 
time. The British Government announced that they would accept these non-citizen 
heads of families in February 197360. The Home Office papers around that time show 
that the decision to admit the stateless heads of the family was based on financial 
rather than humanitarian considerations61.  
The URB believed that their job would be finished when the Asians resettled in the 
community. It was based on the Government’s belief that once the Asians were in the 
communities they should then rely on local agencies and statutory bodies just as other 
immigrant groups and the indigenous British population should.62 The Asians were 
resettled (some said cynically that they were only ‘relocated’ not ‘resettled’63) by the 
URB, but difficulties still remained, especially when the families were resettled in 
remote places where there were not many Asians living in the surrounding areas. The 
URB tried to coordinate the ‘cares in the community’, and relied on the Community 
Relations Commissions, and the Women’s Royal Voluntary Service in localities where 
there was no CRCs64. The Asian organisations’ self-help was also expected to play an 
integral role here, too. There were arguments as to whether the URB should offer public 
funding support for the voluntary services caring for the Asians in the community. Once 
more, within the URB, there was opposition based on ‘no preferential treatment for the 
Asians’ policy65.  
The URB—and the Home Office with pressure from the Treasury—were hoping to 
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close the resettlement centres as early as possible. As of the end of March 1973, there 
were five centres that were still open, with 3,380 Asians living there66. Adding to the 
‘rushed’ closure of the centres by concentrating the Asians in the remaining centres, 
new admittance was actively controlled, and when there were prospects that the Asians 
who went to India (India agreed to take the Asians in on the condition that it was a 
temporary resettlement) would try to enter Britain after the six months’ moratorium in 
early 1973, the URB and the Government agreed that the centres would hurriedly close 
the doors on those who arrived after 23 April 197367. All the resettlement centres were 
closed by January 1974, and the URB dissolved in the same month. 
Shortly before its resolution, the URB was saturated with criticism from different 
sectors, including its important partner and an acute critic, the CCWEU. The CCWEU’s 
report ‘A Job Well Done?’ questioned the claimed success of the resettlement procedure 
and pointed out the enduring difficulties68. The URB Chairman issued a statement that 
he did not accept this ‘as a fair description of the situation’, and argued that ‘many have 
settled satisfactorily and are making success of their new life.’ The enduring difficulties 
and limitation of the URB operation was, however, fully acknowledged by the URB or at 
least by its board members. Its internal memorandum shows that the members tried to 
reconcile themselves to this situation by admitting that the ‘situation is, clearly, far 
from satisfactory; but it seems, unfortunately, that there is little that the Board can do 
in the short term to improve it’69. 
In the end, how successful could we say the URB was in ‘dispersing’ the Asians and 
rendering them invisible from the public eyes? It is obvious that it was not as successful 
as the URB finally claimed in its final report: two-thirds of the Ugandan Asians went to 
settle in the red areas by their own arrangements, and only about one third were 
actually dispersed by the URB, being resettled in about 400 areas all over England, 
Wales and Scotland. However, it was believed that many of those who were dispersed, 
subsequently found their way to places where they could find more familiar faces, like 
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Leicester and other red areas70. One estimation tells us that by 1976, as many as 80 per 
cent of the Uganda Asians were living in areas where they could live with other East 





The acceptance and resettlement of the Asians from Uganda is a small, but intriguing, 
episode in the history of immigration into Britain. As it has been illustrated, the British 
Government’s and the Government-appointed URB’s policy on the Asian acceptance and 
resettlement was influenced by the Government’s overall reluctance to accept this group 
of people into Britain. 
The Government and the URB offered an official welcome mat, but there are doubts if 
it was a genuine ‘homely’ welcome. The voluntary bodies, who tried as much as they 
could to make the Asians feel ‘at home’ even at the ‘un-homely’ resettlement camps, 
were often frustrated by the URB’s bureaucracy, and the camp administrators’ 
quasi-colonial attitude toward the Asians. Here they were generally sympathised as 
‘refugees’ (other than the voluntary organizations’ help, the British peoples’ sympathy 
was expressed by their offering of unused private accommodation), but in the official 
policies the political expediency again crept in, and ‘preferential treatments’ were 
avoided as being destructive to ‘good race relations’. In this situation, they were 
recognised as ‘immigrants’ who were less welcome and less entitled to help than 
‘refugees’. At the same time, the image of the Asians as ‘a burden to bear’ or ‘a burden to 
share’ was crystallised through the dispersal policies. 
The national community was also imagined as a community bearing the burden, 
excluding the Asians as ‘outsiders’: Home Secretary Carr described the public 
sentiments over the issue: ‘[m]any people who believed that this was a responsibility 
and obligation which we were right to accept would have wished that we did not have it 
and there is nothing dishonourable about that’72 and the general concerns were ‘very 
genuine and perfectly natural’. These statements presumed that there were the British 
‘nation’ (‘us’), most of whom were prepared to accept the responsibility toward these 
‘unfortunate’ Asians (‘them’), wishing that they had not had to. On the other hand, Carr 
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argues, there were people who tried to exploit this ‘unfortunate situation’ as ‘a general 
attack on our society and on democratic society generally’ obviously meaning Enoch 
Powell, the anti-immigration lobbies and the National Front. Here, Carr criticised their 
attack on the Asians but justified the fear and discontent the ‘nation’ rightly felt 
towards the Asians. In this sense, he failed to develop a convincing criticism of the 
National Front which later exploited the issue of housing offered to the Asians in local 
election campaigns and was successful in securing seats. 
There is no denying that the Ugandan Asians were persecuted people in great need 
who had been expelled from their place of long-term residence in a very short period of 
time. However, as far as the official minds were concerned, these Ugandan Asians were 
treated as refugees where they were not supposed to be, and were not treated where 
they were entitled to be. 
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Industrial Contraction and Union Structure: 










A principal feature of British industrial relations was a strong influence of skilled 
workers on the shopfloor. This article examines how craft unions responded to the 
drastic changes in the interwar economy and tried to survive. The Nottingham lace 
industry suffered from industrial contraction during the interwar period. The 
Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers (ASOLM) was a typical craft union 
among British trade unions, and was affected by industrial decline very seriously. 
Although the high level of horizontal and vertical specialization characterized the 
industry, industrial contraction made the established industrial organizations less 
effective. Amalgamation between the ASOLM and the Auxiliary Societies took place in 
1933, and it was a solution to the problem. In conclusion, this article claims that the 
ASOLM intended to fortify the existing craft structure, and strengthen their 
relationship with semi-skilled workers and their unions, in order to shelter from the 
pressure of the industrial slump. However, the merge of the unions did not enable the 
craft union to strengthen its influence on the lace industry as a whole, and the ASOLM 
itself became less attractive even among the members. 
 







                                                   
*This paper is based on unpublished MPhil dissertation, Kentaro SAITO, Craft Structure in 
the Nottingham Lace Industry in the 1920s and 1930s, University of Leicester, 1996. See 
especially its chapters 3 and 4. 
Kyoto Sangyo University 




A process of production in an industry is usually divided into many sub-divisions, and 
trade unions in Britain were traditionally organized in the each section. Segmentation 
was, thus, one of the main characteristics of the trade union structure in Britain. This 
feature is interlocked with craft structure in British industrial relations. Craft unions 
and operative unions, whose members' skill was the most advanced and top-ranked in 
each industry, did not admit either female or unskilled workers into their own unions. 
In the nineteenth century, for example, the cotton industry is well-known as its vertical 
segregation in the industrial organization, and cotton spinning unions fought to exclude 
less skilled workers.1 In the early twentieth century, engineering unions merged into 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union in 1920 and the headquarters tried to enroll the 
lesser skilled into the Union for expanding membership throughout the interwar period. 
However, highly skilled engineers, such as toolmakers, felt that they were not 
well-presented in the new union, and were not always corporate to the policy.2 Internal 
frictions of this kind between trade unions were seen in many British industries. 
In spite of this tradition, the interwar period witnessed relatively many 
amalgamations between trade unions. From the beginning of the century to the end of 
the 1930s, trade union membership grew rapidly and the growth led to enthusiasm to 
merge. It is likely that merging activities were accelerated by economic fluctuation as J. 
Waddington discussed in his The Politics of Bargaining.3 Rapid growth in membership 
set off competition between unions with the result that the larger sought amalgamation 
as a means of pushing ahead, and the smaller as the best way to get into the race. Most 
mergers in the interwar period, again as Waddington has stated, were vertical mergers 
within the same industries.4 However, union merger was not always boosted up in a 
                                                   
1 Regarding the industrial organization in the cotton industry in general, see, W. Lazonick, 
'The cotton industry' in The Decline of the British Economy, Oxford, 1986, 18-50. Higgins 
has rejected 'Lazonick approach' in D.M. Higgins, ‘Rings, mules, and structural constraints 
in the Lancashire textile industry, c.1945-c.1965’, Economic History Review (46) 1993, 
342-62. For reluctant attitudes among skilled workers against unskilled workers' entry, see, 
for example, J.L. White, ‘Lancashire cotton textiles,’ in C.J. Wrigley (ed.), A History of 
British Industrial Relations Volume II, 1914-1939 , Brighton, 216-7. 
2 Regarding the expansion policy of the AEU and the resistance by the skilled engineers, see, 
J.B. Jefferys, The Story of the Engineers, 1800-1945, London, 1972, 235-6. 
3 J. Waddington, The Politics of Bargaining: The Merger Process and British Trade Union 
Structural Development 1892-1987, London, 1995. 
4 R. Undy, 'Review Essay: Mergers and Union Restructuring: Externally Determined Waves 
or Internally Generated Reforms?’ in Historical Studies on Industrial Relations (2), 1996, 
125-37. 
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good economic performance as in the post-war restocking boom in the early 1920s and 
the process of merger itself seems to have affected more by internal logic of union 
structure rather than external causes. This article will deal with a union merger 
between an operative union and their lesser unions in the Nottingham lace industry in 
interwar period to discuss union structure, especially craft structure, in Britain.5 
The machine lace industry in the Nottingham area developed its specification in the 
process of production in the late nineteenth century though the scale of the industry 
was relatively small.6 It was one of the typical examples for fragmented structure of 
British industry. The lace industry was, in the first place, divided horizontally into three 
sections in accordance with the type of its products; the plain net section, the curtain 
section and the lever section. And then, the each section was compartmentalized 
vertically into more than 10 processes (Diagram 1). The lace firms were also specified in 
accordance with these divides. Secondly, as in the other industries in Britain, the trade 
unions in the lace industry developed within its horizontal and vertical divides. The 
Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers (hereafter referred as ASOLM) was 
established in 1872 as the prime operative union for 'twisthands', who were the most 
advanced skilled workers in the lace industry.7 However, its horizontal sectionalism 
remained as the three sections, the Plain Net Section, the Curtain Section and the 
Lever Section, within the Union even after the First World War. Employers’ associations 
in the industry were also divided due to the sections and the sectionalism was also very 
strong. The Midland Counties Lace Manufacturers’ Association was in the Lever Section 
and the British Plain Net Manufacturers’ Association in the Plain Net Section.8 On the 
other hand, as for the vertical divides, there were many separate and independent trade 
unions, such as the British Association of Lace and Embroidery Designers and 
                                                   
5  Textile unions are conventionally classified as operative union whereas engineering 
unions, for example, as craft union. Although the difference is said whether or not they 
have apprenticeship this definition is not very clear. This article does not go to the details 
and define craft structure as a wide concept to cover both craft union and operative union. 
6 The lace product was well-known as the Nottingham lace. However, the area was actually 
wide-spread over the East Midlands. Lever lace, for example, being better-known as fancy 
lace, was mainly produced in Long Eaton of Derbyshire from the 1880s. 
7 Machine operators in lace making in the Midlands were called 'twisthands' although in 
Scotland and the USA, they were called 'weavers'. As another operative union for 
twisthands, there was the Southwell Lace Operatives Society in the Nottingham area. But 
the membership was much smaller than that of the ASOLM. For the early organization of 
workers in the lace and knitting industry before the establishment of the ASOLM, see W. 
Felkin, History of the Machine-wrought Hosiery and Lace Manufacturers, Nottingham, 
1867. 
8  D.H. Varley, A History of the Midland Counties Lace Manufacturers’ Association 
1915-1958, Long Eaton, 1959. 
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Draughtsmen, the Amalgamated Society of Lace Pattern Readers, the Lever Card 
Punchers Association, the Auxiliary Society of Male Lace Workers, the Auxiliary Female 
Lace Workers, the Nottingham and District Warpers' Association and the Basford Lace 
Bleachers Society in the Nottingham area. There were also employers’ organizations in 
accordance with the sections, such as the Nottingham Lace Furnishing Manufacturers’, 
the Nottingham Embroidery Manufacturers’ Association and the Warp Lace and Net 
Manufacturers’ Association.9 
 
<Diagram 1>  Processes involved in making lace 
 
 
We will examine the amalgamation took place in 1933 between the ASOLM, the 
Auxiliary Society of Male Lace Workers (hereafter referred as the Male Workers' 
Society) and the Auxiliary Female Lace Workers. The chief purpose of this article is, 
however, not only to analyze union merger itself, but to explore how an organization of 
                                                   
9 The Board of Trade, Working Party Report: Lace, London, 1947, 11-15. 
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skilled workers in fragmented structure of industry, which worked efficiently in the 
nineteenth century, responded to serious industrial contraction in the interwar period 
and tried to rescue their organization and trade. In the following, before discussing the 
merging process, we will summarize backgrounds to the merger. In the first place some 
industrial conditions, focusing on production and employment, of the Nottingham lace 
industry in the interwar period will be overlooked because these external factors all 
together became a driving force for the amalgamation. Secondly we will examine how 
the trade unions suffered from the industrial contraction in the light of the changes in 
their membership and financial situation in order to investigate some internal logic 
within the trade unions for the merger. In the next section, the process of this 
amalgamation will be explored as the response of the Lace Makers Union to their 
industrial and organizational crisis. In conclusion, after briefly touching the result of 
the amalgamation, we will consider some aspects of the relationship between craft 
structure in Britain and industrial contraction. 
 
 
The British Lace Industry and its trade unions 
 
The British lace industry was originally located in the small towns and villages 
mainly in the South, and produced bobbin lace by hand. However, after John Heathcoat 
of Nottingham built the first machine capable of producing lace in 1808, the East 
Midlands became the centre of the production in Britain.10 The lace industry in the 
South and East of Scotland grew from the late nineteenth century. However, 
Nottingham dominated the British lace market for long, and in practice was a centre of 
lace production in the world until the end of the nineteenth century.11 However, the 
industry started to contract after the turn of the century. The Nottingham lace industry 
had depended largely on exports, but it was caught up by other countries and slowed 
behind them. In 1912, exports accounted for 62 per cent of the Nottingham production, 
31 per cent of them going to USA, 31 per cent to the Continent, 20 per cent to British 
                                                   
10 Regarding the handmade lace industry in the nineteenth century, see, J. Bourke, "‘I was 
always fond of my pillow’: the handmade lace industry in the UK 1870 - 1914", Rural 
History (5) 1994, 155-69. 
11 Even in 1951, three-quarters of lace firms and about the same proportion of workers in 
the British lace industry were in the Nottingham district, which produced more than 70 per 
cent of the total output. F.A. Wells, ‘The Lace Industry’, in H.A. Silverman (ed.), Studies in 
Industrial Organization, Oxford, 1946, 47-48. 
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possessions overseas.12 The proportion of exports to production decreased on a net basis 
during the interwar period. It reduced from 62% in 1912, to 39% in 1924 and 25% in 
1935.13  As the result, the output decreased almost constantly during the period 
although the pace of decrease varied due to the sections of the products (Table 1). The 
main reason of the decrease was the rise of the American production. The First World 
War greatly assisted the newly established American industry, and after the war 
exports to America were further handicapped by increased tariffs. Among other 
lace-producing countries France was the most successful partly because the rate of 
exchange made French lace cheaper for America to buy from France, and then even 
from Germany, than from Britain. It has also to be pointed out that boom and slump in 
the lace industry considerably depended on the trend of fashion. Market changes were 
virtually impossible to predict. Particularly in the early 1920s, changes in people’s taste 
in fashion had a bad influence on the industry. The industry generally suffered from its 
industrial contraction over the years. 
 
<Table 1>   Production of lace: England and Wales, 1907 - 30 (£,000) 
Sections/Years 1907 1924 1930
Plain net 1,081 903 439
Curtain 656 792 662
Lever 2,482 1,302 375
Total Value of Goods 9,578 7,657 5,749
 
Source: Census of Production: 1907, 1924, 1930, 1935. 
Notes: (1) The plain net section is listed as 'Cotton net, including all net made on net machines' in the Census. The 
Curtain section is listed as 'Cotton lace curtain and piece goods on curtain machines'. The lever section, known as 
the fancy lace, is listed as 'Cotton lace and articles thereof made on other than net or curtain machine'.  
(2) Total includes other type of lace, such as silk lace, artificial silk lace, muslin curtains, women's garments, 
embroidering on lace and the sections of bleaching, dyeing and dressing of lace. 
 
The industrial contraction meant serious decline in the employment of the industry. 
The Report of the Barlow Commission shows that the number of insured lace makers 
decreased by 40 per cent between 1923 and 1937: 9,420 in 1923 to 5,650 in 1937. The 
number of firms in 1946 represented 72 per cent of the number in 1923.14 This decrease 
in the number of the employment and the firm does not indicate technological progress. 
Attachment to established lace machinery was widely seen among the Nottingham lace 
                                                   
12  R.G. Walton, The History of the Nottingham Chamber of Commerce 1860-1960, 
Nottingham, 1962, 79-80. 
13 Wells, ‘The Lace Industry’, 68-9.  
14 M.P. Fogarty, Prospects of the Industrial Area of Great Britain, London, 1945, 308-12. 
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manufacturers. The lace industry used machines which were fundamentally the same 
as those used at the turn of the century, even until the 1960s.15 New machines were 
built, but they incorporated no revolutionary changes. A few innovations, thus, both in 
introduction of new machinery and new management system, were introduced into the 
industry. Therefore it can be said that the numbers employed decreased throughout the 
period simply reflected the industrial slump. 
 
<Table 2>  Employment of Lace Makers* in England and Wales 
Years Males Females Total
Under 18 All ages Under 18 All ages Under 18 All ages
1907 1, 956 (16.2) 12, 087 4, 611 (26.7) 17, 260      6, 567 (22.4)  29,347
1924 357   (7.6) 4, 613 1, 768 (20.7)        8, 838  2, 122 (15.8)  13,451
1930 369   (9.8) 3, 745 1, 525 (21.0) 7, 257 1, 894 (17.2)   11,002
1935 484 (11.2) 4, 309 1, 510  (19.7) 7, 638  1, 994 (16.7)  11,947
 
Source: The Census of Production; 1907, 1924, 1930, 1935, 1951. 
Notes: (1) Bracketed figures show the percentage of the employed under 18 years old to all male operatives and 
females workers. 
: (2) Lace makers were listed as 'wage earners' in the Census of 1907, and as 'operatives' in 1924 to 1951. Both are 
the average number of persons at work in lace factories and warehouses. 
 
In particular some changes in the occupational structure of male workers were very 
serious problems to the industry; firstly the employment of youth decreased drastically 
and secondly the age distribution among the workers changed badly against the 
industry. According to the Census of Production, the number of lace makers under 18 
year old was 1,956 in 1907, 357 in 1924 and 369 in 1930 (Table 2).16 Apprenticeship in 
the lace industry took at least 5 years in those days and it was becoming risky for young 
workers to enter the lace industry in decline. In addition to it, unfortunately to the lace 
industry and fortunately to the youth in the area, there was an alternative option for 
young workers in the East Midlands. The hosiery industry, which needed no 
apprenticeship and less skill than lace-making, was growing steadily. It worried, as it 
will be stated later, manufacturers and trade union leaders in the lace industry that 
many young workers were actually absorbed into the hosiery industry. The changes in 
the age distribution among the male workers shows more comprehensively what was 
going on in the lace industry. Population Census shows that the largest age-group in a 
cohort of the lace industry progressed towards the older age group over the years. In 
                                                   
15 Nottingham Guardian, 29 May 1965. 
16 The Census of Production; 1907, 1924, 1930, 1935, 1951. Lace makers were listed as wage 
earners in the Census of 1907, and as operatives in 1924 to 1951. Both are the average 
number of persons at work in lace factories and warehouses. 
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1911 the largest age group was the 25-34 group with 21.2 per cent. But it was the 45-54 
group in 1921. And in 1931 and 1951, the peaks fell in the 55-64 age group with about 
24 per cent.17 The same trends can be seen in the female employment although the 
progress of the largest age group to the older group was slower and remained in the 
younger group than the male's case.18 The changes in the employment became serious 
problems in the lace industry. Above all, here, we have to note that youths meant in 
many cases workers engaged in the auxiliary processes in the lace industry. Auxiliary 
processes in lace making are principally the processes through which the yarn passes 
before reaching the lace machine i.e., winding, drumming, warping (or beaming), brass 
bobbin winding.19 It was the custom up to the 1960s for boys to begin as threaders. At 
the age of eighteen those who had determined to become a fully-skilled lace-workers 
entered a period of apprenticeship for a skilled lace maker, whereas females had been 
confined to the auxiliary work within factories since the nineteenth century. Accordingly, 
the decrease in young workers under 18 year old did not mean merely that the 
apprenticeship for lace makers declined and then the labour supply would not be 
enough in the future, but also that 'twisthands' could not start their work because the 
auxiliary processes were indispensable for the whole process of lace-producing although 
they were less skilled. The decrease in the number of youth, thus, threatened the future 
and present of the industry. However, the changes in the occupational structure were 
more concretely intimidating for the trade unions in the Nottingham lace industry. 
The ASOLM was, as stated, the chief operative union in the Nottingham lace industry 
and had been enjoying the high-organizational rate until before the First World War. S. 
and B. Webb wrote in 1896 that the incomparably strongest union among textile unions 
was not the Cotton Workers but the Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers, 
which comprised practically all the adult male workers in the Nottingham machine-lace 
trade and therefore among the Nottingham Lace Makers as a whole, and that 
                                                   
17 The population Census, England and Wales: Occupation Table; 1911, 1921, 1931, 1951. 
The age is categorized by, 14-19, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and over. Lace 
makers are listed as workers of lace manufacture in 1911, as lace machine tenters and 
warp hands in 1921 and 1931, and as just lace in 1951. 
18 Almost half of the labour force can be said to have been under 24 years old before the end 
of World War II; 47.3 per cent in 1911, 50.3 per cent in 1921 and 47.8 per cent in 1931, 
though it jumped to 45-54 years old group in 1951. The population Census, England and 
Wales: Occupation Table; 1911, 1921, 1931, 1951. 
19 According to the rules of the Auxiliary Male Society, shop lads, pressers, jackers-off, 
changers, and card levers could be considered auxiliary workers. Rules of the Auxiliary 
Society of Male Lace Workers, 1911, Lm Ru 22, Hallward Library, University of 
Nottingham (hereafter HL). 
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non-Unionism was almost unknown.20Exaggerated was it by the Webbs (twisthands had 
a choice as to whether or not they joined the union). it was certainly true that the union 
density, the proportion of union members to those who were eligible to become members, 
was high in the lace industry. It was 52.6 per cent in 1921 and 39.0 per cent even in 
1930, being always about 10 per cent higher than the national average. 21  The 
membership of the ASOLM saw a peak in the 1880s and then started to decline. It was 
3,661 in 1901, 2,311 in 1911 and fell to 1,650 in 1929. In 1931 the numbers of lace 
makers fell to 1,440, the lowest level figures during the interwar period.22  These 
decrease in the membership in turn affected their activities through the income of the 
Society because contributions were the main source of the Society's income. 
Contributions consistently accounted for over 90 per cent of the total income. There 
were branches in Nottingham (the headquarters of the Society), Beeston, Long Eaton, 
and Ilkeston, and the contributions from the Nottingham Branch consistently 
accounted for over 80 per cent of total contributions.23 But the most decrease in 
membership took place in the Nottingham area. The contributions decreased 
throughout the interwar period. In 1931 the sum of the contributions was less than half 
of that of 1919. 
In accordance with the decline in income, the total expenditure dropped dramatically, 
especially after the end of the First World War. Unlike other industries, unemployment 
in the lace industry was worse in the early 1920s than during the 1930s. The Society 
was obliged to pay a great number of out-of-work grants between 1919 and 1921, with 
the result that it incurred a large bank overdraft. It was recommended in 1922 that the 
out-of-work benefit should be suspended until the overdraft at the Bank was completely 
paid off.24 By the end of 1925 the Society cleared itself from debt. The Executive Council 
of the ASOLM decided that the question of restoring benefits to their normal level 
should be raised.25 However, there is no evidence that the out-of-work grant was 
reinstated between the wars. It seems that the Society continued to keep a tight rein on 
                                                   
20 S. and B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism, London, 1896, revised edition 1920, 
435-6, 441. 
21 Census of Population, 1921 and 1931; Census of Production,1924, 1930 and 1935. About 
the national average of union density, see G. Bain and R. Price, Profile of Union Growth, 
Oxford, 1980, 37. 
22 The number did not change at all during the interwar years. It seems that the ASOLM 
reported the manipulated number of the membership to the TUC. 
23 ASOLM(AW), Statement Account of Balance Sheets (hereafter Balance Sheets), 1919-39, 
Lm 2P 7, HL. 
24 ASOLM, Annual Report, December 1922, Lm 3A, HL 
25 Ibid., December 1926. 
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their finance during these years. The expenditure, thus, continued at the low level. The 
total expenditure for 1939 was less than half that for 1919. Unemployment benefits 
were not the only one. There were cuts and changes to most benefits during this period. 
In 1922 the Management Committee of the ASOLM recommended the form of a 
complete alteration of the rules, in which reductions were made in all benefits except 
those relating to strike or lock-out, and superannuation. It seems that the provision 
policy of the ASOLM was changed to meet the Society’s determination to ensure its 
financial stability. As it will be seen, the scale of contributions for the lace makers was 
much higher than that of the auxiliary workers. Therefore it does not seem that the 
ASOLM sought the amalgamation in 1933 for raising money to the finance of the 
Society. However, it has to be pointed out that it was in the early 1930s when the 
membership of the ASOLM reached at the lowest level that they started to the 
amalgamation scheme. The industrial contraction became actual problems to the skilled 
workers through the decline in the membership and they decided to tackle with the 
industrial inefficiency by reorganizing their own union. However, union membership 
decreased not only in the skilled sector in the industry but also in the less skilled 
sectors. 
The Auxiliary Male Workers Society in the lace industry was established in the early 
1890s, and was an independent and autonomous body from the craftsmen. Partly 
because major general unions, composed of unskilled workers and semi-skilled workers, 
were formed in the same period, the Auxiliary Male Society has been classified in a 
previous study as a type of ‘new union’.26 It is certainly true that the Auxiliary Male 
Society was continuously strong and active in the political field before the First World 
War. A threader who was expelled by the Society was noticed publicly in 1911.27 The 
membership of the Auxiliary Society reached 600 in 1907.28 However, the Society 
became weaker, in particular, during the 1920s. The membership of the Auxiliary 
Society seems to have started to decrease from the years. There is no records of the 
membership of the Auxiliary Society in the 1920s. However the pattern of membership 
can be seen in their contribution books.29 The amount of contributions was £344 in 1920. 
And then, it dropped sharply in 1921 and then continued to decline at a constant rate, 
falling to £85 in 1925. This decrease seems to have continued up to the early 1930s. It 
                                                   
26 P.H. Wyncoll, The Nottingham Labour Movement, 1880-1939, London, 1985, 57. 
27 N.H. Cuthbert, The Lace Makers Society: A Study of Trade Unionism in the British Lace 
Industry, Nottingham, 1960, 62-4. 
28 Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions in 1908 - 1910, HMSO, 1912. 
29 Contribution books, Lm P 65, HL. 
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was reported at the request of the General Council of the TUC that their income from 
contributions was £40 in 1930.30 In 1931 the membership was only 60 by 1931.31 It can 
be easily imagined that the decline in the membership hit harshly the Male Society. A 
scheme for amalgamation was in fact proposed by the Auxiliary Society to the ASOLM 
in the 1920s. In 1924, a deputation from the Auxiliary Society requested financial 
assistance because their funds were too low to pay a deceased member's funeral benefit 
of £4.32 The idea of merger was not realized at the time because the ASOLM had an 
external problem to solve urgently. The General and Transport Workers’ Union 
projected to absorb the lace industry in the Derby area, especially in Long Eaton. The 
Workers’ Union after the First World War formed a Lace Operatives Branch in Derby 
and started to recruit lace makers. They tried to extend their influence to Nottingham, 
but their 'poaching twisthands' angered the ASOLM and their attempts were strongly 
resisted. The proposal for merge was being put off mainly because the ASOLM was 
stacked in tackling to solve the problem in the late 1920s. However, with these 
backgrounds, the amalgamation was expected to be achieved very smoothly because 
both the parties needed to merge. The problems, crisis in the membership and the 
finance, were serious enough to give an impetus for the unions to fuse together. However, 
it took in fact much longer than it had been expected. It turned out in the process of the 
merger that their intentions for fusion were crossing each other at some crucial. 
 
 
Process of the Merger 
 
By August of 1930, a draft proposal for amalgamation had been prepared by the 
General Secretary of the ASOLM, and at the request of the TUC this was discussed with 
its Organization Secretary in a private meeting during the Annual Congress of the TUC, 
held that year in Nottingham. The Executive Council of the ASOLM had sought the 
TUC advice on the whole matter of relations with the smaller unions in the industry.33  
                                                   
30 Financial Statement from January to December 1930, the Auxiliary Society of the Male 
Lace Workers, dated 15 May 1930, MSS 292/82.30/2, Modern Records Centre, University of 
Warwick (hereafter MRC). 
31 Letters from T.J. Severn to A. Hayday and General Council of the TUC, dated 13 
February 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
32 Cuthbert, The Lace Makers Society, 243. 
33 Playing a role in union amalgamations was a traditional interest of the TUC although it 
seems to have had little or nothing to do with the important developments between the 
wars. R.M. Martin, TUC: The Growth of a Pressure Group 1868-1976, Oxford, 1980, 196-7. 
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However, it was at the beginning of 1931 that the negotiations started in a real sense. In 
February of 1931 Arthur Hayday, M.P., received a letter about this proposal from J.T. 
Severn, the Secretary of the ASOLM.34 H.V. Tewson, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Organization Committee of the TUC, was asked by A. Hayday to discuss the issue at the 
General Council and the TUC started to consider the matter from March of 1931. From 
then on, the amalgamation was achieved mainly through five joint meetings of 
representatives of the three unions under the auspices of the General Council of the 
TUC over a period of more than two years. 
On the 11th of April 1931 a conference of unions was held in Nottingham under the 
chairmanship of A. Hayday to discuss the amalgamation. Originally the General 
Council invited nine lace workers unions; the ASOLM, the Southwell Lace Operatives 
Society, the Lever Card Punchers Association, the British Association of Lace and 
Embroidery Designers and Draughtsmen, the Auxiliary Society of Male Lace Workers, 
the Female Lace Workers, the Amalgamated Society of Lace Pattern Readers, the 
Basford Lace Bleachers Society, and the Nottingham and District Warpers' Association. 
Of these, the Female Lace Workers, the Basford Lace Bleachers Society, and the 
Nottingham and District Warpers' Association were female organizations, and they did 
not participate in this conference. As a result, only six unions attended. Each sent 
representatives, and A.E. Colton, J.T. Severn and R. Sale, who were secretaries of the 
British Association of Lace and Embroidery Designers and Draughtsmen, the ASOLM 
and the Southwell Lace Operatives Society respectively, were appointed as the 
representative of the British Lace Operatives Federation (BLOF). The BLOF was the 
Federation in the lace industry established in 1918 to standardize wages and 
rationalize the lace industry nationally. However, the BLOF was not successful in 
developing collective bargaining and became a totally ineffective body mainly because of 
the sectionalism in the ASOLM. Although the three representatives from the skilled 
organizations were on behalf of the BLOF it was just for formality. And it was only in 
this meeting that the mane of the BLOF could be seen in the process of the 
amalgamation. 
It seems that there was a difference in the intentions of the ASOLM and the General 
Council of the TUC at this point. Tewson wanted all the unions to merge. However, S. 
Dance, a representative of the Lever Card Punchers Association, rejected the 
                                                   
34 Arthur Hayday was the first MP. for the Labour Party in Nottingham, See, Wyncoll, The 
Nottingham Labour Movement, pp. 110, 140 - 7. T. Severn was the General Secretary of the 
ASOLM(AW) between 1928 and 1950. 
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amalgamation on the grounds that it would mean the sinking of individual identity. It 
seems that the Southwell Lace Operatives Society declined to amalgamate because they 
had a good relationship with their firm and had no reason to consolidate with other 
unions.35 The draughtsmen's Society did not agree with the suggestion of the TUC 
either. As a result, it was agreed at the conference that representatives of the ASMLW, 
the ASOLM and the Amalgamated Society of Female Lace Workers only should meet 
again under the auspices of the General Council to pursue further the possibility of 
fusion.36 However the factors affecting the proposed amalgamation were not at all 
simple. 
F. Rowland, the Secretary of the Auxiliary Society of Male Lace Workers, made it 
clear that there were difficulties in amalgamation despite the union’s final decision to 
continue discussion. He claimed firstly that the attitude of the Lace Makers to the 
auxiliary workers was very unsatisfactory, and secondly that, their wages were so low 
as to preclude the payment of higher contributions. He cited cases where men were 
earning only 20s. to 30s. for a full week.37 On the other hand, the ASOLM hoped that 
the amalgamation would take place soon, and for them 'the only problem which 
appeared to stand in the way was that of superannuation'.38 There were no particular 
difficulty in amalgamation for the Female Auxiliary Society, and in November of 1931, 
the Female Society expressed a strong desire for amalgamation.39 
One of the most difficult problems was practical one of how to fix contributions and 
benefits for auxiliary members in the new organization. Tewson asked Severn, Rowland 
and M. Ball, the secretary of the Female Workers Society, to send copies of the rules and 
balance sheets of each Society to him for his examination. Severn also enclosed a 
proposed scheme of contributions and benefits for auxiliary workers together. The Male 
Society was not satisfied with this proposal. Rowland wrote to Tewson that he was 
afraid that if contributions were increased the organization would be severely 
handicapped.40 According to their original rules, the contribution for members under 18 
years old was 3 pence per week and 6 pence per week for members over 18 years.41 
                                                   
35 TUC, Conference of Representatives of Unions in Nottingham and District Catering for 
Lace Makers, p. 2, 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
36 TUC, Report of Proceeding at the 63th Annual Trade Union Congress, p.111. 1931, MSS 
292/82.30/2, MRC. 
37 TUC, Conference of Representatives of Unions in Nottingham, op.cit., p.2. 1931. 
38 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 29 May 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
39 Ibid., dated 18 November 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
40 Letter from Rowland to Tewson, 29 April 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
41 Rules of the Auxiliary Society of Male Lace Workers, 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
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Under the proposal although members could receive special benefits, such as sickness 
benefit, which had not been available in their own organization, they would each have 
to pay a 3 pence higher contribution; 6 pence for members under 18 years and 9 pence 
for members over 18 years. Strike and lock-out benefits were allowed for members in 
their original rules, but they were not actually effective for so long years as shown. 
Tewson informed Severn of the dissatisfaction of the Auxiliary Society. 
Tewson and Severn had a talk in order to solve this problem. In that meeting, Severn 
promised to create a system with different level of contributions and benefits and to 
endeavor to provide for a lower scale of contributions with correspondingly lower 
benefits.42 In December 1931, another meeting of the three unions was held under the 
chairmanship of Hayday and Tewson, and the general principle of amalgamation was 
agreed.43 At this meeting, however, Severn suggested the same proposed scheme for 
Contributions, Benefits and Entrance fee for Auxiliary members as the one he had 
suggested in April.44 It seems, as a result, that the ASOLM and the Auxiliary Male 
Society were not in agreement with each other. It was decided not to alter rules in these 
areas until one year after amalgamation and to keep to the original contribution and 
benefits for each society until then. Further to this compromise, in January of 1932, the 
name of new union, composition, funds, contributions, benefits, trade practice were 
agreed, and it appeared that amalgamation would be in operation soon.45 
The question of contribution seems to have once settled down by the compromise. 
However, the intention of the General Council of the TUC was not exactly the same as 
that of the ASOLM, regarding contributions and benefits in the new organisation. In a 
letter of 3 November 1932, Tewson voiced his concern about the inflexible attitude of the 
Lace Makers the issue of concession for the Auxiliary Society on benefits. Tewson wrote 
to Severn as follows; 
 
A further matter... is the fact that no specific provision is made for the benefit to the 
Auxiliary Workers. ...it would appear that they [auxiliary workers] are entitled to the 
same benefit as the Lace Makers Section. ... and there is no provision stating who are and 
who are not entitled to sickness, out-of-work and superannuation benefit.46 
 
                                                   
42 TUC, Memorandum of interview, 12 May 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
43 TUC, Report of Meeting of Representatives of Unions in the Nottingham Lace Trade, 
December, 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
44 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 7 December 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
45 TUC, Report of Meeting of Representatives of Unions in the Nottingham Lace Trade, 
1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
46 Letter from Tewson to Severn, dated 3 November 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
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This was further proof of the difference in intention of the ASOLM and the General 
Council of the TUC. Although it seems that the TUC promoted this amalgamation in 
the context of the wider meaning of the trade union movement, the ASOLM sought only 
their own interest. Therefore Severn's answer to Tewson’s query was very simple and he 
just repeated that they would proceed under the agreement of 12 December 1931 and 
present contributions, benefits and trade practice would remain the same for the first 
twelve months of the new union. We will discuss what real intention of the executive of 
the ASOLM was. 
It appeared that the scheme would come into effect early in 1932. However, another 
query was raised again by the Auxiliary Male Workers in March. Rowland asked Severn 
about the question of the legality of amalgamation before a ballot of the members had 
been taken.47 This discussion on the legal position of effecting the fusion took nine 
months, and the proposals were unanimously agreed at a meeting on the 15th of 
October 1932.48 This was not the end of the discussion. The Auxiliary Workers again 
tried to delay fusion, raising the question of continuity of membership. Although the 
General Council and the ASOLM worked the merger to come into effect at the beginning 
of the New Year, the Male Society requested June as the date of amalgamation.49 These 
repeated rejections by the Male Society were not common attitudes among auxiliary 
workers in the lace industry. Severn wrote to Tewson on the 1st of November 1932 that 
they would be able to impress on the Male Society the importance of getting the scheme 
into operation as soon as possible as it was known that a number of auxiliary workers 
were anxious to become members as soon as the amalgamation was completed, but 
absolutely refused to join the present organization.50 Furthermore to it, some members 
of the Male Society allowed their membership to lapse because they felt that the Society 
was not an effective organization.51 However, as far as the Executive of the Male 
Society was concerned, there seems to have been strong doubt about amalgamation. 
There is no clear evidence showing the reason for their repeated complaints. Tewson 
wrote in a letter to Hayday that the Male Society was playing for time without any valid 
reason.52 However, the next letter from Severn to Tewson indicated what was allegedly 
                                                   
47 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 30 March 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
48 TUC, Summarised Report of Meeting of the Joint Executives of the ASOLM, the ASMLW 
and the ASFLW,15th October, 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
49 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 27 October 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
50 Ibid., dated 1 November 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
51 Letter from Tewson to Hayday, dated 28 October 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
52 Ibid. 
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the ‘very unsatisfactory’ attitude of the Lace Makers to the Auxiliary workers. 53  
Severn stated in his letters to Tewson that  
 
...at one of firms where the Auxiliary Workers joined the Auxiliary Society some time ago, 
and left off paying contributions owing to the apathy of the officials of the Society, a 
dispute has been in progress ...  I have been asked by both the workers and the employer 
why we cannot take in these workers. At the moment they have no one to look after them, 
and it is doubtful if the Auxiliary Society have one per cent of the workers in this section 
in their Society. If we could only get permission to enroll these workers, we could have at 
least 70 per cent of them in the Society in a few weeks time.54 
 
Severn acted as a mediator between the employer and the workers in this dispute. He 
had stated in a previous letter that some employers were looking forward to the 
amalgamation in order that they could get auxiliary workers when necessary.55 
By contrast to the reluctant attitude of the Male Workers, the Female Auxiliary 
Society was very positive toward the amalgamation. It is clear that as in the case of lace 
makers and auxiliary male workers, the membership of the Female Auxiliary Society 
had also decreased over the years. The membership reached its peak of 222 members in 
1906, and then gradually decreased between 1910 and 1914. It dropped to 130 in 1914 
from 175 in 1910.56 After that it seems to have maintained almost the same level of 
membership during the 1920s.57 Although decrease in membership might have been 
one of the reasons why they accepted amalgamation soon after its proposal, the main 
reason was that they were almost completely under the control of the ASOLM. Their 
organization was originally established by the ASOLM, who spent 'both money and 
time'.58 According to B. and S. Webb, the women's union was totally controlled by the 
male lace makers.59 Regarding contributions and benefit, they were 3 pence per week 
for members over 16 years old and 2 pence for members under 16, and there was to be 
no great change as a result of amalgamation.60 Therefore the Female Society did not 
express any dissatisfaction about the amalgamation proposed. 
                                                   
53 Rowland’s statement at the Conference of April 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
54 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 14 March 1933, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
55 Ibid., dated 7 March 1933, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
56 Board of Trade, Report on Trade Unions (1912), pp. 38-9. Regarding the membership of 
the Female Society in the 1910s, data is available in Ministry of Reconstruction, Report of 
the Women's Employment Committee (HMSO, 1919). According to this source, the 
membership was, 130 in 1914, 125 in 1915, 75 in 1916 and 129 in 1917. 
57 In 1931, the membership of the Female Society was 118. Letter from J.T. Severn to A. 
Hayday, dated 23 February 1931, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
58 Wyncoll, The Nottingham Labour Movement, 94. 
59 B. & S. Webb, Trade Union Collection, Section A, vol. XXXIX. 
60 Rules of the Female Lace Workers' Union, Nottingham 1920, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
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It should be noted that female auxiliary workers constituted only one section of 
female workers in the lace industry. There were a huge number of women workers 
engaged in other processes of lace making, such as finishing and mending, who did not 
belong to an organization. The amalgamation proposal interested some of these. In 
October of 1932, Susan Lawrence, an ex-leader of the workers side on the Lace 
Finishing Trade Board,61 informed the General Council of the TUC that the Lace 
Finishers, both factory workers and out workers, were completely unionized, and the 
proposed amalgamation should widen its scope so as to take in finishers.62 The workers 
engaged in the finishing section were employed partly in the warehouses, and partly as 
outworkers. In 1932, there were 1,800 female workers in this section; some 1,000 were 
employed in the warehouses or factories and about 700 were home-workers.63 The 
Trade Board played a part in regulating their wages. However, the Board applied only 
to the out-workers, and the wages of those working inside on similar jobs were totally 
unregulated. Therefore, it was natural for some of them to want to have a proper system 
for assuring systematic bargaining. Before the slump in the 1920s, there had been an 
organization for the outworkers known as ‘the Home Workers League’ with 300 
members paying penny each per week. This organization was carried on with the 
knowledge of the Lace Makers Union and was to be converted into a proper trade union 
as soon as the outworkers were ‘sufficiently educated’.64 However, it had fallen apart as 
a result of the slump and both outworkers and inworkers were without organization in 
1932. S Lawrence also approached Severn and promised to help M. Ball, the secretary of 
the Female Society, to organize a campaign for promoting membership. Severn 
promised to discuss this issue with the Executive Committee of the ASOLM. However, 
there is no evidence that the Lace Makers discussed this matter seriously. Judging by 
the rather limited increase in the membership of the females in the years following the 
amalgamation, as will be discussed in the next section, it seems likely that the 
participation of the finishing workers did not take place and their joining the new union 
was out of the interest of the ASOLM. 
We return to the main process of the amalgamation. By December of 1932, 'Proposed 
scheme of fusion: for the information of members' had been prepared by Severn and 
                                                   
61 According to her letter, she was forced to resign the status in 1929. However, Popplewell, 
an officer of Trade Board, requested that she return to back to her previous position. Letter 
from S. Lawrence to Tewson, dated 1 October 1932. Letter from Popplewell to Lawrence, 
dated 5 September 1932, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
62 Letter from S. Lawrence to Tewson, op.cit., MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
63 Letter from F. Popplewell to S. Lawrence, op.cit., MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
64 Letter from S. Lawrence to Tewson, op.cit., MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
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Tewson. Amalgamation was becoming reality. This leaflet said that 'The negotiation is 
to create a single union for lace makers and auxiliary workers in order that a united 
appeal may be made for all eligible members to join and thus secure 100 % trade union 
organization. In this way it is hoped that, by united action, the interests of the industry 
and the workers engaged will be furthered to an extent which has hitherto been 
impossible owing to lack of essential unity’.65 However, at the same time, this proposal 
claims that “it should be understood that existing contributions, trade customs and 
privileges of the respective organization have been safeguarded and will be maintained 
by the fusion”.66 Later pages of the leaflet detailed such items. For example, there 
remained a difference in contributions and benefits between craftsmen and auxiliary 
workers by introducing scales. It seems that the auxiliary workers in fact did not gain 
anything from this amalgamation. In May, Severn urged non-unionized auxiliary 
workers to join the new organization and sent bills to shop stewards for display on the 
shopfloor. He wrote again to Tewson that he had received a number of names from 
various workshops, of workers who were ready to join the new Society as soon as they 
could be enrolled in them as members.67 
 
 
Results of the Merger 
 
The Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers and Auxiliary Workers 
(hereafter ASOLMAW) eventually came into existence in 1933. This amalgamation 
seems to have been rated as a failure in previous studies.68 As long as it is seen in the 
official records of the TUC, as stated, the membership of the ASOLMAW did not change 
throughout the 1930s.69 However, the contribution books set up for the new auxiliary 
section after 1933 shows that the merger was, to some extent, influential to the 
auxiliary workers.70  Although the total contributions of the auxiliary members were 
£57 at the end of 1933, 
                                                   
65 The ASOLM, Proposed scheme of fusion: for the information of members (Nottingham, 
1933). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Letter from Severn to Tewson, dated 10 May 1933, MSS 292/82.30/2, MRC. 
68 Cuthbert, The Lace Makers Society, 243-44. 
69 The TUC, Reports of Proceedings of the Trade Union Congress, 1919-1939. 
70  In the contribution book, we can see how individual members actually paid their 
contributions. The members' name and the sum paid can be seen foe each week from April 
of 1933 to December of 1939 
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<Table 3>  The number of the Auxiliary workers in the ASOLMAW, 1933-39 
Years Male Female Total
1933 139 56 195
1934 159 122 281
1935 180 120 300
1936 185 126 311
1937 185 123 308
1938 162 124 286
1939 115 97 212
 
Source:  The Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers and Auxiliary Workers, Contributions Books, 
Auxiliary Workers, 1933-1939. Lm P/65, Hallward Library, University of Nottingham. 
 
it started to rise after the merger and reached to £ 255 in 1936.71 The membership of 
the auxiliary workers also increased from 1933. Table 3 shows the changes in the total 
numbers of the Auxiliary workers in 1931 and between 1933 and 1939. In 1933, the 
membership was 195 and it rose up to 311 in 1936. Although the figures are not large 
and the term of increase was short, the amalgamation somehow appealed to the 
auxiliary workers in the lace industry for a while. 
The number of both the male workers and female workers increased from 1933. After 
peaking in 1937 in the male case and 1936 in the female case, the numbers started to 
decline noticeably from 1938 in the male case and in 1939 in the female case. Breaking 
down by the sections in the auxiliary workers shows the details of the reaction among 
the auxiliary workers. The member of the new organization was divided into five 
sections by the scale of contribution. They firstly were divided into two parts, the lace 
makers (Scale A) and the auxiliary workers, and the latter was sectioned further into 
four parts: male auxiliary workers over 18 year old (Scale B), threaders and brass 
bobbin winders (Scale C), male auxiliary workers up to 18 year old (Scale D) and female 
auxiliary workers (Scale E). The contributions were respectively 6 pence, 6pence, 
3pence, and 3pence. The left columns of Table 3 show the age distribution of the male 
auxiliary workers. It shows firstly that the numbers of high-scale auxiliary workers was 
stable, but by contrast, the numbers of the workers under 18 year old were more 
variable. Despite no great change between 1933 and 1934, they gradually rose and had 
doubled by 1936. Although these numbers were not great influential enough to affect 
the total number due to their small percentage, we can see that young workers 
responded to the alterations in the union’s organization. The middle columns of Table 3 
shows the breakdown of the female auxiliary workers by the scale distribution as we 
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cannot break down female workers by age group owing to the method of classification of 
the scales in the contribution book. In contrast to the male workers’ case, the ratio of low 
scale members to the total members in female auxiliary work was consistently high and 
was never less than eighty per cent of the total members. The ratio of low scale 
members to high scale members reflects the ratio of low scale workers to high scale 
workers in the industry as a whole. The number of low scale female workers jumped in 
1934 and stayed almost at the same level, whereas that of the high scale workers did 
not change much. To sum up briefly, the high scale auxiliaries did not show a 
measurable response to the amalgamation, whereas low scale auxiliaries, male 
auxiliaries under 18 years old and low scale female auxiliaries responded to it 
positively. 
As mentioned, after the amalgamation, the ASOLMAW started campaign for 
promoting membership. This effort was continued throughout the 1930s. In 1936, the 
executive committee again appealed to all Lace Makers to render all possible assistance 
in making the auxiliary section a strong one.72 This appeal was not successful, partly 
because of apathy for trade unionism among the young workers,73 and partly because of 
the transfer of workers to other trades.74 However, the main reason for the decrease in 
membership in the later 1930’s was the attitude of the organization, which did not fully 
recognize the status of the auxiliary workers and their value of his membership. This 
made the recruiting campaign of the mid-thirties far less effective than it could have 
been, although some auxiliary members reported that their position had greatly 
improved since joining. In 1938, the annual report stated, "The Auxiliary Section 
members...have remained loyal; true, there have been some cases where difficulties 
have arisen, but those difficulties could easily be overcome if the lace makers ... would 
assist the Executive Council".75 This situation seems to have been resolved after the 
outbreak of World War II. The annual report of 1940 stated that “the Auxiliary section 
of the industry is now entirely under the control of the Executive Council. The two small 
Societies having now transferred their members to the present body, it is hoped to make 
this section much stronger than in the past".76 
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It is certain that vertical segregation of the lace industry both in the process of 
making lace and in employment relations made the industry potentially inefficient, 
especially in the Slump when the number of semi-skilled workers and unskilled workers, 
especially young workers, were decreasing. Partly because the hosiery industry could 
absorb workers during contraction of the lace industry, assuring sufficient numbers of 
lower skilled workers was a serious problem. Drastic changes in the situation of the 
industry during the interwar period made the established industrial specialization less 
effective and then led to a need to overcome this problem. Amalgamation between the 
ASOLM and the Auxiliary Societies was a type of unification and an answer for the 
problem. This amalgamation was undertaken for further unification between processes 
in lace making from the point of view of trade union organization. It is clear that the 
ASOLM saw the amalgamation as a means of recovering control over the lower unions. 
The numbers of workers in the lace industry and membership of the unions in the 
industry had decreased drastically in the inter war period. The supply of auxiliary 
workers had already been recognized as one of the most difficult problems in 1919.77 It 
was pointed out in the early 1920s by the Executive Committee of the ASOLM that 
large percentages of young workers, more particularly auxiliary workers, obtained 
employment in other trades.78 It was, therefore, necessary for the craftsmen to assure 
the number of auxiliary workers and to have them under the craftsmen’s control. The 
amalgamation was undertaken in order to meet this necessity on the shop floor of the 
lace industry. This intention of the ASOLM was, despite some differences, 
correspondent with that of the General Council of the TUC to promote a powerful trade 
union movement through an expansion of membership. In addition, it should be noted 
that this merger was welcomed by the employers and their associations as stated by 
Severn, Secretary of the AOLM.79 There is not a lot of tangible evidence of employers 
and union relations, but the following is a good example. Some auxiliary members did 
not pay their contributions even after the start of World War II. In 1941 an arrangement 
was proposed between the union representatives and the employers side 'NOT TO PAY 
THOSE WHO REFUSE TO JOIN OR ARE UNWILLING TO BE FINANCIAL 
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MEMBERS' in order to  force them pay their contributions. 80  This is a sign of 
co-operation between the union representatives and employers regarding securing of 
auxiliary workers. The proposed amalgamation by the ASOLM was, to some extent, at 
least at the beginning of the negotiation, welcomed by the Auxiliary Male Society. The 
slump of the early 1920’ had weakened the position in the industry. However, it was 
becoming clear that full fusion as proposed by the ASOLM would mean a loss of control. 
It seems that this was a major reason why the Auxiliary Male Society delayed merging 
and dissolving themselves. On the other hand, the situation of the female workers was 
very different from that of the male workers. With the exception of only a few workers, 
there was no effective organization for female workers despite the still extremely large 
number of female workers in the lace industry. Although the female members increased 
as had been expected, the increase was not very great considering the huge numbers of 
female workers in the industry.  
Overall the amalgamation was not as successful as T. Tewson, the secretary of the 
ASOLM, had hoped during the stage of negotiation. Young male workers under eighteen 
years old were responsive to this amalgamation. However, the increase in membership 
was not great enough to be influential on the recovery of the union’s influence, nor to 
the industry as a whole. In the middle of the 1930s the industry recovered for a short 
while. The output of the Plain Net section rose up to £1.416 in 1935 from £439 in 1930, 
and in the Lever Section from £375 to £904 in the same period.81 Even the number of 
young workers under 18 year old reversed to 484 in 1935 from 369 in 1930 (Table 2). 
However, it seems that the amalgamation could account for only small portion, 10.8 per 
cent, of the increase in the whole industry.82 
In conclusion, we can detect the intention of the skilled workers' union in the lace 
industry to fortify the existing craft structure, and strengthen their relationship with 
semi-skilled workers and their unions. The merging activities in the lace unions were 
accelerated not by good economic situations but in order to shelter from the pressure of 
the industrial slump. However, the amalgamation did not enable the union to 
strengthen its influence on the lace industry as a whole. In addition, the Lace Maker’s 
Society itself seems to have become less attractive even among the members. The 
                                                   
80 Annual Report, December, 1941, p. 4. 
81 Census of Production, 1930 and 1935. 
82 In 1935 there were 484 young male workers under 18 years old in the lace industry 
according to Table 2. We can find at least 52 male auxiliary members in the Society from 
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Executive wrote in the Annual Report of December 1938 that they ‘desired to draw the 
attention of the members to the insufficient number of nomination for the various 
committees and urge the responsible members to do all that is possible to secure 
nominees in order that the Committee may be at full strength'.83 This is evidence that 
their influence on the working community became weaker, and the absorption of the 
lower grade unions was, probably, their last attempt to secure their survival before 
Second World War. 
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The Bank of England Financial Advisory Missions to Latin 
America during the Great Depression: 







This paper examines the activities of the Bank of England Missions to Latin America 
during the 1930s, focusing on the Niemeyer Missions to Argentina in 1932 and the 
Powell Mission to El Salvador in 1934. Previous studies have shown little interest in 
examining the reactions of the countries which received the missions or the intentions 
of the local governments and other interests, such as major politicians or big 
commercial bankers, etc. Therefore in this article, I would like to analyze these local 
factors and actors in detail and insist that the success of "money doctoring" depends on 
the political and economic situation in the country which receives the mission, i.e. 
whether there are local promoters or collaborators. This would not only furnish a fresh 
interpretation of the Bank of England Advisory Missions in the interwar years, but also 
provide a new image regarding “money doctoring” in general.  
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After the First World War, Lord Montagu Norman (Governor of the Bank of England, 
1920-1944) attempted to reconstruct international monetary and economic order 
through the establishment of a gold exchange standard1. In order to achieve this goal, 
Lord Montagu sought to establish "orthodox" central banks in as many of the peripheral 
countries as possible2. The "orthodox" central banks were supposed to be independent 
from national governments and function as the guardians of sound money both 
internally and externally, and were also expected to economize on their use of gold 
reserves. In addition, these central banks were expected to be agents that would 
promote central bank cooperation under the leadership of the Bank of England and 
ultimately realize world peace. 
In order to propagate the "orthodox" central banking doctrine, during the inter-war 
years British financial advisory missions were dispatched all over the world from the 
Bank of England3. As Table 1 shows, the activities of the Bank’s missions seem to be 
more comprehensive in scale and deeper in their impact than those of the well-known 
Kemmerer missions in the 1920s4. The Bank’s missions were not only dispatched to 
countries in the British Empire, but also to so-called "informal empire" countries such 
as Argentina, China and Egypt. Hence, the Bank of England missions are widely 
considered to be the most important case of "money doctoring" in history. 
This article examines the activities of the Bank of England Missions to Latin America 
during the 1930s, focusing on the Niemeyer Missions to Argentina in 1932 and the 
Powell Mission to El Salvador in 1934, based on research of primary documents held by 
the Bank of England Archives. These missions are considered to be worthy of attention 
for the two following reasons: first, they shed light on the British policy regarding the 
countries which constituted the "informal empire" on which few studies have been 
                                                   
1 There are a few biographies of Lord Montagu Norman. See, in particular, Boyle, A. 
Montagu Norman, London, 1967; Clay, H. Lord Norman, London, 1957. 
2 For the Lord Montagu Norman’s epitome of the "orthodox" central banking, see Cottrell, 
P.L. Rebuilding the Financial System in Central and Eastern Europe, 1918-1994, Aldershot, 
1997, 63. 
3 The activities of the Bank of England Financial Advisory Missions in the interwar years 
are roughly reviewed by the following books: Sayers, R.S. The Bank of England, 1891-1944, 
London; New York; Melbourne, 1976; Singleton, J. Central Banking in the Twentieth 
Century, Cambridge; New York, 2011. 
4 For details of the Kemmerer Missions, see Drake ed., P.W. Money Doctors, Foreign Debts, 
and Economic Reforms in Latin America from the 1890s to the Present, Wilmington, 1994. 




published5. Second, they represent an interesting case study of "money doctoring" or 
"money doctors", because almost all of the Latin American countries in the 1930s were 
in default and were plagued by a series of military coups d’état6, inevitably making the 
missions' tasks both daunting and challenging. 
In this study we have focused on the following point, which has not previously been 
addressed. It is inevitable that "money doctoring" from abroad must have involved 
infringement of sovereignty and provoked some kind of conflict of interest or 
nationalism on the side of the countries that invited the "money doctors". However, 
previous studies have shown little interest in examining the reactions of the countries 
which received the missions or the intentions of the local governments and other 
interests, such as major politicians or big commercial bankers, etc.7  
 
<Table 1>  British Financial Advisory Missions in the Interwar Years 
Countries Year Advisors and Institutions Results
South Africa 1920 Sir Henry Strakosch the South African Reserve Bank was established
Austria 1923 Financial Committee of the League of Nations the Australian National Bank was established
Poland 1923 Financial Committee of the League of Nations reorganized the National Bnak of Poland into a central bank
Free State of Danzig 1923 Financial Committee of the League of Nations the Bank of Danzig was established
Hungary 1924 Financial Committee of the League of Nations reorganized the National Bank of Hungary into a central bank
Czechoslovakia 1926 Financial Committee of the League of Nations the National Bank of Czechoslovakia was established
Estonia 1927 Financial Committee of the League of Nations reorganized the Bank of Estonia into a central bank
Bulgaria 1928 Financial Committee of the League of Nations reorganized the National Bank of Bulgaria into a central bank
Greece 1928 Financial Committee of the League of Nations the Central Bank of Greece was established
Australia 1930 Sir Otto Niemeyer reorganized  the Commonwealth Bank into a central bank
New Zealand 1930 Sir Otto Niemeyer the Central Reserve Bank of New Zealand was established
Brazil 1931 Sir Otto Niemeyer reorganize the Bank of Brazil into a central bank(failed)
Canada 1933 Lord Macmillan, Sir Charles Addis the Bank of Canada was established
India 1933 Sir Earnest Harvey, W.H.Clegg the Central Reserve Bank of India was established
El Salvador 1934 F.F.J.Powell the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador was established
Argentina 1935 Sir Otto Niemeyer the Central Bank of Argentina was established
China 1935 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross financial and currency reforms were carried out
Egypt 1936 Sir Otto Niemeyer reorganized the National Bnak of Egypt into a central bank  
Based mainly on the description by Sayers, R.S. The Bank of England, 1891-1944, London; New York; Melbourne, 
1976. 
                                                   
5 After the World War I, the Bank of England Financial Advisory Missions were sent mainly 
to the central and eastern Europe, "formal" empire countries and "informal" empire 
countries. We already have a few good studies on the former two areas. For details of these, 
see, in particular, Orde, A. British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First 
World War, Cambridge, 1990; Cottrell, P.L. Rebuilding the Financial System in Central and 
Eastern Europe, 1918-1994, Aldershot, 1997; Péteri, G. “Central Bank Diplomacy: 
Montagu Norman and Central Europe’s Monetary Reconstruction after World War Ⅰ”, 
Contemporary European History, 3, 1992. 
6 Marichal, C. A. Century of Debt Crisis in Latin America: From Independence to the Great 
Depression, 1820-1930, Princeton, 1989, Chap.8. 
7 On this subject, see Frandreau, M. ed. Money Doctors: The Experience of International 
Financial Advising, 1850-2000, London and New York, 2003. 
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Note: The Financial Committee of the League of Nations was dominated by a few British officials such as Strakosch 
(Sir Henry Strakosch) and Niemeyer (Sir Otto Niemeyer). Therefore activities of the Financial Committee are 
included in this Table. 
 
 
1. The Bank of England Missions to Latin America during the 
Great Depression 
 
1.1. Latin American Economy in the Interwar Years 
 
In this section, we briefly overview the economy of Latin America in the interwar 
years. It is well-known that the Latin American region was a typical area of the British 
informal empire from the 19th to the early 20th century. However, as Tables 2 and 3 
show, the area has been encroached on by American financial and economic influence 
since the First World War.  
According to these tables, the United States increased its trade and investments, 
particularly in the countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Chile which were 
grouped as "Mineral-producing countries" and "Tropical agricultural countries" by the 
League of Nations8. There was a close connection between American investments and 
trade in Latin America since three-quarters of the capital represented direct 
investments, mainly by enterprises engaged in plantation and mining for export9. 
 
<Table 2>  Latin American Imports and Exports: Market Shares, 1913 and 1929 (%) 
US UK US UK US UK US UK
Colombia 25 21 46 15 45 15 75 5
Peru 28 28 42 14 34 36 35 19
Chile 17 35 32 18 21 39 25 13
Brazil 16 24 27 21 32 13 45 8






Source: Knight, A. “Latin America” in J.M. Brown and Wm.R. Louis eds., The Oxford  




                                                   
8 League of Nations. The Network of World Trade, Geneva, 1942, 12. 
9 Ibid., 56. 




<Table 3>  Outstanding Long-term Investment of UK and US in Latin America in 
1939 (millions of dollars) 
UK US
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay 2,250 800
Brazil 1,000 500
Chile 300 600
Rest of South America 300 600
Mexico and Central America 300 670
Cuba 150 750
Other West Indies 200 80
Total 4,500 4,000  
Source: League of Nations. The Network of World Trade, Geneva, 1942, 56. 
 
 Against the backdrop of this situation, the well-known Kemmerer Missions were 
dispatched to many Latin American countries. In the 1920s, US investors were eager to 
invest there, but, at the same time, they demanded assurance of the security that would 
come with financial stability. Therefore on the part of the Latin American governments, 
the establishment of central banks and the financial reforms recommended by the 
Kemmerer Missions were essential for attracting US capital10. Central banks were 
actually established in many Latin American countries under the guidance of the 
Kemmerer Missions in the 1920s.   
However, the 1929 Crisis completely devastated the financial order established by 
Kemmerer. Without the possibility of getting American loans, almost all of the Latin 
American countries fell into default, and a few Latin American countries such as 
Argentina and Brazil started to implement unorthodox policies such as open market 
operation in order to avoid undergoing external shocks11. From the standpoint of the 
orthodox doctrine, these measures seemed inflationary and it was considered that they 
would lead to financial chaos. Furthermore, given the economic difficulties caused by 
the 1929 Crisis, the Bank of England saw the situation as a chance to reclaim its 
financial influence in Latin America12. This was the context in which the Bank of 
England Financial Advisory Missions were dispatched. 
 
                                                   
10 Dalgaard, B.R. “Monetary Reform: Prelude to Colombia’s Economic Development”, The 
Journal of Economic History, Vol.40, No.1,(Mar.), 1980, 100. 
11  Bulmer-Thomas, V. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, 
Cambridge and New York, 1994, 194. 
12 Cain, P.J. “Gentlemanly Imperialism at Work: the Bank of England, Canada and the 
Sterling Area,1932-1936”, Economic History Review,XLIX,2, 1996, 337. 
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<Table 4>  Latin American Debts and Defaults 
Country Date of Initial Default Funded External Debt in 1933(U.S.$)





Costa Rica 11/1932 21,000,000
Cuba 1933-34 153,000,000
Dominican Republic 10/1931 16,400,000
Equador 7/1931 23,000,000
El Salvador 1/1933 4,000,000
Guatemala 2/1933 14,000,000
Haiti No default 13,000,000
Honduras No default 4,000,000
Mexico 1914 684,000,000





Venezuela No default 0  
Source: Marichal, C. A. Century of Debt Crisis in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression, 
1820-1930, Princeton, 1989, 212-213. 
 
 
1.2. The Bank of England’s Policy on Latin America 
 
As Sayers’ seminal study indicated, there was every possibility that the Bank of 
England Financial Missions could succeed in creating central banks based on the 
orthodox principle in Latin America13. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, 
the Latin American region still had strong economic relations with Britain, both in 
terms of trade and investments, even after the Great Depression. Secondly, most of the 
Latin American governments still considered the City as one of the international 
financial centers and thought it appropriate to seek advice on central banking from the 
Bank of England. Thirdly, the United States’ government was so committed to the 
internal economic recovery program that it lost the will to dispatch missions to Latin 
America after the Great Depression.  
Hence, a chance appeared for the Bank to propagate its central banking doctrine to 
                                                   
13 Sayers, The Bank of England, 1891-1944, 521-522 




Latin America in the 1930s. According to a memorandum by the Bank’s Overseas & 
Foreign Department, the Bank itself recognized this opportunity and seemed to have a 
very optimistic view of sending the missions to Latin America. 
 
“Economic ideas are very catching in Latin America, and with returning prosperity there 
seems every possibility that other republics will follow the example of the Argentine and 
Salvador. In addition to these two republics the five Kemmerer countries (Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile) already have Central Banks, ...although their statutes 
do not fulfill all the requirements of a true Central Bank.” 14 
 
However, in reality, contrary to this optimistic view, the Bank sent missions only to 
Brazil in 1931, Argentina in 1932 and El Salvador in 1934, and succeeded in creating 
central banks only in Argentina and El Salvador. In Brazil, Niemeyer’s advice was 
rejected as an "unpalatable dish" by Vargas’s government15. Furthermore, although 
central banks were established in Argentina and El Salvador, very little is known about 
the factors which led to their creation.  
 
 
2. Niemeyer Mission to Argentina 
 
2.1. The Creation of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic 
 
The former banking system was completely altered by five closely connected laws: (1) 
The Central Bank of the Argentine Republic (hereafter CBAR) (Law 12, 155); (2) The 
Banking Law (Law 12, 156); (3) The Institution for the Liquidation of Bank Investments 
(Law 12, 157); (4) Amendments to the Laws of the Official Banks (Law 12, 158/12, 159); 
(5) The Law of Organization (Law 12, 160)16. Through these laws, a central banking 
system was firmly established in Argentina. As Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show, the 
Conversion Office and Exchange Committee, and certain functions of the National Bank 
were merged into the newly-created central bank. 
                                                   
14  Overseas and Foreign Department, “Bank of England Missions to Latin America”, 
OV188/2, Bank of England Archives, 1935. 
15 For details of the Niemeyer’s recommendations, see Report Submitted to the Brazilian 
Government by Sir Otto Niemeyer, K.C.B.,G.B.E., Rio de Janeiro, 4th July, 1931. 
16 Editorial la Ley Buenos Aires, Anales de Legislación Argentina, Año 1920-1940, Buenos 
Aires, 1953, 596-610. 
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According to the analysis of the League of Nations, the banking reform was based on 
Niemeyer’s recommendations17. However, in reality, these bills concerning the CBAR 
were drawn up by the then Finance Minister F. Pinedo and sent to Congress on 17th 
January. Although, up till now, it has been argued that the Laws concerning the CBAR 
were framed based on Niemeyer’s draft, this view must be modified in light of the three 
following facts.  
Firstly, Law 12, 155 stipulates that the CBAR is a joint-stock company with a capital 
of 30 million pesos, a 10 million peso block of which is to be subscribed by the 
government. However, in order to assure the independence of the central bank, 
Niemeyer recommended that the government should not subscribe to shares of the 
CBAR. Secondly, under the stipulations of Law 12,155, open-market operations were 
implemented for the first time in Argentina, although Niemeyer did not recommend 
these measures because of Argentina’s immature financial market. Thirdly, the 
Liquidation of Bank Investments was created under the instructions of Pinedo. 
   These findings seem to refute the above-mentioned argument regarding Sir Otto’s 
role in forming the laws relating to the financial reform of Argentina. That is, they 
underline the importance of the role played by Pinedo. In fact, we have already 
confirmed that, in addition to even the basic rule of independence of the central bank 
not being assured by the laws, drastic measures were introduced by Pinedo. This is 
because leadership in creating the central bank in Argentina was taken by Pinedo, not 
Sir Otto. It is crucial to remember this fact if we are to discover the true factors leading 












                                                   
17 For details of the Niemeyer’s recommendations, see Report Presented to the Argentine 
 Government by Sir Otto Niemeyer, K.C.B.,G.B.E., Buenos Aires, 24th March, 1933. 
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Based mainly on the description by the League of Nations, Economic Statistical Series 1910-1945, 45, Far 
Eastern Book-Sellers(Kyokuto Shoten), Tokyo, 1987, p.2. 
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2.2. Factors Leading to the Creation of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic 
 
In the previous section, we confirmed that the laws concerning the creation of the 
CBAR were modified by Pinedo. Why then did Pinedo make these modifications? 
Finding the answers to this question will allow us to discover the factors leading to the 
creation of the CBAR. 
It is important to note that, in short, Sir Otto intended to create a central bank which 
only had the power to supply money based on the gold exchange standard. In other 
words, Sir Otto expected the CBAR to be an institution which would act simply as an 
"orthodox" central bank. However, Pinedo and R. Prebisch, the General Manager of the 
CBAR, went so far as to implement the following novel or heterodox measures18. 
Firstly, they further developed the exchange control system which had been in 
operation since October 1931. The CBAR’s foreign exchange department not only 
purchased and sold gold and performed foreign exchange, but also—taking advantage of 
a dual exchanged market—raised funds for creating various kinds of marketing boards 
which alleviated the distress of the primary exporting sectors19.  
Secondly, as mentioned before, they created a transitional institution to bail-out the 
four big commercial banks which had accumulated huge quantities of bad assets 
relating to government bonds and mortgages. In exchange for getting the money to 
liquidate the bad assets, they were forced into one bank called the Banco Espanol del 
Rio de la Plata Limitado. In addition, the Banco Escandinavo Argentino and Banco Italo 
Argentino were liquidated due to their bad management20. 
Finally, this being the most important point, after sanitizing the corrupt banking 
system, Pinedo introduced counter-cyclical measures. This was totally out of line with 
the orthodox central banking doctrine of the Bank of England. Prebisch introduced open 
market operations with the securities which had been gradually sold to the market and 
succeeded in managing the fluctuations of the international business cycle. This policy 
was praised by the League of Nations as ‘the most striking example of cyclical 
neutralization’21. 
                                                   
18 Dosman, E.J.The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch, 1901-1986, Montreal; London; Ithaca, 
2008, 98 
19 Salera, V. Exchange Control and the Argentine Market, New York, 1941, Chap.4. 
20 Della Paolera G. and Taylor A.M. Straining at the Anchor: the Argentine Currency Board 
and the Search for Macroeconomic Stability, 1880-1935, Chicago and London, 2001, 
253-254. 
21 League of Nations. International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Inter-War Period, 
Geneva, 1944.League of Nations 1944, 85. 




In conclusion, we could argue that a key factor playing a major role in the creation of 
the CBAR was the intentions of the economic policy-makers such as Prebisch and 
Pinedo, not those of Sir Otto. What role then did Sir Otto play in setting up the CBAR? 
The answer can be found in Pinedo’s following recollection. 
 
“・・・There was rather excessive partiality in favor of the British proposal that of Sir Otto 
Niemeyer from which we drew not only many ideas but also phraseology, when we 
thought there was no serious objection to doing so, even though we may have felt that 
better texts could have been adopted. We did this because we did not want to create 
serious obstacles to the approval of the bills and we knew that, by a curious 
characteristics of the collective mentality, at that moment the adoption of the 
government’s proposals would be facilitated if we could make them appear to coincide to a 
great extent with what the foreign expert had advised.”22 
 
It is true that this shows that Sir Otto’s format for creating a central bank was 
respected. But we should take more notice of the fact that Pinedo used Sir Otto’s—i.e. 
the Bank’s—authority to pass the law which stipulated creation of the CBAR and 
helped Prebisch and Pinedo achieve their own goals. Cain’s recent work on the creation 
of the Bank of Canada also concluded that Canadian politicians succeeded in using the 
Bank’s prestige and influence to serve their own domestic ends23. 
 
 
3. Powell Mission to El Salvador 
 
3.1. The Creation of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 
 
In this section, we deal with another case of a successful Bank of England Financial 
Advisory Mission to Latin America. In this case, the Bank sent F.F.J. Powell to give 
advice on central banking matters to the government of El Salvador24. As a result, the 
Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador Law was enacted on 19 June, 193425. From the 
                                                   
22 Ciria, A. Parties and Power in Modern Argentina, Albany, 1974, 24-25. 
23 Cain, P.J. op.cit., 1996, 354. 
24 For details of the Powell’s recommendations, see Report Presented to the Government of 
El Salvador by F.F.J. Powell, 8th March, 1934, OV20/1, Bank of England Archives. 
25 For details of the law, see Diario Oficial, Imprenta Nacional Ministerio de Gobernación, 
El Salvador(http://www.imprentanacional.gob.sv/index.php/institucion). 
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Bank’s or Powell’s standpoint, this could be judged as a very successful Mission. 
According to Sayers’ work, Lord Norman praised Powell’s success, and the Mission was 
remembered long afterwards 26 . The Powell Mission to El Salvador was seen as 
successful based on the following three points. 
Firstly, central bank independence was assured by Law; the Government was strictly 
prohibited from being a shareholder in the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 
(hereafter ‘CRBES’). In addition, L.A. Duran, who had been recommended by Powell as 
a sound central banker, became the first President of the CRBES. 
Secondly, as Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show, drastic financial reform was successfully 
carried out. The banking system of El Salvador had actually been dominated by the "big 
three" commercial banks since the end of the 19th century, and each enjoyed issuing 
rights without any strict regulations27. However, one of these commercial banks, the 
Banco Agricola Comercial, was transformed into the CRBES, and the other two were 
forced to abandon issuing rights and surrender their gold reserves to the CRBES.  
Thirdly, unlike the case of Argentina, there was no stipulation concerning open 
market operations. The CRBES was given only the power to maintain the external and 
internal values of the colón, and to control the internal volume of money in accordance 
with the volume of gold and foreign exchange. According to Wallich and Adler, El 
Salvador has the almost unique distinction among Latin American countries having 
maintained a stable exchange rate and a free exchange market since 193428. The colón 
was pegged a rate of 2.5 to the United States dollar by the CRBES. The CRBES was 










                                                   
26 Sayers, R.S. The Bank of England, 1891-1944, London; New York; Melbourne, 1976, 524. 
27  Anderson, T.P. Matanza: The 1932 “slaughter” that traumatized a nation, shaping 
US-Salvadoran policy to this day, Second Edition, Connecticut, 1992, 193. 
28 Wallich, H.C. and Adler J.H. Public Finance in a Developing Country: El Salvador-A Case 
Study, Cambridge and Massachusetts, 1951, 35. 
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3.2. Factors Leading to the Creation of the Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador 
 
What then brought about these successful results? In short, the ‘orthodox’ central 
bank in El Salvador was not created because the El Salvadoran policy-makers 
wholeheartedly accepted the Bank of England’s orthodox doctrine. It was a by-product 
of the political struggles between M.H. Martínez and R. Duke who played critical roles 
in the creation of the CRBES. 
Martínez was the President when Powell visited El Salvador29. He was from the lower 
middle class and of Indian ancestry. He engaged in military service and distinguished 
himself as an able military technician. His ultimate objective as President seemed to be 
the establishment of the military as the nation’s governing elite, in place of the coffee 
oligarchy known as the ‘fourteen families’ that had exercised control since the end of the 
19th century30. On one hand, he established the state-guaranteed Commission for the 
Defense of Salvadoran Coffee in order to prop up the coffee industry, an action which, in 
a way, served the interests of the oligarchy. On the other, however, he was determined to 
create a system in which the state directed the economy.  
In contrast, Duke was managing director and majority shareholder of the Banco 
Agricola Comercial, which had grown together with ‘coffee prosperity’ since the end of 
the 19th century31. Duke actually accepted his bank being transformed into a central 
bank not only because he thought it would bring him some money through a part of the 
shares of Agricola being sold to the government, but also because he believed he would 
get the post of President of the CRBES, allowing him to become a dominant power in 
financial and banking circles32. According to Anderson, he went so far as to eliminate 
Martínez by backing another army officer33. 
Knowing Duke’s intentions, Martínez expressed his wholehearted support of Powell’s 
recommendation and realized the creation of the CRBES. As already mentioned, the 
Banco Agricola Comercial lost the right to issue its own paper money and its own gold 
reserve. In addition, Martínez appointed Duran, who was recommended by Powell as a 
                                                   
29 For further details Martínez, see Parkman, P. Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: 
The Fall of Maximiliano Hernάndez Martínez, Tucson, 1988, Chap.2. 
30 Kinsbruner, J. and Langer E.D. eds. Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture, 
Second Edition,Vol.3, 2008, 91. 
31 Lindo-Fuentes, H. Weak Foundations: The Economy of El Salvador in the Nineteenth 
Century, Berkeley, 1990, 183. 
32 Letter from F.F.J. Powell to Sir Otto Niemeyer, 7 Feb., 1934, OV20/1, Bank of England 
Archives. 
33  Anderson, T.P. Matanza: The 1932 “slaughter” that traumatized a nation, shaping 
US-Salvadoran policy to this day, Second Edition, Connecticut, 1992,195. 




sound banker with no political ambitions. We could argue that the authority of the Bank 
and its advisor Powell was used by Martínez to eliminate the power of his rival. As in 
the case of Argentina, the authority of the Bank and its advisor was used by local 
interests and policy makers. We can conclude that this is the factor that led to the 





Both case studies underlined the importance of the local factors and actors. Prebisch 
and Pinedo in Argentina, and Martínez in El Salvador, all succeeded in using the Bank 
of England’s prestige and influence to serve their own agenda. What these findings 
seem to highlight is the major role played by the local or peripheral actors, once called 
"collaborating elites" by Gallagher and Robinson34. 
Although this study is limited to the Latin American region and is still in its early 
stages, this may indicate that the success of "money doctoring" depends on the political 
and economic situation in the country which receives the mission, i.e. whether there are 
local promoters or collaborators. An approach from the perspective of the periphery 
could be applied to previous studies on the Bank of England policies regarding central 
and eastern European countries and the countries of the British formal Empire.  
Hence, what we need to do now is to review the history of "money doctoring" based on 
the view from the peripheral standpoint. This would reveal the actual process of "money 
doctoring", and the negotiations between advisors and local interests and amongst the 
local interests themselves. This would not only furnish a fresh interpretation of the 
Bank of England Advisory Missions in the interwar years, but also provide a new image 
regarding money doctoring in general. In addition, studies based on the peripheral 
viewpoint could provide interesting historical case studies which might support policy 






                                                   
34 Gallagher J. and Robinson R.E. “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, Economic History 
Review, 2nd ser. VI, 1953. 
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  How the British lost their empire has recently attracted renewed attention from 
historians.  Their interest has been fueled both by the release of new archival records 
about the collapse of colonialism and by the broader resurgence of research into the 
imperial experience and its postcolonial legacies.  The causes, course, and 
consequences of decolonization have generated a flood of books and articles in recent 
years, ranging from specialized studies to broad surveys.  Many more such works can 
be anticipated in the near future.  For the past seven years, I have had the privilege of 
serving as a faculty participant in the National History Center’s International 
Decolonization Seminar, which brings to Washington D.C. fifteen junior scholars from 
around the world for a month of research and debate about European decolonization.1  
The fascinating array of research projects that they and other historians are currently 
pursuing promise to enrich our understanding of the history of decolonization for years 
to come. 
While it would be erroneous to claim that a new interpretive consensus has emerged 
among historians about the collapse of the British Empire, much recent and 
forthcoming work shows that the British were far more reluctant to relinquish control 
over their imperial possessions than the conventional narrative has acknowledged and 
that the process of decolonization was consequently far more troubled and violent in 
many cases than we had previously appreciated.  The decolonization of the British 
Empire is often still conceived as a carefully choreographed series of ceremonies where 
colonial officials and nationalist leaders stood together on stages, gave speeches, signed 
documents, exchanged handshakes, and observed the lowering of the Union Jack and 
the raising of the new nations’ flags while military bands dutifully played “Pomp and 
                                                   
 George Washington University 
1 The seminar is directed by Wm. Roger Louis, funded by the Andrew Mellon Foundation, 
and hosted by the Library of Congress.  Information about its mission and activities can 
be found at: http://nationalhistorycenter.org/category/decolonization-seminar/. 
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Circumstance”.  What happened at these events is usually referred to as the ‘transfer 
of power,’ a trite phrase that suggests decolonization was a consensual, constitutional, 
and, above all, orderly process.  This complacent characterization of the British 
experience is often contrasted to the violence and chaos that accompanied the 
decolonization of the French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese empires.  What much of 
the recent scholarship on decolonization has shown, however, is that the break-up of the 
British Empire was no less afflicted by disorder, displacement, and destruction than 
were other European empires, contradicting simplistic assumptions about the 
exceptional character of the British case. 
Another version of exceptionalism has continued to inform the conventional view of 
decolonization as well, if only because it is left largely unspoken and unexamined.  
This is the belief that European decolonization in the two to three decades after World 
War II was a unique event, a turning point that brought an abrupt end to the age of 
empire and the triumph of the age of the nation-state.  The very fact that the word 
“decolonization” was not coined until the late 1930s and did not come into common 
usage until the late 1940s certainly suggests that the events it signified were 
unprecedented in nature.  Yet this period was not the first one to find European 
empires forced by global crises to surrender control of colonies to rebellious colonists 
and other parties.  Nor, arguably, was it the last.  Once we remove our teleological 
blinders, it becomes clear that the British Empire and its European rivals had passed 
through several previous periods of decolonization, even if that term had not been 
coined in time to describe them.  Our understanding of the disintegration of the 
European empires after World War II can be greatly enriched by examining this 
moment of decolonization in the context of these earlier eras of imperial upheaval. 
But, first, it is important to understand how these misconceptions about British (and, 
more broadly, European) decolonization came into play and why they have endured as 
long as they have.  The simple answer is that they served the interests of the major 
parties involved in the process of decolonization.  For the British, it was obviously 
preferable to portray decolonization as an act that they had undertaken of their own 
accord, the culmination, in effect, of their self-professed efforts to prepare their colonial 
charges for the responsibilities of self-government.  Where the scale of the violence and 
disorder that often accompanied decolonization made it impossible for the British to 
claim good will and a graceful exit, they did their best to erase these events from their 
memory. 
The nationalist regimes that inherited power in these ex-colonial states had their own 
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reasons to encourage a kind of selective amnesia about decolonization.  True, their 
public histories place more emphasis to the actual struggles to win independence than 
did those offered by the British.  Much attention was paid in particular to the trials 
and tribulations of the new nations’ founding fathers.  But those groups and 
individuals that had sought to create differently constituted states or had conceived of 
the nation in different terms were ignored or vilified by the victors, and the internal 
conflicts that so often gave rise to civil wars and ethnic cleansing were subsequently 
erased from public memory.  The desire to let sleeping dogs lie provided a powerful 
incentive to promote a kind of selective amnesia about the process that produced 
nation-states out of empires. 
So both the British and their ex-colonial heirs have had a shared interest in 
promoting a selective and sanitized version of decolonization, one that presents it as a 
rational process carried out by political elites whose actions affirmed the authority and 
legitimacy of the governments they represented.  The two parties also have had a 
shared interest in portraying the era of decolonization as an unprecedented historical 
event, one that brought into being an entirely new epoch.  This teleology also appealed 
to the two postwar superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which 
were determined to present themselves as the agents of modernity, ushering in a new 
world, a postcolonial (and, so they claimed, a post-imperial) world that fulfilled the 
promise of national self-determination through the creation of an international concert 
of independent nation-states.  
 
 
* * * 
 
Far from being unprecedented, the upheavals that brought about the dismantlement 
of the British and other European colonial empires in the aftermath of the Second World 
War comprised the third wave of decolonization.  The first wave can be termed as the 
era of New World decolonization (1776-1822), the second the era of Old World 
decolonization (1917-1922), and the third the era of Third World decolonization 
(1947-1970s).  Some might characterize the disintegration of the Soviet Union as still a 
fourth wave.  Each of these waves resulted in the transfer of sovereign authority over 
large tracts of territory from European empires to independent nation-states.  Yet 
Britain in particular was able to reconstitute and revivify its empire despite the losses it 
incurred in the first and second waves, and it sought to do the same by means of the 
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“special relationship” it established with the United States during the third wave.2 
Two themes become apparent when we place the decolonization of the post-World War 
II period in the context of the two prior waves.  The first is the crucial role that global 
wars played in the process of decolonization, creating the economic and political crises 
that made this transformation possible.  The second is the degree to which 
decolonization was not simply the rejection or negation of imperialism, but a 
manifestation of the collision between empires and, all too often, an impetus to renewed 
imperial ambition and aggrandizement.    
The first great wave of European decolonization occurred in the Americas.  It began 
in 1776 with the rebellion by the thirteen North American colonies against British rule.  
This was followed in 1804 by the great slave revolt against French rule in 
Saint-Domingue (Haiti), which made that island colony the second nation in the 
Western hemisphere to break away from European control.  Soon thereafter a series of 
revolutions swept through Spain’s new world colonies, extending from Mexico to 
Argentina in the early decades of the nineteenth century.  In addition, Brazil declared 
its independence from Portugal in 1822.  The crucial precondition and impetus for the 
American Revolution was the global imperial struggle between Britain and France 
during the Seven Years War.3  It produced the economic and political pressures that 
provoked rebellion by American colonists.  All the other New World revolts came about 
as a by-product of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which were in many 
respects a continuation of the earlier global struggle between Britain and France.  
Napoleon was unable to reestablish control of Saint-Domingue and his invasion of Spain 
and Portugal undermined those empires’ ability to maintain control of their own 
American colonies.  Yet “what emerged from [these] imperial revolutions was not the 
antithesis of empire, but the revitalization of the notion of empire itself.”4  The main 
beneficiary of this imperial revitalization within the Americas was the United States, 
which used the Louisiana Purchase to launch its bid to build a transcontinental empire, 
one that eventually incorporated territory previously claimed by Britain, Spain, Mexico, 
and Russia, not to mention many Native American polities.  The other major 
beneficiary was Britain, which was able to impose informal imperial control over many 
                                                   
2 Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Decolonization,” Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22, 3 (1994): 3462-511. 
3 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage, 2001). 
4 Jeremy Adelman, “An Age of Imperial Revolutions,” American Historical Review, 113, 2 
(April 2008), 320. 
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of the newly established South American states, enforced by means of gunboat 
diplomacy.   
The second great wave of decolonization was precipitated by World War I.  All of the 
European continental empires collapsed under the strain of that terrible conflict.  The 
first to go was the Russian empire: the revolution that overthrew the Czarist regime 
resulted in the political fragmentation of its vast dominions.  Poles, Estonians, and 
other subject peoples along the empire’s western borderlands were able to form 
independent nation-states—at least until the next war provided the Soviets an 
opportunity to reassert its Czarist predecessor’s sovereignty.  And once the Bolsheviks 
had established control of the Russian heartland, they began to reassert influence over 
the wayward provinces to the south and east, rebuilding the Russian Empire on new 
ideological and organizational foundations as a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  
The Austro-Hungarian Empire also broke up as a result of the war, and although it may 
be more problematic to describe its domains as colonies, Vienna certainly ruled over 
restive peoples in central and southeast Europe, as the assassination of Archduke 
Ferdinand by Serbian separatists—the precipitating cause of the Great War—made 
abundantly clear.  The Czechs, Hungarians, and other subject populations of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire would become beneficiaries of President Woodrow Wilson’s 
call for national self-determination by establishing nation-states.  Imbedded in this 
new principle was the premise that these new nation-states would possess relatively 
homogeneous populations, which gave rise to what Eric Weitz has termed “the pursuit 
of population politics.”5  The problem posed by population politics was most readily 
apparent as a result of the post-war collapse of another great continental empire, the 
Ottomans.  When the truncated nation-state of Turkey emerged from the empire’s 
ruins and the Greeks failed in their irredentist efforts—supported by the British—to 
assert control over a large swathe of Anatolia, a massive population transfer ensued, 
with a million Greeks driven out of Turkey and 350,000 Muslims forced from their 
homes in Greece.6  This horrific case of ethnic cleansing would be a harbinger of things 
to come.   
Britain and its great power allies made it clear, however, that the Wilsonian principle 
                                                   
5 Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the 
Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” 
American Historical Review, 113, 5 (December 2008), 1323. 
6 Michelle Tusan, Smyrna’s Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle 
East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
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of national self-determination did not extend to non-European peoples.7  Nowhere was 
this more apparent than in the southern and eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, 
which the British and the French divided between themselves as ‘mandated territories’, 
quasi-colonial possessions sanctioned by the League of Nations.  Similarly, the German 
Empire’s colonies in Africa and the Pacific were distributed among the victors.  
Meanwhile, Egyptian, Chinese, Korean, and other non-western advocates of national 
self-determination were simply ignored.  The war, then, brought decolonization to 
Europe itself, but it simply reshuffled the imperial deck elsewhere, much as the 
decolonization of the New World had done.  No imperial power benefitted more 
dramatically from these developments than Britain, which acquired direct or indirect 
control of ex-German colonies in Africa and the Pacific, Ottoman territories in the 
Middle East, and, at least temporarily, portions of what had been Russia’s imperial 
sphere in the Caucasus and Central Asia.   
One final example of Old World decolonization in this era is worth special attention: 
the curious case of Ireland.  This is the only significant territorial loss by one of the 
victors in World War I, and it is noteworthy for several reasons.  First, it marked the 
failure of more than a century’s worth of efforts to bring about the political integration 
of Ireland within the United Kingdom.  In this respect, Ireland was to Britain what 
Algeria was to France—a territory separated from the imperial homeland by a narrow 
sea, occupied by a large settler population, and nominally incorporated within the 
metropolitan political system.  Yet much of the indigenous Irish population, not unlike 
its Algerian counterpart, was never wholly reconciled to its conquerors.  Second, the 
mutual antagonisms between the Catholic and Protestant populations within Ireland 
meant that the struggle for independence was also in some respects a civil war, with 
ethnic cleansing one of its consequences.  In the south, Protestant landlords were 
driven off their estates and their country houses were burned to the ground.  In the 
north, Protestants launched what has been described as a ‘pogrom’ against Catholic 
communities.  Nowhere were its effects more devastating than in Belfast, where 650 
houses and businesses were destroyed, 8,000 residents fled their homes, and nearly 500 
individuals—two-thirds of them Catholics—were killed.8  The immediate consequence 
of this ethnic violence was the partition of Ireland, an outcome that would recur in other 
                                                   
7 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
8 Robert Lynch, “The People’s Protectors? The Irish Republican Army and the ‘Belfast 
Pogrom,’ 1920-1922,” Journal of British Studies, 47, 2 (April 2008), 375-376. 
                                          Decolonization and Disorder 101 
 
 
places where decolonization exposed and intensified ethnic tensions and conflicts. 
 
 
* * * 
 
The third major wave of decolonization—the one we most commonly associate with 
the term—was precipitated by another world war.  The states that launched World 
War II were trying, in effect, to reverse the decolonization of Europe and to redraw the 
imperial map in Asia.  Hitler, like Napoleon, sought to establish a European-wide 
empire, though unlike Napoleon, he pursued a reactionary agenda that relied on racial 
hierarchies and slave labor.  There is a good deal of truth to the claim that Hitler was 
simply attempting to apply within Europe the same doctrines and practices that 
governed European colonial rule over non-European peoples. 9   Japan sought to 
establish a similarly structured empire across Asia and the Pacific, one that treated 
Chinese, Koreans, and others as inferior races and sought to replace Europeans as the 
colonial masters.  Nor should we forget Italian efforts to establish a new Roman empire 
in the greater Mediterranean region, which also collided with the interests of 
established European imperial powers.   
World War II was in many respects far more genuinely global in its scale and 
repercussions than World War I, and its devastation stretched far beyond the 
battlefields.  In Asia, for example, the war caused massive disruptions in trade and 
especially food supplies, leaving populations vulnerable to starvation.  One result was 
the notorious Bengal famine of 1943, which left some 3 million people dead; another was 
a famine in Vietnam in 1944-45, which claimed an estimated 1.5-2 million victims.10  
These were only the most dramatic examples of the widespread suffering experienced 
by civilian populations across Asia as a result of economic disruptions, food shortages, 
forced labor, and political violence.  Only recently have historians begun to appreciate 
the full dimensions of this human disaster.  Elsewhere, the historical neglect has been 
even more noticeable.  To my knowledge, no one has devoted much attention to the 
civilian suffering that the war in North Africa produced, though countless people were 
                                                   
9 Sven Lindqvist, ‘Exterminate All the Brutes’: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart of 
Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide (New York: New Press, 2007).  
10 For the Bengal famine, see Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The 
Fall of British Asia 1941-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), ch. 5.  
The Vietnamese famine figures come from Ronald Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The 
Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House, 2007), 
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displaced by the movements of armies and a terrible famine that swept through the 
region.  Even in sub-Saharan Africa, which was largely untouched by fighting, the war 
placed immense pressures on populations.  A famine in Rwanda killed an estimated 
300,000 people (probably a higher per capita death toll than in the Bengal famine).11  
Britain mobilized nearly half a million of its African subjects for military service, and 
many more were pressed into forced labor, including 100,000 men sent to work in the tin 
mines of Northern Nigeria and another 84,500 in the sisal and rubber plantations of 
Tanganyika.12  The traumatic effects of the war were felt by peoples all across Asia and 
Africa.  It shattered or strained colonial institutions, gave impetus to nationalist 
doctrines, and made violence so pervasive a feature of everyday life that its effects 
proved difficult to contain even after official hostilities ceased. 
If the experience of war gave impetus to anti-colonial feelings, its outcome also 
ironically gave the British and their European allies new hopes of recovering the 
colonies they had lost to the Japanese and reinvigorating those they had retained.  
Some American officials sarcastically suggested that the acronym SEAC (South East 
Asia Command) actually meant Save England’s Asian Colonies.13  To be sure, the 
British recognized that major concessions to Indian nationalists would be required 
when the war ended, but they did not believe that this necessarily meant the loss of 
their imperial influence on the subcontinent.  Churchill, for example, had hopes that 
the outcome would be the balkanization of India into “Pakistan, Hindustan, and 
Princestan,” each sufficiently weak and suspicious of the others to ensure a continued 
British presence in the region.14  And almost immediately after the surrender of Japan, 
the British moved to regain control of the colonies they had lost in the war.  British 
rule was soon reestablished in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong.  British 
forces (which meant Indian troops in many cases) also occupied Indochina and 
Indonesia.  By their own lights, the British were not seeking imperial aggrandizement 
by these actions, but rather the restoration to the French and the Dutch of their rightful 
colonial domains.   
Not surprisingly, these postwar initiatives ran into plenty of opposition from peoples 
whose deference to imperial authority had been shattered by the war.  The Burmese 
                                                   
11 Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of 
the Colonial Empires (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 70. 
12 Hyam, 125. 
13 Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Armies, 363. 
14  Sir Archibald Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, ed. Penderel Moon (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 120. 
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objected, the Malaysian Chinese objected; the Indians, who had been objecting for some 
time, did so with renewed vigor.  British efforts to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia 
stirred up a hornet’s nest of resistance.  Its most dramatic manifestation was the battle 
for the city of Surabaya, which “equaled in intensity many of the urban battles of World 
War II”.15  The city was almost totally destroyed and Indonesian casualties numbered 
7,000.  And this was simply a preview to the violence that accompanied Dutch efforts 
to re-impose colonial control over Indonesia.  The same thing happened in Vietnam as 
French reoccupation provoked resistance from the Viet Minh.  Even so, the more 
telling point in the immediate aftermath of the war is not that the British and their 
European allies ran into resistance, but that they were so determined despite that 
resistance to reconstitute their Asian empires. 
They were even more optimistic about the prospects for a new imperial era in other 
parts of the world, especially sub-Saharan Africa, with its vast, underutilized resources.  
Here the British in particular made plans to turn their African colonies into another Raj, 
using the mineral and agricultural resources of the continent to revive its own economy 
and protect it from American competition.  The French had similar ambitions for their 
African colonies, as did the Belgians and even the Portuguese.  All of them embraced 
the rhetoric of modernization, and all hoped that colonial economic development would 
forestall demands for political freedom.16 
When nationalists’ demands in fact intensified in spite of—or, in some cases, because 
of—the postwar economic boom in minerals, edible oils, and other primary products, 
European officials tried to head off or blunt any real devolution of power with clever 
schemes to restructure colonial institutions, territorial boundaries, and constitutional 
relations to the imperial metropolis.  The British Commonwealth offered one model: it 
had provided the basis for protectionist policies during the Great Depression and for a 
common strategy during the Second World War, and British officials were determined to 
hitch India and other colonies to that institution.  France and the Netherlands 
developed post-war commonwealth proposals of their own: in each instance the aim was 
to bring colonies into closer political association with the imperial center, often by 
admitting representatives to a common parliament.  The problem, of course, was that 
these schemes were designed to ensure that colonial peoples had little real political 
leverage.   
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16 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and 
British Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
104 East Asian Journal of British History, Vol. 3 (2013) 
 
 
Another institutional strategy the imperial powers introduced to diffuse nationalist 
demands was to draw neighboring colonies together in regional federations.  A key 
purpose of these schemes was to shackle those colonies that were troubled by 
nationalist agitation to other colonies that were more subservient to imperial 
interests—in effect, replacing divide-and-rule with combine-and-rule.  The British got 
into federations in a big way: their schemes included the Central African Federation 
(Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland), the East African Federation 
(Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika), the Malayan Federation (Malaya, Singapore, Borneo), 
the West Indies Federation (Jamaica, Trinidad, and other Caribbean islands), and the 
South Arabian Federation (Aden and South Yemen).  The French introduced an 
Indochina Federation and a West African Federation.  The Dutch tried to establish an 
East Indies federation.  Some of these federations never got off the drawing board, and 
none lasted very long.  They are important nonetheless for two reasons: they 
demonstrate both that imperial authorities were prepared to cook up new institutional 
schemes to hold onto their colonies in one form or another and that they regarded 
colonial territorial boundaries as arbitrary and fungible.  
The British and their European counterparts also turned when necessary to that old 
standby, violence and repression.  Torture, detention without trial, forced relocation, 
and brute military force became characteristic features of late colonial regimes.  The 
sheer scale of the violence that accompanied decolonization has been forgotten in far too 
many cases.  It is difficult to find much information about the 1947 nationalist 
rebellion in Madagascar, which required 18,000 French and Foreign Legion troops to 
crush and cost some tens of thousands of Malagasy lives.17  We still know surprisingly 
little about the Dutch military campaign to maintain control of Indonesia from 1946 to 
1950.  At its height, this campaign involved 140,000 Dutch and auxiliary troops, along 
with a militarized police force of 35,000, and it carried out what has been described as 
“extreme violence” against nationalists. 18   Portugal’s prolonged struggle to retain 
control of its African colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau required the 
use of more than 200,000 soldiers, and we may never know how many hundreds of 
thousands of Africans died in its counter-insurgency campaigns.  No European empire, 
however, is likely to have surpassed the death toll the French compiled in their 
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desperate efforts to hold on to Vietnam and Algeria.  In Vietnam, some 20,000 French 
soldiers were killed, along with 11,000 foreign legionaires (many of them German 
veterans of World War II), 15,000 Senegalese and other African troops, and 46,000 
Indochinese recruits—a telling reminder of how much colonial armies relied on subject 
peoples as cannon fodder.19  Vietnamese losses numbered half a million.  The Algerian 
war absorbed nearly 500,000 French troops, of whom almost 18,000 were killed, while 
the death toll among Algerians may have reached a staggering million people.20 
Some British historians rather smugly insist that their country managed the business 
of decolonization with far less violence and destruction than other empires.  Ronald 
Hyam, whose Britain’s Declining Empire is the most recent major study of the subject, 
praises the British for their “relatively smooth and peaceful transfers of power,” 
proclaiming the outcome of decolonization “a success story.”21  This strikes me as a 
highly selective and deeply distorted judgment.  Two years after the end of World War 
II, Britain had army battalions stationed in Egypt, Libya, Cyprus, Somaliland, Sudan, 
India, Burma, Malaya, and various other territories, including Palestine, where 80,000 
troops and 20,000 police waged an unsuccessful campaign to maintain control over that 
small but explosive land.  In 1948 the National Service Act instituted peacetime 
conscription for the first time in British history; it remained in force through 1960.  
The law required all young adult males to spend 18 months (extended to two years in 
1950) on active duty in the armed force, followed by four years in the reserves. Nearly 
one and a half million Britons were conscripted during this period.  They served in a 
series of military operations, including long and bloody counter-insurgency campaigns 
in Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-56), Cyprus (1955-59), Oman (1957-60), and Aden 
(1963-67), as well the great debacle at Suez (1956) and the quasi-colonial clash with 
Indonesia in Borneo (1962-66).22  Many of these campaigns have been all but purged 
from the British public memory.  Forgotten Wars is the apt title that Christopher Bayly 
and Tim Harper have given to their important book on the wars of decolonization that 
broke out in British South and Southeast Asia.23   
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One of the conflicts that registered quite forcefully in the British consciousness at the 
time it occurred was the Mau Mau rebellion in colonial Kenya.24   Only recently, 
however, has the scale of the violence that the British perpetrated against suspected 
rebels been revealed.  Although they disagree about how many Gikuyu and other 
Kenyans were killed and incarcerated in detention camps, even the lower estimate is 
daunting: 20,000 dead and 150,000 imprisoned.  David Anderson notes that 1090 Mau 
Mau rebels were hanged, and he observes that “at no other time in the history of British 
imperialism was state execution used on such a scale as this.”25  The recent revelations 
that the British government destroyed thousands of records concerning torture, murder, 
and other human rights abuses during their retreat from empire and hidden thousands 
of other embarrassing files in a secret Foreign Office archive at Hanslope Park suggest 
that the Kenyan case was not unique.26  So far, no one to my knowledge has conducted 
a systematic examination of the human costs of British counter-insurgency campaigns 
in the post-war era, but those costs were clearly not negligible.27 
Once these attempts by the British and other European imperial powers to restore 
and maintain colonial rule through military force and political stratagems collapsed, as 
they eventually did, the consequence was often a precipitate, chaotic rush to withdraw.  
Roger Louis has argued that European decolonization was as much of a ‘scramble’ as 
European colonization had been.28  This term perfectly captures the often unplanned, 
disorderly nature of the withdrawal.  The retreat from empire was characterized by 
two striking developments that often get overlooked in celebratory accounts of 
decolonization.  One was the mass flight of European soldiers, settlers, and other 
colonial agents, as well as many of their non-European collaborators.  The other was 
                                                                                                                                                     
Southeast Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
24 See the classic work by Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., and John Nottingham, The Myth of ‘Mau 
Mau’: Nationalism in Kenya (New York: Meridian, 1970), David Maughan-Brown, Land, 
Freedom, and Fiction: History and Ideology in Kenya (London: Zed, 1985), and Dane 
Kennedy, “Constructing the Colonial Myth of Mau Mau,” The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 25, 2 (1992): 241-260. 
25 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 7, whose estimates are presented.  Caroline Elkin, 
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: Henry Holt, 
2005), estimates the number of those killed at 136,000-300,000 and those placed in 
detention camps at 1.5 million (xiv, 366). 
26 See Ian Cobain, Owen Bowcott, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Britain Destroyed Records of 
Colonial Crimes,” The Guardian (April 17, 2012), accessed online 4/23/2012. 
27 Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of 
Empire (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
28 Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and 
Decolonization (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). 
                                          Decolonization and Disorder 107 
 
 
the outbreak of civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of political violence as 
competing regional, religious, linguistic, and other groups sought to shape the 
territorial dimensions and ethnic composition of nation-states while they were still up 
for grabs.  
For Europeans, perhaps the most visible and dramatic manifestation of 
decolonization was the sudden flight of their countrymen from the colonies they had 
settled and governed.  A preview of what was in store for them came with the collapse 
of the Japanese empire at the end of World War II.  Lori Watt has studied the 
extraordinary five million or so Japanese settlers and soldiers who were forced to flee 
Manchuria, Korea, and other territories colonized by Japan, another of the aspects of 
decolonization that has until now been all but forgotten.29   
The British were fortunate to have had relatively few officials, planters, and the like 
in India, Burma, and Ceylon, and those who pulled up stakes had plenty of other sunny 
tropical climes to relocate to.  For most sahibs and memsahibs, Africa and Australia 
was a far more appealing than damp, dreary Britain, struggling with postwar austerity 
measures.  It was a different story, however, for the 300,000 or so Dutch and Eurasia 
refugees from Indonesia: they had few other options than cramped, cold Holland.  Most 
of the tens of thousands of Frenchmen who were driven from Indochina in the 1950s 
also had little choice but to return to France.  But their repatriation was little more 
than a trickle compared to the flood of pied noirs who fled Algeria after independence.  
Over a million settlers retreated to France; another 50,000 to Spain, and smaller 
numbers to Malta and Italy.  Tiny Belgium had to absorb nearly 100,000 refugees 
when colonial rule in the Congo suddenly collapsed in 1960.  And in the 1970s Portugal 
was obliged to absorb nearly half a million settlers and 200,000 soldiers when its 
African colonies were lost.30 
Far less well documented is the impact of decolonization on those minority 
populations that had found privileged niches as auxiliaries of colonial regimes.  The 
Christian Ambonese had been the main source of recruits for Dutch colonial forces in 
Indonesia, and they paid a high price for their collaboration upon independence.  An 
even more tragic example is the Harkis, poor villagers recruited to fight for the French 
during the brutal Algerian war.  With independence, the victorious FLN probably 
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killed 100,000 of the Harkis and their families, while another 100,000 fled to France 
(despite efforts by the French government to keep them out).31  In plenty of places, 
immigrant communities that had established specialized niches in colonial economies, 
often as artisans and traders, were forced to pack up and go once decolonization 
occurred.  Indians were made unwelcome in newly independent Burma and Malaysia, 
and later still their countrymen were expelled from Kenya and Uganda.  Chinese were 
targeted as enemies in Malaysia and Indonesia; Lebanese were driven out of many West 
African states; Iraqi Jews were forced from Singapore.  The Parsis of Bombay, who had 
enjoyed a privileges status in British India, saw their fortunes decline dramatically in 
the post-colonial era.32  Countless other examples could be mentioned.   
What happened to these minority groups was often part of a larger process of civil 
unrest and ethnic cleansing as colonies were transformed into nation-states.  Arguable 
the most tragic case was British India, where various groups—Hindus, Muslims, and 
Sikhs, princes and communists, scheduled castes and tribes and more—jockeyed for 
position, seeking to shape the outcome of decolonization.  It is important to recall that 
there was nothing inherent or predetermined about the sort of state that would replace 
the Raj, despite the decades of Parliamentary commissions, government roundtables, 
and constitutional blueprints.  “Partition took place,” Yasmin Khan has astutely noted, 
“in a society only partially emerging from long years of war,” which had inured many of 
its members to violence and eroded the power of the colonial state.  The result was “one 
of the worst human calamities of the twentieth century.”33  Even after the decision was 
made to partition India by giving a separate state for Muslims (but not Sikhs, Nagas, 
and various others), most of the subcontinent’s inhabitants had little real appreciation 
of what partition meant, where the boundaries were, and which ‘country’ they now 
belonged to.   Hindu and Muslim extremists launched systematic campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing against members of the other community.  Their efforts resulted in half a 
million to a million deaths, along with the rape, mutilation, and kidnapping of tens of 
thousands women, and the forced migration of some 12 million people across newly 
created, artificial borders.  This was nation-building with a vengeance. Until recently, 
however, this tragic story has received remarkably little attention.  Instead, we have 
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been treated to in-depth examinations of the strategies and negotiations that took place 
between Gandhi, Mountbatten, Nehru, and Jinnah—a worthy subject, to be sure, but 
one that fails to indicate what actually happened in the villages and cities of South Asia.  
For many of those swept up in the maelstrom of violence in the Punjab and Bengal, the 
only way they could cope with its emotional trauma was by asserting a kind of willful 
amnesia.  Only recently have historians and others begun to break through that 
amnesia and record the memories of partition’s survivors.34 
A very similar process occurred in Palestine, where decolonization again involved a 
desperate scramble by the British to get away and an equally desperate struggle by the 
Jews and Palestinians to drive one another out of their homes and claim the emptied 
land as their own.  A recent book by the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe argues that the 
Zionists launched a calculated campaign of ethnic cleansing that resulted in the 
massacre of hundreds of Palestinian peasants, the destruction of over 500 Palestinian 
villages, the clearing of Palestinian neighborhoods in major cities, and the forced 
removal of some 800,000 Palestinians.  Pappe also makes the point that since then the 
Israeli state has systematically sought to erase the memory of the Palestinian presence: 
most modern Israelis do not know that forests and parks and other public spaces were 
once Palestinian villages.35  
Much the same sad story of disorder and destruction was repeated in Burma, Malaya, 
Cyprus, Nigeria, Sudan, and elsewhere as British colonial rule gave way to an uncertain 
independence that encouraged competing groups to pursue their share of the prize.  All 
too often this story has been divorced from the popular narrative of decolonization, 
conveniently averting any consideration of the culpability that Britain might have held 
for these terrible aftershocks of the end of the empire.  
 
 
* * * 
 
What I have argued against in this essay is an exceptionalist interpretation of British 
decolonization, one that remains surprisingly resilient in some circles.  This 
exceptionalist stance rests on two premises: the first, often assumed and unstated, is 
that the British experience of decolonization in the period after World War II was 
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unprecedented; the second, often announced with a measure of pride, is that the 
decolonization of the British Empire, unlike that of other European empires, was 
planned and peaceful.  Ronald Hyam may be the most prominent current proponent of 
this view.  A related version of this exceptionalist stance has been advanced by Niall 
Ferguson, who argues that the British Empire “was dismantled not because it had 
oppressed subject peoples for centuries, but because it took up arms for just a few years 
against far more oppressive empires.”36  While Ferguson is certainly right to see the 
war as a struggle between empires and its outcome as undermining British imperial 
power, his rendering of the reason decolonization took place suggests that the British 
relinquished their empire to save the world.   In fact, the British not only had no 
intention of sacrificing their empire in this global struggle, but after it ended they clung 
to their colonies with a ruthless determination that carried terrible costs for all 
concerned. 
Disorder, then, was an integral feature of European decolonization after World War II, 
not least in the British imperial realm.  It was derived in the first instance from the 
global wars that so often precipitated decolonization by disrupting the imperial status 
quo and opening the door to alternative political configurations.  As agents of change, 
wars obviously are destructive and destabilizing, and they certainly were so when it 
came to creating the contexts for decolonization.  In the second instance, disorder 
derived from the fact that nation-states were not the inevitable result of imperial 
collapse.  Other options existed, including the absorption of colonies into new empires, 
their consolidation into other corporate polities, such as federations or commonwealths, 
and their fragmentation into unstable, often mutually antagonistic polities.  Each of 
these alternatives had their proponents, and it often required a violent struggle to 
determine which would win out.  And, in the third and final instance, the triumph of 
the nation-state was itself an impetus for disorder.  Invariably its creation required 
confronting that crucial, troubling question: whose nation?  For all those who won the 
rights and privileges of statehood, countless others were made stateless or second-class 
citizens.  As new nations fixed their political and ethnic and moral boundaries, those 
who had sought different boundaries and different definitions of inclusion either 
became oppressed minorities or refugees.  Ethnic cleansing and forced diasporas were 
as integral as national self-determination to the creation of new nation-states.  We can 
celebrate the end of empires, but we should not romanticize the ways they ended or 
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what they left behind.  Nor should we assume that national liberation was in any way 
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Kenneth Pomeranz’s book has had a significant impact in comparative global history. 
When scholars before him had looked for contrasts in economic aspects of Europe 
(represented by Britain) and Asia (represented by China or India), Pomeranz looked for 
similarities. The similarities he did find, and he made an argument based on them that 
was so counterintuitive but also attractive. According to him, Western Europe, China, 
and Japan were few candidates for a dramatic shift in economic possibilities based on 
relatively high levels of capital accumulation, demographic patterns checked by unique 
control mechanisms, and the existence of some kinds of markets. Neither these factors 
nor technological differences, however, can explain why that shift exactly happened in 
Europe. He admits that Europe had some distinct institutional bases that promoted 
both capitalism and consumerism but argues that they could not point a way out of 
early modern economic constraints:  land, resources, etc. That explanation is to be 
found in intercontinental connections.  The New World provided Europe with ghost 
acreage, and Europe’s often violent relations with other continents helped Europe, as 
the world’s first “modern” core, acquire needed resources from the world’s first “modern” 
periphery. Then, China and Europe were on a similar path leading to Malthusian trap 
and Smithian limitations until a series of sharp discontinuities diverged their paths. 
The Industrial Revolution was accidental and represented something of a discontinuity.  
Pomeranz’s book and its reception prove that the Industrial Revolution is not a dead 
horse quite yet, and Robert C. Allen’s recent book on the topic is yet another testament 
to the scholarly interest in the Industrial Revolution. While Allen does not address 
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Pomeranz directly, one can make obvious comparisons between the two and see how this 
new work updates the literature we have on the Industrial Revolution. First, unlike 
Pomeranz’s view, Allen’s view on this historical phenomenon is that it was more 
contingent than accidental. From a historian’s perspective, this perspective is almost 
inherently more attractive, for it explains both the beginning and the end of a historical 
phenomenon we know as the Industrial Revolution. Not only that, Allen incorporates 
many works that have looked at the Industrial Revolution as an incremental, longue 
durée historical process by taking seriously the entire “lifespan” of the Industrial 
Revolution.  Second, Allen’s focus is more narrow and wider at once. His narrow focus 
on technological aspects of the Industrial Revolution is complemented by his 
incorporation of the demand side of the story in addition to the supply side.  
So how does Allen explain the Industrial Revolution? He does it in three steps. First, 
he analyzes Britain’s pre-industrial economy, putting emphasis on high wage and cheap 
energy. His comparison across Eurasia shows the English worker to have enjoyed high 
wages in four senses: at the exchange rate, relative to the cost of consumer goods, 
relative to the price of capital, and relative to the price of energy. Life of the English 
worker, in turn, was positively influenced by this high wage economy in the following 
ways: quantity and quality of food, physical well-being, consumer revolution, education 
and learning. On energy, Allen first looks at Nef ’s “timber crisis” theory and admits that 
it is valid to a point. He argues, however, that coal could not have been activated as a 
backstop technology had Britain not achieved the level of urbanization and economic 
success it did. Here again, the supply side alone cannot explain the accelerating use of 
coal and its cheapness in pre-industrial Britain. A British urban household had to 
“learn” to heat a house with coal, and that was a long-term process.  
Then Allen explorers the birth and youth of the great inventions that substituted 
capital and energy for labor. Because these inventions responded to the British needs 
specifically, they were only useful in Britain and nowhere else. Obviously, demand alone 
could not have resulted in these breakthroughs. High rates of literacy and numeracy 
resulting from high wages supplied Britain with human assets for these developments. 
Allen refers to this stage of the Industrial Revolution as macro-invention or 
“inspiration” phase, following Edison’s statement on the act of invention (1% of 
inspiration and 99% of perspiration). Even though these macro-inventions involved 
leaps of imagination and scientific discovery, decades and sometimes even more than a 
century of research and development were required to make these technologies more 
neutral in their utility. Looking at three great inventions of the Industrial Revolutions, 
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Allen concludes that Abraham Darby I’s achievement in coke smelting (1700s), 
Newcomen’s steam engine (1712), other macro-inventions to coke iron (1720-55), 
Hargreaves’s spinning jenny (1764), Richard Arkwright’s inventions (1760s-1770s), 
were useful in Britain and nowhere else. The late adoption of these technologies in 
countries like France, America, and India were not due to their cultural or intellectual 
backwardness. Rather, local circumstances simply did not render the use of these 
technologies cost-efficient just yet. 
Allen then moves on to the maturation of these technologies: micro-invention or 
“perspiration” phase. For the steam engine, it took a century and half of improvement: 
James Watt’s separate condenser (1769), Arthur Woolf ’s combination of compounding 
with high-pressure steam (1813), etc. By 1830, the falling cost of power had eliminated 
Britain’s advantage, and thus the steam engine was diffused across the economy and 
the globe in the next four decades. For the production of cotton, improvements in the 
machines used and Samuel Crompton’s invention of the mule (1780) gradually made the 
technology more neutrally effective. Here, the international context was crucial in that 
it was the reason that the British industry grew so large, so fast after its mechanization. 
Coke smelting, even after half a century of macro-inventions, had to wait a century of 
micro-inventions before it could be diffused worldwide. In an ironic turn of events, 
research and development made in Britain eliminated Britain’s edge over its 
competitors and brought an end to the Industrial Revolution.  
Allen’s work has huge implications for comparative global economic history. His 
three-stage analysis strikes me as something that can be applied to studies of many 
other regional economies. For example, Pomeranz’s work might have looked much 
different had Pomeranz not stopped at the analysis of pre-industrial economy and 
looked further to the birth and growth of industrial economy across Eurasia. His 
obsession with “origins” of the divergence, rather than the process of the divergence 
itself, makes his account ahistorical in more than one way. More broadly, Allen’s work 
provides a good point of departure for analyzing diffusion of technologies and ideas in 
general. For example, scholars have taken considerable pains to explain the 
“divergence” of Japan and China in the second half of the twentieth century. They have 
mostly looked at factors unique to Japan and lacking in China as possible explanations 
for the “failure” of the Self-strengthening Movement and the “success” of Meiji Japan. 
This search again was driven by obsession with the origins: Why did the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-95 turn out to be so one-sided? Allen’s work suggests, however, that a part 
of the answer might lie in micro-inventions that were neutral technical improvements 
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inspired from local learning. Much has been made of Japan’s successful adoption of 
railroads and other aspects of industrialization and China’s failed attempts to purchase 
and produce Western weapons and other heavy machineries. We might learn much 
more from looking at how this divergence exactly manifested in the process of 
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As with the recent global historians, the author pays attention to European 
‘divergence.’ However, its standpoint and case study greatly differ from previous 
scholars. He analyzed the case of the Indian subcontinent while China and England 
were mainly the subjects of comparative researches so far.  
The introductory part suggests an assumption that there were the plural paths of 
development all over the world until the 19th century. As the means of justifying it, 
different criterion are adopted in comparing economy, society and politics of the 
subcontinent with those of Western Europe, the Ottoman Empire, China, and Japan: 
needs, pressures, and the ‘context’ of each society. 
In chapter 2, the author claims that India was the core of world economic order 
during the 17th-18th century in terms of cotton textile production and trade. Also, along 
with chapter 3, India during that time had shared political and economic institutions, 
the standards of living and income, common to Western Europe. At least, there was 
neither superiority of the one to the other nor uniqueness in the ‘context.’ Rather, India 
was economically superior to Western Europe due to cotton textiles consumed and 
demanded in Europe, Middle East, West and East Africa, and Southeast Asia.  
While identifying that product as a ‘pressure’ or a global challenge, chapter 4 makes 
clear English response to it. The author criticized previous historians who have traced 
technical innovation or mechanization from the context of European internal demand 
and supply. Instead of it, it is claimed that the inventors of spinning machines aimed at 
the improvement of yarn’s quality, which had been caused by the competition with 
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Indian cotton textiles. 
Additionally, contemporary France’s and the Ottoman Empire’s response to the cotton 
textiles are compared with English one in chapter 5. Here is the author’s focus on the 
role of state in the different paths of economic development. Both England and France 
developed ‘protectionism’ as a state policy whereas the Ottoman Empire’s policy was 
so-called ‘provisionism.’ England reduced a tax on Indian white textures while 
regulating its domestic consumption of Indian cotton textiles, and importing them only 
for overseas markets, especially in West Africa. England was also able to take 
advantage of such commercial network across the Atlantic Ocean. Meanwhile, France 
thoroughly practiced ‘protectionism’ whereby domestic manufactures were prevented 
from import substitution industrialization. According to the writing, such states’ 
interventions with economy, independent of market economy which Adam Smith and 
other scholars have described, was crucial in the ‘divergence.’  
Another pressure, which Kenneth Pomeranz and other scholars have mentioned, is 
evaluated in chapter 6: deforestation and coal, namely the problems of ecological system 
and energy resources. According to it, both crisis of deforestation and easy access to coal 
had existed in China as well as England. The author’s emphasis is laid on evidence that 
in England, there were state policies of coal trade - regulation on coal price, the 
protection of coal trade through navy, and customs to coal exports used in London - since 
the 18th century. At the same time, imposing tax to imported Swedish irons supported 
iron manufacturing in England. Consequently, at the end of the 18th century, ‘new 
energy complex’ consisting of coal, cotton textile, and iron or steam engine industries, 
was emergent in England. In contrast, China’s state was in the shortage of policies for 
coal and iron industries. Instead of it, the state was concerned with population growth 
and a lack of grain. However, it brought about more deforestation through expanding 
cultivated land, consequently failed to deal with energy and ecological pressures. The 
use of coal in China did not sufficiently operate as a state’s response to such needs. In 
this chapter, Japanese response to deforestation is referred to as a successful case, 
different from English policies. Meanwhile, the Indian subcontinent had never 
experienced the same crisis of deforestation. Also, there was not competition with 
external iron manufacturing. Since such ecological pressure did not exist, any responses 
of Indian states were never necessary during the 18th century.  
Chapter 7 reconsiders another aspect of Europe’s exceptionalism leading to the 
‘divergence’: ‘science culture.’ Through a term ‘mindful hand,’ which indicates the 
mutual development of and inter-relation between pre-modern knowledge and skill, the 
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author attempted to exemplify that India and Europe had followed the same path in 
some terms: the interest of both states and intellectuals in knowledge, the political, 
military and economic application of scientific knowledge, the interest of even artisans 
in scientific or skillful knowledge. Thanks to the ‘science culture’ in India until the 18th 
century, as chapter 8 shows, the further technical development in and the transference 
of European technique into the subcontinent were astonishingly successful in the first 
half of the 19th century. 
In chapter 8, the author attributes the failure of Indian industrialization to the lack of 
state policy, compared with the cases of 19th century France, Germany and Belgium. In 
India, the rule of the East Indian Company (EIC), by which public sectors such as 
education were not invested and Indian exports to England was highly taxed, had 





The author puts emphasis on the role of state in both Europe and Asia, not market 
economy. The unique viewpoint would inspire its readers to discuss further on the 
influence of state policy. For example, chapter 4 mentions the aim of spinning machines’ 
inventors through the analysis of primary sources on the Society for the Encouragement 
of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce in London.  At the same time, we need to further 
think of whether English state’s policy, represented by ‘protectionism,’ reflected the 
claims of and pressures for such economic organization intentionally or not. Also, it is 
doubtful that the author regards state intervention in England and France as 
‘self-conscious actions to protect and expand the national economy’ (P. 144). How 
effective is the protection of ‘national’ economy, if any? More importantly, we should not 
forget the initiatives of local people and industries outside the scope of state policy. 
Indeed, although chapter 6 mentions a little, Midlands, Lancashire and Yorkshire had 
formed ‘new energy complex’ out of London to Northeast England where taxation on 
coal was carried out. In the case of India during the mid-19th century mentioned in 
chapter 8, the author seems to exaggerate the influence of colonial state and colonialism 
upon Indian economic development. Certainly, EIC and British rule were important 
factors. However, EIC’s and the British Empire’s impact would not be thorough, rather 
restrictive. There could have been a certain opportunities for local elites, nobles and 
artisans to develop local industry. Had local industry in the sub-continent been so 
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fragile and dependent on state support? We cannot neglect a possibility that Indian 
industry since the 19th century, even if its scale and efficiency were shrunk, survived 
without previous states’ effort to promote skills and industries. Likewise, the succession 
of skills and knowledge, namely education, would not easily disappear even if texts were 
scattered and lost throughout the subcontinent since the beginning of the 19th century. 
Thus, further consideration should be taken about local initiatives in order to analyze 
the importance and commitment of state policy to market economy and industries. 
Another merit of this book is the criteria for comparative research. The criteria 
depend on the ‘context’ of each region’s society, economy and politics, a variety of 
pressures and response to them. According to the author’s criteria, England had 
recognized economic (competition with Indian cotton textiles) and ecological or energy 
(deforestation) pressures. As a result, those pressures were overcome through the use of 
coal and state ‘protectionism’ in favor of iron and cotton industries. China (Ming and 
Ch’ing) experienced the same pressures as England. However, its response was different 
from the latter’s and insufficient especially in dealing with deforestation. Meanwhile, 
any responses and breakthroughs had not been necessary for the Indian sub-continent 
until the 19th century, because its society had never been confronted with such 
pressures. Thus, the greatest common factors allow the author to accomplish a globally 
comparative research. In contrast, previous scholars on ‘divergence’ have mainly 
compared Western Europe (England) with China (Ming and Ch’ing); therefore, they are 
simply inter-national or inter-regional comparison, not global. In this sense, the author 
broadens more room for global comparison, by including India, the Ottoman Empire, 
the other European states and Japan. This technique could be applicable to any area 
studies. 
For example, the ‘provisionism’ of the Ottoman Empire is suggestive even though it 
was not investigated enough in this book. Because of its policy, according to the author, 
it had never driven for the protection and promotion of domestic industries during the 
17th-18th century. To some extent, the historians of the Ottoman Empire have a common 
in their interpretation, and have considered it as a mediator of conflicting economic 
interests within the commercial order across the Mediterranean Sea, the Middle East 
and the Indian Ocean since the Middle Ages. In particular, the historians have pointed 
out the remarkable openness of the Empire’s market under the institutions of 
‘capitulations.’ Indeed, the tariff rate of 3% until the end of the 18th century was much 
lower than those of mercantile European states, and even those of free trade European 
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states since the 19th century, which were generally 5% in trades with Asia1. To forward 
global comparison with Europe, India and China, those facts should be further analyzed 





How about cases in Sub-Saharan Africa? African environment and society, in general, 
have caused the decentralization of political or state power. Scattering population and 
richness in land led to the lack of awareness of territory, and the shortage of 
accumulated wealth through surplus agrarian products. Also, polygamy brought about 
conflicts over successors, and consequently, the weaken power base of rulers2. However, 
there were some objects for comparison in Africa during the 17th-18th century. For 
example, pre-colonial Ghana, especially the Asante ‘empire’ or Greater Asante had been 
a state where the development of market, production and differentiated labour was 
emerging. According to an African economic historian, Kwame Arhin, more actual 
pressures for Asante’s rulers seem to have been the drain of gold through linkage to 
external or international trade. As a policy, in Asante, cowrie and gold as moneys were 
used in different areas separately: the former was a money for slave markets with the 
coastal area, and for trade in the border areas of savannah and tropical forest while the 
latter was used only in its domestic markets whose centre was Kumasi. Arhin 
maintains that ‘Locating the termini of the regional long-distance trade away from 
central Asante was also consistent with the Asante state policy of discouraging 
commercialism in favor of militarism’ 3 . In pre-colonial Asante, trading whereby 
economic wealth was accumulated had been the privilege of office holders such as 
Asantehene (paramount chief of Greater Asante) and subordinate chiefs. Indeed, 
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international trade in southern and northern border areas was regulated strictly by the 
heavy taxation upon the exports of gold, slave and ivory, and the monetary system of 
cowrie and gold. While its rulers gained weaponry in exchange for slaves by the 
beginning of the 19th century and gold since the 19th century, they were concerned with 
the disintegration of their own social status whose symbol was gold and accumulated 
economic wealth acquired by commerce and trade4. When we take account of this book’s 
criterion, international trade represented by slave trade should be regarded as 
pressures or needs for state rulers. Those standpoints should be investigated further in 
the cases of pre-colonial Africa. At least, the example of Greater Asante provides us with 
a trigger to consider the substance of state (rulers) and the significance of state policy 
for economy, politics and social life.  
Thus, this book demonstrates the great potential of comparative research within 
global history studies. In this sense, the core arguments of this book should be more 
carefully considered or applied not only by European or Indian but also other historians 
in the world. 
                                                   
4 Arhin, Kwame, ‘A Note on the Asante Akonkofo: A Non-Literate Sub-Elite, 1900-1930,’ 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol.56, no.1, 1986, pp. 25-31. 
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Catherine Hall, Macaulay and Son: Architects of Imperial Britain 






This outstanding book reassesses the life and work of the antislavery activist Zachary 
Macaulay (1768-1838) and his son, the Whig historian Thomas Babington Macaulay 
(1800-1859). Its author is no mere biographer. As a leading scholar of imperial Britain, 
Catherine Hall uses these two lives as ‘lenses through which to explore the key themes 
of home, nation, empire and history writing’ (xxi). The subtitle gives us a sense of the 
book’s ambition. This is a major work, but it is also thoroughly readable and accessible. 
Each chapter is perfectly crafted and proportioned, illustrated with apt quotations and 
written with consummate skill. It should be read by anyone with an interest in British 
history and historiography.  
First and foremost, this is a study of imperialism. Hall tells us that she began to work 
on the book in the wake of the 9/11, when Tony Blair joined with President Bush to fight 
‘the war on terror’, and historians like Niall Ferguson resurrected the discourse of 
liberal imperialism. Hall feared that ‘Moral rectitude was masking new geo-political 
claims. Britain’s shameful colonial history in Iraq, and subsequently in Afghanistan, 
seemed to be entirely forgotten’ (xiii). Thus this book is a tract for the times. It insists 
that we remember past ‘civilising missions’, and learn the perils of imperialism. 
Macaulay and Son can be read as the antidote to Ferguson’s Empire: How Britain Made 
the Modern World (2004). Of course, that book came with its own TV series, and was a 
bestseller. Hall’s work will mainly be read by academics and students, though one hopes 
it will also reach a general readership. Whereas Ferguson enjoys provoking outrage 
among his fellow academics, Hall is closer to current orthodoxy in the field of imperial 
studies. Although she displays some sympathy for Zachary Macaulay’s indefatigable 
abolitionism, she is more critical of him than his other recent biographer, Iain Whyte, 
for whom he is ‘The Steadfast Scot in the British Anti-Slavery Movement’. Ideally, the 
                                                   
 University of Leicester 
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two studies should be read alongside each other. 
The focus throughout is on the hierarchical character of British imperialism.  Both 
Macaulays were convinced of the superiority of British civilisation. Profoundly 
influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment’s stadial view of history, they believed that 
colonisation would enable backward cultures to catch up with advanced imperial 
nations. The Macaulays lived before the rise of scientific racism, and neither believed 
that other races were biologically inferior and so incapable of civilisation. Yet Hall finds 
both guilty of cultural racism. Even Zachary, with his passionate conviction that God 
had created all humans in his own image, had a tense relationship with the black 
settlers in Sierra Leone.  As a sober Anglican, he was disturbed by what he took to be 
the irrational and primitive fervour of black Methodists and Baptists. Exercising an 
‘authoritarian paternalism’, he was more comfortable with the kneeling and submissive 
Africans depicted in abolitionist iconography than with uppity black settlers. Thomas 
Babington Macaulay was also patronising towards the Gaelic Irish, the Indians and 
aboriginal peoples. British culture, education and civilisation could enable these subject 
peoples to rise through stages of development, but as an administrator or an historian 
he could be contemptuous of their present state.  
But Hall is also alert to the differences between father and son. Both were ‘architects 
of imperial Britain’, but whereas Zachary was a close friend of William Wilberforce and 
an earnest Evangelical Christian, his son left Evangelicalism behind (like other 
children of the Wilberforce circle). Zachary wanted a Christian and humanitarian 
empire, and (though Hall doesn’t quite put it this way), this introduced a critical 
ambiguity into his thinking. Ideally, the interests of God and Caesar – the empire of 
Christ and the empire of Britain – would be in alignment.  But on the issue of slavery, 
Zachary believed that Britain was at odds with the will of God. If the nation was to 
regain the favour of Heaven, it must abolish first its slave trade and then its colonial 
slavery. The younger Macaulay, by contrast, was sceptical about traditional Christian 
doctrine and allergic to expressions of piety. As a result, he did not struggle with any 
sense of dual allegiance to God and Ceasar. His devotion was to Britain and its empire. 
Although he supported abolition (partly in deference to his father), he had little time for 
sentimental philanthropists. Unlike his father, he called Africans by the derogatory 
term ‘niggers’. He could praise Cromwell’s suppression of the Irish and advocate similar 
measures in the wake of the Indian mutiny. In general, Hall treats him with less 
sympathy than his father.  
Where she is particularly sensitive is in probing gender relations and the influence of 
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family. The Evangelicals who gathered around Wilberforce were determined to set a fine 
example of godly family life and Christian manhood, something explored in Anne Stott’s 
recent book, Wilberforce: Family and Friends (2012). They helped to shape Victorian 
family values and new ideals of Christian manliness that challenged less domesticated 
conceptions of masculinity. Hall shows how Zachary and his wife Selina created a 
closely knit family, while preserving firm distinctions between the private female sphere 
and the public world of men. Zachary was a firm patriarch, and his relationship with 
Tom was formal rather than warm. The boy bonded much more closely with two of his 
sisters and was devastated when one died and the other married. He remained celibate 
throughout his life and Hall suggests that he found solace in the world of books and 
papers, a world that was more easily managed than family relationships. While some of 
this is speculative, the analysis is highly plausible and avoids the pitfalls of crude 
psycho-history. Hall shows how particular notions of gender continued to shape 
Macaulay’s perceptions of politics, empire and other cultures. 
Last but by no means least, this is a book about historiography. The final chapter is a 
magisterial account of the younger Macaulay’s greatest achievement, his multi-volume 
History of England (1848-1855). For Hall this was ‘an iconic nationalist history’ (xvi), a 
work designed and destined to shape the way the English thought about themselves 
and about the peoples they ruled. It described English history as a story of progress 
from barbarism to civilisation. Macaulay celebrated Britain’s ‘preserving revolution’ of 
1688, comparing it to the great political reforms of 1828-34 and contrasting it with the 
kind of ‘destroying revolution’ that shook Europe in 1789 and again in 1848. He ignored 
the darkest element of England’s story – the transatlantic slave trade which his father 
had laboured so hard to destroy. Instead, he accented the positive. His England was 
liberal, secular, enlightened and sure of itself. And it was this vision that he hoped to 
instil in his readers.  
Hall’s book, then, works as a critique of Whig history as well as liberal imperialism. 
Yet for all that, Macaulay and Son is Whiggish in its own way.  The Introduction 
explains how three waves of scholarship reshaped Western historiography in the second 
half of the twentieth century. First, Marxist historians ‘rejected the whig story of 
peaceful progress and reform’, and put class struggle into the picture. Second, feminist 
historians challenged ‘the primacy of class’ in the Marxian account, and asserted ‘the 
centrality of gender, sexuality and reproduction to social and political formations’. 
Finally, the realities of immigration and the end of empire led historians to realise the 
importance of race and ethnicity in the construction of identities. Hall has brilliantly 
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brought these three themes – class, gender, ethnicity – to bear on the ‘architects of 
imperial Britain’ with striking results. But in the process, does she construct a new 
whig history, a tale of stadial progress and historiographical enlightenment? Macaulay 
and son are chided for being unenlightened on class, gender and race, just as they 
themselves chided ‘backward’ peoples. Hall’s history, like Thomas Babington Macaulay’s, 
is emphatically progressivist, with the liberal Left becoming ever more inclusive thanks 
to the contributions of Marxism, feminism and post-colonialism. By contrast, 
nineteenth-century liberals were paternalist and hierarchical: ‘Even the most 
progressive Englishmen and women tended to assume that their ways of life should be 
copied by colonial subjects’ (xiv); they ‘assumed that they themselves occupied a more 
civilised, and by definition much better, society than the dark others they increasingly 
encountered’ (19). But could not such statements be applied with equal validity to 
liberal Britons in the twenty-first century, who have little doubt that their own 
conceptions of gender and sexuality are ‘by definition much better’ than those of 
Nigerian Anglicans or conservative Muslims? Then and now, progressive politics entails 
a sense of cultural superiority towards those who are lagging behind.  
Instead of finishing on this irony, however, we should leave the last word to the author, 
who highlights the many ironies of the Macaulay’s own liberal imperialism: 
 
‘A nation founded on gender, class and ethnic inclusions and exclusions; an empire of 
virtue yet with authoritarian rule at its heart; a universal family of man yet an 
assumption of cultural and racial hierarchies; a certainty that Western women’s status 
was an index of levels of development yet a blindness to the culture of strangers; an 
insistence that all British subjects had the right to the rule of law yet some had more right 
to it than others; a conviction that civilisation was worth waiting for yet some would wait 
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